PAÑCĀMṚATM

SHRI LALABAHADUR SHASTRI RASTRIYA SANSKRTA VIDYAPEETHA

DELHI

आशुतोष अवस्थी
अध्यक्ष
श्री नारायणेश्वर वेद वेदाङ्ग समिति (उ.प्र.)

Śāradīya Jñāna Mahotsava-3

PAÑCĀMRTAM

पञ्चामृतम्

FORWORD

by

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शारदीयज्ञानमहोत्सव-व्याख्यानमालायाः

तृतीयं पुष्पम्

पञ्चामृतम्

प्रस्तावनालेखकः

डा० आदित्यनाथ झा

उपराज्यपालः

दिल्ली

प्रधान सम्पादकः

डा० मण्डनमिश्रः

निदेशकः

श्रीलालबहादुरशास्त्री-राष्ट्रिय-संस्कृतविद्यापीठम्

दिल्ली

विक्रमाब्द : २०२४

INDEX

FORWARD

Sanskrit is a very rich language with a iarge number of roots and primary and secondary derivatives. Because of this, it is easy to express accurately any idea in this tongue. Indeed our administrative and technical terms can be best derived from Sanskrit. Before the integration of the princely states into the Indian Union there was at least one state, the state of Baroda, which successfully used Sanskrit words for administrative purposes.

2. The need for a knowledge of the classics has been recognised by modern educationists in the West, inspite of the emphasis laid there on science and social studies. The great mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead took great pains to plead for classical education in one of the chapters of his book, 'The Aims of Education'. The Radhakrishnan Commission on University Education in India quotes the following words from the book, 'The Classical Tradition'.

"The difference between an educated man and an uneducated man is that the uneducated man lives only for the moment, reading his newspaper and watching the latest moving picture, while the educated man lives in a far wider present, that vital eternity in which the psalms of David and the plays of Shakespeare, the epistles of Paul and dialogues of Plato, speak with the same charm and power that made them immortal the instant that they were written."

The Commission adds, "Ptolemy may be superseded by Copernicus, but not Sophocles by Shakespear, nor Kalidasa by Goethe. Their works represent a complete and absolute vision. Literary geniuses do not correct one another as scientists do but give us alternative insights from new perspectives."

The importance of education in the Sanskrit classics for Indian students is made clear by the Commission in these words, "The Sanskrit language contains works which are priceless possessions of humanity and it will always have a place in a scheme of humanistic culture." The Commission quotes with approval the view of Dr. S.K. Belvalkar of Poona that 'next to one's own mother tongue which every one inevitably learns by Nature's method, the first language, the study of which ought to be academically pursued, is and ought to be Sanskrit, the language of India's culture and traditions."

It is heartening to note that at long last it has been made cleai that the three-languages formula will not result in ousting sanskrit. For it is very necessary that our educated men and women should have some knowledge of Sanskrit for understanding and using their own mother-tongues properly. The literature written in these modern languages also demands a knowledge of Sanskrit for fully understanding their forms and content. It is our national duty to know a number of Indian languages and for this a knowledge of Sanskrit from which most of the languages derive their origin will be of inestimable help.

Every educated Westerner ordinarily possesses some knowledge of the history and culture of his own country. On account of a faulty educational policy which has bedevilled us for the past many years, however, this is not true of the average educated Indian. Now that we have become an independent country and political and commercial relations have been established with the rest of the world, large numbers of Indians are going to foreign countries on Government business or for trade or education. There is great inquisitiveness in the world out side about Indian life and culture. For want of adequate or any knowledge of Sanskrit our official and unofficial ambassadors cut every sorry figures before non-Indian questioners who are in some cases far better informed than these gentlemen. Is it not shameful and are we helpless to remedy this sorry state of affairs? Knowledge of Sanskrit and of the culture reflected in its literature would enable India's representatives, whether they man our embassies or go as members of cultural delegations to act as effective cultural ambassodors of our motherland.

It is the need of the hour that institutions connected with the learning of Sanskrit be encouraged and sustained with vigour. Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth is doing yeoman's service in this direction and it was in the fitness of the things that the Vidyapeeth began by inviting that great scholar, the late M.M. Sri Giridhar Sharma Chaturvedi, to speak on the Vedas. Next came the series on the Puranas, and the present book contains in it the speeches of five eminent scholars who have earned world-wide fame in their respective fields.

Dr. Nakamura is a great authority on Budhistic scriptures, and many Oriental Scholars all over the world have been desirous of listening to his discourses on his favourite subject. His exposition of the Vedantic Philosophy as revealed in Budhistic scriptures is a unique contribution to Oriental Scholarship. A look at the article will impress the reader of his deep knowledge and understanding of the Vedas, the Upanishads and Budhist scripture.

The contribution on the Rashtrakutas of Kuntala and the date of Kalidasa comes from the pen of that learned Scholar Dr. V.V. Mirashi. The date of Kalidasa has always puzzled scholars The present article is an attempt to solve that puzzle. At least it presents a new theory for the consideration of scholars.

Dr. S M. Katre of Poona has justly acquired a name both as a Sanskritist and as eminent linguist. His profound observation, 'The traditional system should be integrated with modern scientific approaches in the matter of teaching as well as learning', should be taken to heart by the modern universities as well as traditional institutes of oriental learning, for, as he says, 'by this integration alone will Sanskrit become a vital force which can make its effect felt on the everyday life of the people.'

Dr. Lutse's 'Brecht's Theatre : A new approach to the Sanskrit Drama' draws our attention to the other part of the reorientation of our Sanskritic studies. We must accept that Sanskrit is no longer the heritage of India only. We should be pleased that it is a part of the world's heritage. Oriental scholars are found all over the world and by placing Sanskrit learning in the context of their own cultures, they will surely give freshness to Sanskrit. Dr. Lutse's is a pioneer of this movement.

Prof. Nagendra is well known to us as a specialist in 'Poetics'. His book 'Rasa-Siddhanta' has justly earned the National honour for him. The present article is a fresh study of his on 'The Nature of Aesthetic Experience.'

The basic principles of India's foreign policy to-day are those laid down centuries ago by Kautilya, the author of the famous *Arthasastra*. These principles are ahimsa (non-injury), Satya (truth), Saucha (purity), Anasuya (lack of malice,) gentleness and Kshama (forgiveness for all). Kautilya adds that if these universal principles are transgressed, the resultant confusion means the destruction of the world. Should not those who have to interpret India's policies to the world know this ?

India is an active member of the United Nations Organization and is in a position to influence world opinion. We may not be among the most powerful nations, but the day must come when, if the world is not to destroy itself, the self-interest that informs the policies of many great powers will be replaced by the larger interests of humanity and the universal acceptance of the Indian philosophy of world brotherhood reflected in the Sanskrit verse :

अयं निज : परो वेति गणना लघुचेतसाम् ।
उदारचरितानां तु वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् ॥

If the pursuit of politics and economics has to give real happiness to the individual and the society, we have to think and act not for the immediate present but for the ultimate good of mankind. Our ancient writers have told us that man has four *purusharthas* or ends in life, *dharma* (duty), *artha* (material prosperity), *kama* (physical happiness and well being), and *moksha* (salvation). Knowledge of the physical world is all very good but without a knowledge of the undying self, life is without meaning. In the famous passage of the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* Yajnavalkya tells his wife Maitreyi, "atma va are drashtavyah." (The self is to be realised). After imparting knowledge of the self to Janaka, Yajnavalkya says in the same *Upanishad, Abhayam vai janaka praptosi* (Janaka, thou art now established in fearlessness). Principles underlying the Philosophy of a balanced existence have remained a perennial guiding force in India's cultural life, such teachings are found throughout Sanskrit literature. But how can we have access to these teachings without knowing this great language ?

I heartily welcome the present publication which gives us very valuable material ranging from Philosophy to poetics. I take pride that I had the honour of inaugurating this series of lectures.

January 10th, 1968 Dr. A.N. Jha

EDITORIAL

Post-Independent era so a great revival of Sanskrit learning in India by the inception of the long conceived institution Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha. It was really most fascinating that the stearer of the thought, the main organiser and the first President of the governing body of the institution was Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri. It was his earnest desire to develop the same as the International school of Indian learning where the cross-roads of cultures may meet. Looking at this long cherished hope of Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, the present Prime Minister of India took to her self to fulfil it and accepted to be its president. Under her leadership the Vidyapeeth grew in such a model institution that the government of India through its Education Ministry took over the same as an autonomous body on 1.4.67, with the desire of realising the dreams of Shastriji. Dr. Karna Singh, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, a scholar in his own right and the Minister of Civil aviation, government of India, is presently at the helm of the affairs and is the president of the Governing body of the Vidyapeeth which is composed of the persons of established reputation in Sanskrit by Education Ministry, after proper consultation with All India Sanskrit Sahitya Sammelan, the originator of the Vidyapeeth and the other dignitories of Sanskrit learning. In the memory of the services of Lt. Shri Shastriji at the instance of Shrimati Indira Gandhi, the government of India named it as Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth.

Over and above its regular functioning *i.e.* Higher studies and Research, this vidyapeeth aspires at spreading the age-old message of India breeding the tranquility of soul. It is all accepted fact that this message is written large in Sanskrit language from Vedic to modern times and it is this land-Bharat where this unique learning in all its disciplenes have grown.

"That which is ours should be yours," and "That which has the fundamental appeal to human existence should be every body's property'. It's the love's labour therefore for the Vidyapeeth and perhaps its main function to spread the Indian learning to the deep corners of the world. Two possibilities are out for Vidyapeeth to bring this in function :

(*i*) To keep its courtyards of studies open to foreigners and

(*ii*) to publish the treasured material of Sanskrit in various languages of the world. The Vidyapeeth aims at both these

programmes but the first being no easy task have started with the second.

Autumn is an auspicious season in India. The sky is clear. It's blue comes forth. The earth is beautifully green and equally prosporous. It is abundant in beauty. And India through ages therefore have worshipped eternally that greatness which breeds power (Mahakali), prosperity (Mahalakshmi) and learning (Maha-saraswati) in this season. Vidyapeeth true to this tradition and true to its ideals, started the worship of learning and a lecture series of a very highly creative and research was modelled out and it was called sharadiya Jnan Mahotsava (Autumn Lectures). It was inaugurated in 1964 with the consideration that the series should be published in Sanskrit, in Hindi and also in English for the International audience.

It was definitely a matter of great joy for Vidyapeeth that it could chase out the celebrated old Sanskrit Pandit M.M. Giridhar Sharma Chaturvedi who had by that time earned a great name in the nation. His subject was 'Veda', The Late Shri Madhusudan Oza-a freak-a giant among Vedic interpreters had always been original in his interpretations. His tremendous researches is always a study of abounding interest. M.M. Chaturvedi explained some of these interpretations in first Lecture series which when published, received a great applaud. Shri P.B. Gajendra Gadkar, the then chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India and Presently Vice-Chancellor of Bombay University was quite happy over this programme and in his inaugural address he correctly interpreted the sentiments behind it :

"I have no doubt that these lectures will furnish valuable material to oriental scholars and will be highly appreciated by all of them...."

..."I wish to pay tribute to the Vidyapeeth and all the teachers who are actively associated with it. By its varied educational and cultural activities, the Vidyapeeth is steadily and consistantly endeavouring to encourage the study of ancient Sanskrit Literature which has an imperishable value for us and is thereby guiding properly the movement of Indian cultural reanaissance in appropriate, rational and scientific way".

Shri Gajendra Gadkar himself presented the first Volume of the series to the then Prime Minister of India Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri who simply thrilled with joy to see a part of his dream realised.

The second lecture series was 'Puranic Studies' given by Prof. Shri Badrinath Shukla of Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya—the oldest seat of Sanskrit studies. Lt. Governor of Delhi Shri A.N. Jha Vidyavachaspati—the promulgator of our culture in the country inaugurated the same. The present publication is the third lecture series. It has its own importance because it was given at the time of the Golden Jubilee celebrations of all India Sanskrit sahitya sammelan—the oldest Sanskrit institution of India. Naturally the audience consisted of more than 1500 orientalists of India and abroad.

Actually the speakers this time were of no less eminence then Dr. Nakamura, Vidyavachaspati of Tokyo University, Japan, Dr. Lutse of Germany, presently residing in India and the Indian scholars like M.M. Dr. V.V. Mirashi, the celebrated scholar of Kalidas, Dr. S.M. Katre, the internationally recognised linguist and Dr. Nagendra, the master of the science of Indian poetics.

The series has got the further significance by Dr. A.N. Jha's inauguration by a classical lecture on Sanskrit learning and Dr. Nagendra's (convener of the series) introduction.

I as the Chief Editor of the lecture-series offer my humble thanks to Dr. Nakamura, Dr. Lutse, Dr. V.V. Mirashi, Dr. S.M. Katre and Dr. Nagendra who by their acceptance made the series successful and this publication possible. In what words should I thank Dr. A.N. Jha ! He is one of the moulders of the present form of the Vidyapeeth and he has always remained one with the Vidyapeeth in its crisis. His generous mind which takes this as his own duty, would not like any recognition and therefore I keep mum. I simply mention the fact that his preface to this publication is simply one of the glaring examples to his services towards sanskrit.

Thanks are due to the Research and publication committee of Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth which is comprised of brillient scholars like Dr. Ram Dhari Sinh 'Dinkar', the celebrated poet of India, Dr. Rasik Vihari Joshi of the University of Delhi, M.M. Parameshwaranand Shastri and Shri Rajendra Dwivedi.

The book is entitled 'Panchamritam. Vidya is considered Amrit (Nector) in our Country. These studies of various branches of orient by the scholars who have spent their lives in Vidya justify the tittle.

Dr. Madan Mishra

Vasanta Panchami,
3rd, February, 1968.

THE VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY AS WAS REVEALED IN BUDDHIST SCRIPTURES

Dr. Hazime Nākāmurā
Tokyo-University, Japan.

THE VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY AS WAS REVEALED IN BUDDHIST SCRIPTURES

Sect-1. Introduction

AMONG the currents of orthodox Indian thought which admit the authority of the Vedic sacred canon, the greatest philosophical school is probably the Vedānta. And the most valiant among the unorthodox thought which rivalled it, is Buddhism. Both of them are collosal monuments, soring highest and towering over one another, in the noetic history of India. As for the Vedānta philosophy within them, despite the fact that the source of its ideas can be found in the pre-Buddhistic early Upaniṣads, the development of its animated activity as an independent school belongs to comparatively late centuries, and was later than the peak, flourishing period of Buddhism. And conversely, as I shall discuss in detail later, some of the systems within the Vedānta school have been greatly influenced by Buddhiṣm, and Buddhist thought has eaten into its very pith. Opposing this, however, those on the Buddhist side did not regard the Vedānta school as so important. The Buddhists collectively called the men who did not believe in Buddhism the "outsiders" (tirthika); but it seems that the Vedānta school may not have possessed much force in the so-called "outside path," and accounts related to it are extremely scarce in the large number of Buddhist works also. The schools which Buddhists of that time regarded as most important and criticised in their discourses are the Sāṁkhya and the Vaiśeṣika. These two schools were regarded as representative

of the "outside path,"[1] Despite the fact that the writings of India, except for the Buddhist Canon, were not translated into Chinese as a rule, because the *Sāṁkhya-Kārikās* was translated by Paramārtha, and the *Vaiśesika-daśa-padārtha-śāstra* by Hsüan Tsang, these two schools later came to draw the attention of scholars in particularly in China and in Japan. At variance with this fact, however, the school-name "Vedānta school" is hardly mentioned at all in the Chinese translation of the Buddhist Canon.[2] The situation is such that no matter how much one may search in the voluminous Chinese-translated Buddhist Canon, his efforts will result in disappointment.[3]

In that case, is reference to the Buddhist Canon for research on the Vedānta school completely meaningless? By no means, for the fact is just the exact opposite. First of all, on the *negative side*, although the Chinese-translated Buddhist Canon has, to such extent, copiously introduced the names of schools and criticised a great number of "outside paths," the fact, nevertheless, that they do not cite in the slightest the name "Vedānta school," contains an important problem which researchers should carefully consider. I shall

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1. "The Sāṁkhya and the Vaiśeṣika are schools of the outside path. The Sthavira-sāṁghika forms the foundation of the sects." *Chung-lun-su*, Vol. 9 (TT. XLII. 132c). (TT.=Taisho Tripitaka)

2. In the *Chin-keng-chên-lun*, a work of later centuries handed down with the works of Aśvaghoṣa, the Mimāṁsā is mentioned as follows, but it is not clear whether it indicates only the ritualistic Māimsā, or includes the later Mimāṁsā (*Uttara Mimāṁas*), i. e., Vedantism, as well. "he, too, has false notions: he has understood the four Vedas and the Mimāṁsā together with the Sāṁkhya and the Vaiśeṣika, as well as the other theories, and has completely mastered them all; he is called a Brahmin.', (*Chin-kang-chên-lun*, TT. XXXII, 170b).

3. Sukhtankar says that explicit mention of the Vedānta school is not to be found in the Buddhist Canon (*WKM* , 1908, p. 129).

discuss this problem later. On the *positive side*, also, the Buddhist Canon, moreover, has an important significance :

1. First, if one were to clarify, by a survey and study of the passages which seem to have a relation to Buddhist thought, the attitude towards Buddhism of their authors, the existence or non-existence of the influence of Buddhist thought, and the sphere of that influence, whenever he reads the works of the scholars of the early Vedānta school or the statements handed down as fragments, not only could he establish the intellectual position of each of the scholars, but he could sometimes also determine their approximate dates. And if he persisted, he could contribute to tracing out the development of early Vedānta thought. Again, some dates, such as those of Bhartṛhari.[4] have become clear for the first time by the accounts in *The Records of the Buddhist Religion* by I-tsing, while scholars, no matter who they may be, had formerly been aware indeed of the necessity to clarify, in order to study the history of Vedānta philosophy, its relation to Buddhism, it has been a very difficult job to master the literature of both thought-systems which are completely different from one another, so that the task has, as yet, been hardly begun. Since it is, however, an extremely important study, for the sake of clear understanding early Vedānta thought, I would like, to the extent that I am able, to advance the investigations a step. Since it is more convenient, however, to successively examine the early Vedānta literature piece by piece. I shall refer such a study to later discussions.

2. Even though the name "Vedānta *school*" has not been cited in the Chinese-translated Buddhist Canon, the ideas of the Vedānta philosophy have frequently been mentioned. Again, in the logical works of the late-period Mahāyāna Buddhism-these have not, for the most part, been translated into Chinese—the Vedānta school (Vedānta-vādin) and the Upaniṣad school (Aupaniṣads, Aupani-

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4. H. Jacobi : "On the Dates of the Philosophical sutras," in *JAOS*. XXXI. Dr. Ui : "Vedanta-kyo no Genryu oyobi Vedanta-gakuha no Seiritsu," In *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, Vol. I; this article is a study conducted upon such a conception.

ṣadika) have clearly been mentioned, and are then criticised in minute detail. If we were, accordingly, to examine such material in fine detail, we could organise a summary outline of the history of the development of early Vedānta thought by going through the sources in the Buddhist canon. As the dates of the works in the Buddhist canon are considerably better known than those of any other Indian school, the most reliable method of tracing the contours of the pre-Śaṅkara early-period Vedānta philosophy would be to form first a tentative estimate by means of the Buddhist canon. I shall treat this problem in the chapter which follows.

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Section 2 : Early Buddhism Upanişadic Thought

During the period of Early Buddhism, not only had the greater part of the Vedas been formulated, but the various branches of learning concerned with them had also been extensively pursued. Accounts of this nature can be found in great numbers in the early Buddhist Canon. Yet even in these numerous references, the Upanişads are not quoted once, and there is no mention of those branches of learning directly connected with the Upanişads. Although the Earliest Upanişads had been completed prior to Early Buddhism,[1] the fact that they were not cited in particular as Upanişads or Vedānta would seem to indicate that for the Buddhists of that time, they had not yet come to be regarded in general as having any outstanding significance as Upanişads, and were probably merely thought of as being one section of the Vedas. Consequently, even if there had been a sect which held the Upanisads above all in esteem, it would have enjoyed a very trifling existance, and could not have been looked upon as an independent school by the Buddhists, at least.

Thus, neither the Unanisads nor a Vedanta School are mentioned anywhere in the early Buddhist Canon, yet the fact is that the earliest Upanişads came into existence before early Buddhism, and somewhere in that spacious land of India, there must surely have lived some Brahmin who embraced thoughts similar to those expounded in the Upanişads and who followed the religious ideals and way of life found therein. An account can be found in the early Budhist canon of a Brahmin who led the life of a wandering priest, such as the Upanişads eulogize as the ideal. For example, it reported that a certain Brahmin, "thoroughly conversant with the *mantas* (i. e., the Vedas)." continually wandered about the country, gaining his livelihood by "picking up fallen grain and eating the fruit of trees," and earnestly desired for himself "that existence which is not existence (e. g., nothingness, *ākiñcañña*".[2] And the

1. This will be discussed on another occasion.
2. *Suttanipāta*, 976-978.

account also has been noted of another wandering, medicant brahmin who "fasted in a tomb and recited the three scriptures in the three capitals."[3] The Brahmins who thus abandoned wife and children, property, fame, all they possessed, and pursued a life of a wandering mendicant without having a definite place of residence, must have embraced a thought different in context from that of the great brahmins who received immense gifts from the wealthy and the kings whenever there was a religious festival, who gave shelter to their disciples, who lived in grand mansions, and who were accustomed to a life of opulence. Now, since the Buddhist Canon has handed down that these wandering brahmins *were conversant with the Vedas*, it would appear that while they did not set a high value on most of the Vedas, i.e.. those portions which expound on the rituals, they were particulary devoted to and followed those Upanisads which praise the itinerant life and which teach the concept of the oneness of Brahman and Ātman. Of course, the life on an itinerant priest had probably been realised prior to the formulation of the Upanisads, as may be noted from the universal sacrifice *(sarvamedha)* in which one relinquishes all possessions and dwells in seculsion in the mountains or forest, and which had been set forth also in the most ancient portion of the Vedic Canon, so that one cannot conclude that just because a brahmin was throughly versed in the Vedas and led an itinerant life, he must have necessarily been a follower of the Upanisads, It must be said, however, that such a state of peace of mind and determination of fate of the brahmin who has abandoned all material desires and pursues a life typlified by roaming clouds and flowing waters, was certainly in essential agreement with the teachings expounded in the Upanisads.

At all events, accounts of the lives of itinerant brahmins who seem to have been devoted to the Upanisads are to be found here and there throughout the early Buddhist canon; furthermore, in this connection, ideas similar to those expounded in the Upanisads are also mentioned, before they are rejected.

The doctrine that the Presiding Deity (*Issara*) is the creator

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3. *Tsa a han ching*, Chaüan 9, No. 255. TT. II. 63b.

of the world is cited in several places in the early Buddhist canon.[4] Nothing in detail has been set forth on this concept of "Presiding Deity," but it had perhaps been thought to resemble Brahma. Since "Presiding Deity" refers to the supreme deity who controls all myriad existences, it is a designation which cannot be applied to the lesser deities. Now, the Canon has made the Brahmā itself say : "I am Brahmā, am the Great Brahmā; superior in power, I have never been vanquished; I see all, control all; as the Presiding Deity (of the world), I am the chief creator (of the myriad existenes), the master of change and birth, the supreme life-giver, the governor, and the father of those already born and yet to be born." (*Aham asmi Brahmā Mahābrahmā abhibhū anabhibhuto aññadatthudaso vasavatti issaro kattā ninmātā seṭṭho sañjita vasi pitābhutā-bhavyānam.*)[5] Although expressions of similar import may be found here and there in the early scriptures, neither Śākyamuni nor his disciples orginated such a concept of Brahma; there can be doubt, however, that a section of the people of that time believed such a theory. These essential properties of Brahmā are put forth in the Ancient Upaniṣads on the Brahman as the creator or the controller of the world, and they were lumpted together with other stereotyped passages in the early Buddhist canon.[6] Furthermore, of the properties attributed to the creator-deity Brahmā, the following four are noteworthy : First of all, Brahmā has the marks (*nimitta*) of light (*āloka*) and lustre (*abhāsa*). Whenever Brahmā appears or

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4. The *Mahābodhijātaka* mentions five masters of doctrine, among whom is included "the doctrine master who holds that the Presiding Deity is the cause of the world" (*issarakāraṇvādin*) (Jātaka V. 228). Again, the theories are also cited that "everything done by man is caused by the design of the Lord" (TT.I. 435c), and that pleasure suffering, non-suffering and non-pleasure which man receives "is caused by the creation of the Presiding Deity" *Issaranimmānāhetu*, AN. I. 173).

5. DN. I. 18. Cf. MN. I. 326.327. See further Dr. Ui *Indo Tetsugakyū Kenkū*, III, 104-105.

6. Dr. Ui (*op, cit.*, pp. 142-147) has demonstrated this in detail.

comes near a particular light and lustre appear even among the other gods. Second, it is invisible. Even to the gods who dwell in the world of Brahmā, it cannot be seen. Third, it is unknowable. It is impossible to know the fundamental essence of Brahmā itself. Fourth, it is omniscient. No matter what it may be, there is nothig which is not known to Brahmā. Now, all these properties have been explained as belonging to Brahman, the world-principle in the neuter gender, add to Brahmā, the personal god, in the Ancient Upaniṣads. (on the first, of., *Chānd*. Up. III. 14.7; Kāthaka-Up. V. 15; Muṇḍaka-Up. II. 2 10; *Svet. Up*. VI. 14; *Maitri. Up*. VI. 35, 36. On the second : *Kena-Up*. I. 6; *Kāthaka-Up*. VI. 9. 12. on the third : *Kāthaka-Up*. II. 7-9; VI. 12; *Kena-Up*. I. 3; II. 3; *Muṇḍ*. Up III. 1. 8. On the fourth : *Maitri-Up*. VI. 38; VII. 1; *Muṇḍ. Up*. I. 1. 9; II. 2. 7; *Praśna-Up*. IV. 10; *Māṇḍ. Up*. VI.)

One can regard, accordingly, these concepts appearing in the Upanisads as being reflected in the Early Buddhist Canon. In the Upanisads, however, Brahman (neuter gender, Brahma in the nominative case) is largely considered as an impersonal principle; and Brahman (masculine gender, Brahma in the nominative) is thought alongside of it to be the personal god; in the Pali Canon the neuter Brahman does not appear at all,[8] but is exclusively expressed at the masculine Brahmā. One can also say. accordingly, that some differences exist in this respect; however, since there are not a few examples in the Upaniṣads in which Brahman appears at the neuter impersonal principle, and at the same time is thought of as being perhaps similar to the personal god, its particular aspects as an impersonal god had propably strongly impressed the Buddhists of that time.

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7. According to Dr. Ui. *ibid*., pp. 140-142.

8. Rhys Davids: *Dialogues of the Buddha*, II.298. Further. in the Pāli Canon, the word "Brahman," even in compound words, does not have the meaning of a neuter gender, impersonal world principle, but means only "supreme," "superior," or "purity," (Cf Yamamoto Kairyū. "Agon ni arawareta gaikyo" in the Nihon Bukkyo Kyōkai Nenpō, VIII. 270-271.)

The idea, then, which made abiding-together with such a Brahmā the ideal, was prevalent among the brahmins of one section at that time. The *Tevijja-suttanta* in the *Dīgha-nikaya* has ably reported on the state of thought of the brahmins then, and the brahmins who appear in it have regarded "union with the Brahmā (*Brahma-Sahavyatā*) as liberation, and earnestly sought after it. We see in the *Tevijja-suttanta* that the following assertion of the brahmins of that time is reported :

"Truly every brahmin thoroughly versed in the three Vedas has said thus : "We shall expound the path for the sake of union with that which we do not know and do not see. This is the correct path. This path is the truth, and leads to liberation. If one practises it, he shall be able to enter into abiding-together with Brahmā."

Te vata tevijjā brāhmaṇā evam āhaṃsu : "yaṃ na jānāma yaṃ na passāma, tassa sahavyatāya maggaṃ desema, ayam eva ujumaggo ayam añjasāyano niyyāniko niyyāti takkarassa Brahmasahavyatāyāti."[9]

Again,

"There are several brahmins (e. g.) the Addhariya brahmins, the Tittiriya brahmins, the Chandoka brahmins, and the Bavharija brahmins, who teach various paths. Do or do not all of these paths leading to release truly enable the one who acts according to each to reach the abiding-together with Brahmā ?"

Brāhmaṇā nānā-magge paṇṇapenti—Addhariyā brāhmaṇā Tittiriyā brāhmaṇā, Chandokā brāhmaṇā, Bavharijā brāhmaṇā—atho-kho sabbāni tāni niyyānikāni niyyanti takkarassa Brahma-sahavyatāya ?[10]

On this problem, the brahmin gave the answer that, "They all can attain the Brahmā-world." It can be known, accordingly, that in the period of Sākyamuni, all the above-enumerated brahmin of the Vedic branch schools had longed for liberation. It is

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9. *DN*. 1. 239.

10. On the translation of this passage, of. Yamamoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-261.

not likely that the brahmins who had entertained such thoughts regarded the rituals alone as absolute. "Abiding-together with the Brahmā," then, is frequently expouned in the Early Upaniṣads (*Bṛhad. Up.* I. 5. 23; *sāyujyaṃ salokatām jayati. Mahānār. Up.* V.3: *Gacched brahmasalokatām;* and, *Kausitaki-Up.* I). Since this Brahmā, then, is taken as "that wh ch we do not cognize and do not see," it corresponds exactly to the concept of Brahman in the Upaniṣadic sages.[11] As seen from the above passage, accordingly, that the Early Upaniṣads had probably already been formulated in Vedic sub-schools of that time can also be verified from this point. (It should be noted, however, that the sub-schools of the *Atharva Veda* are not cited.)

Besides the concept of Brahmā, other Upaniṣadic thoughts can also be seen scattered throughout the early Buddhist Canon. While it is not the case that Brahman (neuter gender) is clearly mentioned, a thought which sets up an absolute principle corresponding to it has been introduced as one of the "pernicious views" (i. e., mistaken opinions):

"O Bhikkhus ! At that time Baka, the Brahmā, produced the following pernicious view: "It is permanent. It is eternal. It is always existant. It is independent existence. It has the *dharma* of non-perishing. It truly is not born, does not become old, [does not die, does not disappear, and is not born again. Furthermore, a liberation superior to it does not exist elsewhere."

tena kho pana bhikkhave samayena Bakassa brahmano evarūpaṃ pāpakaṃ ditthigataṃ uppannaṃ hoti : idaṃ niccaṃ idaṃ dhuvaṃ idam sasstaṃ idaṃ kevalaṃ idaṃ acavanadhammaṇ, idaṃ hi na jāyati na jīyati na mīyati na cavati na upapajjati, ito ca pan' aṇṇuṃ uttariṃ-nissaranam natthiti.[12]

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11. Cf. note 9 *supra.*

12. MN. I. 326, No. 49. In the Chinese translation of the corresponding sūtra, it has become the following: "Up to this time there exists one Brahmā, who dwells above and gives brith in this way to pernicious views. Here is permanence, here is eternity, he long existence, here is the essential, here the unending dharma, here appears the essential ; this appearing essential does not transcend that which is superior, is excellent, and is the greatest." (*Fan-t'ien-ch'ing*, in *Çhung-a-haṇ-çhing*, ch. 19.)

The principle expounded here corresponds contextually to the concept of Brahman expounded in the Upaniṣads, but the Buddha is taken to have criticised such a thought: "Truly the Baka Brahmā is covered over with unwisdom *(avijjāgata)*."

Again, the thought which assume consciousness *(viññāṇa, vijñāna)* as the ultimate principle, was also prevalent at that time. In a passage which Brahmā related to the Buddha, the following is said :

"There is a consciousness which the eye does not see, which does not have boundaries, and which shines in all places. It cannot be perceived even as the earthiness of the earth, cannot be perceived even as the wateriness of the water......"

viññana idnsanam anantam sabbatopabham. tam tam paṭhaviya paṭhavattena ananubhūtām, āpassa āpattena nanubhūtam......[13]

Tha thought which holds that the absolute is "pure cognition" (consciousness, *vijñāna*) and regards it as identical with the Brahman, originally appeared already in the Early Upaniṣads.

Since the word "Vinnāna" is used with a great number of meanings in the Ancient Upaniṣads, one cannot discuss it without qualifications ; not infrequently, however, "pure cognition" or "pure wisdom" is taken to be essentially identical with the ultimate principle, Brahman.

vijnānaṃ ānandaṃ brahma—Bṛhad. Up. III. 9. 28 *vijñānam brahma ced Veda......Tait. Up.* II. 5. 1 *vijñānam brahmeti vyajānād vijnānād dhi···bhūtani jāyānte vijnānena···jivanti vijnānam prayanti ......Tait. Up.* III. 5. 1.

Again, according to the Maitri Upaniṣad VI, 7, "consciousness" manifests various activities in a dualistic confrontation, and returns to a non-dualistic and undifferentiated state, Such thought, accordingly, probably is represented here as an expression of Brahmā. Now, the scriptures have recorded that there was no

13. MN.I. 329, No. 49.

logical attack on nor refutation of this thought directly; the theory on Brahmā was finally overthrown by another method (i. e. debate using super-natural powers). Although the theoretical basis is not clearly expressed, to set up a metaphysical principle like "consciousness" was something which early Buddhists were not ready to do. As I shall explain later, this attitude was consistently held by Buddhists until later centuries.

Again, the early Buddhist Canon classsified the ātman theories of the other schools into several kinds and set up the theory of sixty-two types, but one cannot think that all these theories had actually been held by the intelligensia of that time. They represent a classificatory method constructed theoretically by Buddhist Scholars, it is notewarthy, however, since to classify the "concepts of the self" (*attapaṭilābha)* prevalent at that time into three kinds and to set up a materialistic ātman (ōaārika), a mental ātman *(manomaya)*, and a formless ātman (arūpa),[14] as is done in the Poṭṭhapāda-sutta, has some resemblance to the theory of five sheaths (kośas) in the *Taitt. Up*. II.

Further, the theory of the non- functionalists (*akriyāvādins*) who taught the real existence of the ātman, has also appeared in the Buddhist Canon ; but since it is also mentioned in the Jaina Caon, I shall discuss it in Scction II of the next chapter, of the sixty-two views expounded in the *Fan-wang-ching*, non which coincides exactly with Vedānta thought appears.

From our examination above of some of the accounts in the early Buddhist sciptures which seem to have a relation with the Upaniṣadic or Vedāntic thought, we can now derive the following conclusions. During the period which the early Buddhist Canon has preserved in writing, an independent school which could be called the Vedānta school and possessed a developed and orangised philosoph cal system, had not been formulated yet. However, the brahmins who devotedly followed the Upaniṣadic doctorines, existed here and there throughout the land ; and the Various philosophical theories of the Upaniṣads were quite widely disseminated. Consequently those intellectual trends are mentioned in the Buddhist Canon, and are rejected as pernicious views.

14. *DN*.I. 195.

Sect. III. Sectarian Buddhism and the Upaniṣads

The Buddhist community rapidly developed and expanded, receiving the protection and support of King Aśoka after he unified the greater part of India (he ascended to the throne c. 268 B.C.). Following thereupon, however, schisms began to appear within the Order, and a great number of the sects found themselves in conflicting positions with one another. In the technical treatises which came into existence during this period can be found several passages which refer to the Upaniṣads, Although some of the ideas expounded in the Upaniṣads, as I have considered in the previous section, are reflected in early Buddhist scriptures, these can only be admitted to have a vague resemblance of content; while in the Buddhist treatises of the period of sectarian antagonism, the passages found in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads are quoted in nearly the same form as they are in the original. Furthermore, the phase, "The Vedas say" is distinctly recorded in places.

The *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-ṣāstra*, the greatest work of the Sarvāstivāda, cites, in Book 200 among the 62 views concerning the existence of consciouness in a future life, as a theory of "the philosophers who consider the self to be infinite and to have idea tion after death":

"Either it exists within the heart, of about the size as the thumb being replete with brilliance and splendor. Or it exists within body, corresponding to the size and shape of the body, and is lustrous within and without."[1]

This same view has definitely been expostulated in the Upaniṣads. Corresponding to the first half of the passages, the following verse is extant :

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1. *TT*.XXVI. 999b. Further, the idea that the size of the soul corresponds to that of the body also is set forth in Book 99 *TT*.XXVII. 997c) and Book 200 (idid. 9 9b,1000c) of the *Mahavibhasa-sastra*.

"The ātman within is a person (*puruṣa)* of the size of a thumb and ever dwells within the heart of man."

(*Kāṭhaka-Up.* VI.17; *Śvet.Up.* III.13*) aṅguṣṭhamātraḥ Puruṣo ntarātmā sadā janānām hrdaya samniviṣtaḥ.)*

"The *Puruṣa* the size of the thumb is like unto brilliance and has no smoke." *Kāṭhaka-Up.* IV. 13) *aṇguṣṭhamātraḥ puruṣo jyotir ivādhūmakah*)

"That object the size of the thumb has the same aspect as the sun." (*Svet. Up.* V.8*) aṅguṣṭhamātro ravitulyarūpaḥ.)*

"The *puruṣa* the size of the thumb dwells in the center of the (individual) *ātman*." (*Kāthaka-Up.* IV.12) *aṇgusthamātraḥ puruṣo madhya ātmani tiṣṭhati*) And the idea referred to the second half i.e., that the size of the spirit conforms to the size and shape of the body, is famous as an assertion of Jainism in general of later centuries, but It had already been taught in the Upaniṣads.

"Higher than this is the supreme Brahman, the great, who *exists hidden within all the living species and who conforms in size with (their) bodies* (*yathānikāyāṃ* sarvabhūteṣu gūḍham, the unique embracer of all the universe, the presiding deity—if men know it, they will become immortal." (*Śvet.Up.*III.7)

Also in Book 200 of the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣaṣastra,* there is, as a theory of "the philosophers who hold that the self is infinite and has consciousness after death" :

"As is stated in the clear doctrine, there is the self, the Person (*puruṣa*)—its size is large and broad and its limits are dlfficult to measure. The colour of its radiance is like the sun, yet, dark and mysterious beings dwell in front of it, so that we are unable to see it. It is necessary to know this self, so that one can cross over and transcend birth and old age, sickness and death; different from this there is no other path for crossing over."[2]

And this corresponds to the next passage. (The "clear doctrine" is the phase used for translating "Vedas.")

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2. *TT.*XXVII. 999c. The source for this comes from Dr. Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* Vol. I, pp. 174-175.

"This great one beyond the darkness, the *puruṣa* (person) possessing the color of the sun, I know. If men only know it they will transcend death. There is no other path leading to it."

Vedāhaṃ etaṃ-puruṣaṃ-mahāntaṃ-ādityavarṇaṃ tamasaḥ parastāt-tam eva viditvā'ti mṛtyum eti nānyaḥ, pantha vidyate, yantaya.

(*Vaj.-Samh.* XXXI.18; *Tait.-Ār.* III.12,7, III 13 1: *Svet.-Up.* III. 8; *Mahānārāyaṇa-Up.* I.12)

The aforementioned theories are also listed in Chapter 130 "Views of the Body," (Satkāyadṛṣṭi) of the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* (Chin. *Ch'eng shih lun*, composed by Harivarman, c. 250-350 A.D.)

"A question is asked:—we actually see that the parts of the body, e.g, the hair, nails, are each different. How can the wise man take this to be the self ?

"The answer is spoken :—There are some who see the spirit as a grain of barley or as a mustard—seed etc., dwelling within the heart; the spirit of a brahmin is white, that of a Kṣatriya is yellow, that of a Vaiśya is red, and that of a Śudra is black. And in the Vedas it is taught: In the very beginning of the world, the colour of the spirit of the Great Person (*Mahāpuruṣa*) was like the radiance of the sun. If a person knew it, he could cross over birth and death —there is no other path. Measuring small in a small person, large in a large person, it dwells in a cavern within the body. A person who practices meditation can see the aspect of lustre of the spirit within the body, like a string through pure gems."

The theory following "in the Vedas it is taught" is the same as that already given in the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra*. We might also say that the last sentence resembles the next passage.

"Then when the man who has unified his mind perceives the original essence of the Brahman in this world by means of the truth of the *ātman* which is compared to a lamplight, he shall know the unborn and ste dfast spirit which transcends all essences, and shall be released from all bondage." (*Svet.-Up.*II.15).

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3. *TT.* XXXII. 316b.

Now, the fact that these passages considered to be theories of the "Vedas" in the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra* coincide for the most part with the *Śvetāśvatara-Upanisad*, III.8, III.7, and II.15, and that the contents of the first two verses are combined and quoted *one after the other*, perhaps indicates that not only by the time the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra* came into existence (250-350 A.D.), but also in the period in which the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-sastra* was complied (about 100 to 150 years later), the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* had already been formulated in its extant state.

And the idea that the spirit "is like a grain of barley or like a mustard-seed dwelling within the heart" is likewise to be found in the Upaniṣads.

"This *puruṣa* which lives inside the heart consists of mind, has light as its basic quality, and is like a grain of rice or of barley. It is the controller of all, the ruler of all; it directs all whatever there is." (*Bṛhad,-Up.*V.6) Further, it is also taught in the teachings of the fāmous Śandilya (Śandilya-vidyā.)[4]

"This *puruṣa*, existing within the *ātman* (physical body) and consisting of gold, is like a grain of rice or like a grain of barley, or like a grain of millet. or like the core of a grain of millet." (*Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*.X.6.3.2)

Again, nothing like the "spirit of the brahmin is white, that of a Ksatriya is yellow, that of a Vaisya is red, and that of a Sudra is black" is not taught anywhere in the Vedas, but such an idea has appeared in the epic poems of the orthodox brahmins. For example one says that the spirit (jiva) has six colors, white, yellow, red, blue, gray and black, and of these white is the most excellent, while the others gradually deteriorate, until black is the worst. The fate of

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4. The corresponding passage in *Chandogya Up.* III. 14.3 differs somewhat from this.

"This then is my *ātman* which exists within the heart. Truly smaller than a grain of rice, than a grain of barley corn, than a mustard seed, a grain of millet or the core of a grain of millet, it is my *ātman* which exists within the heart."

the soul is related to its colour.[5] The theory mentioned above of the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra* might have received such an influence.

As we have seen from the above, by the time of sectarian splits and division in Buddhism, the phrases and verses from the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads were quoted almost literally from the original sources. In the Early Buddhist Canon, also, thoughts similar to those of the Vedānta are faintly alluded to and then rejected, but there are no quotations beginning with "it is said in the Vedas." In the next peariod, on the contrary, not only are the theories presented in the early Buddhist Canon quoted in almost exactly the same form as the prototype verse, in addition, the original passages are mentioned or quoted as "a theory of the clear doctrine," or "a theory in the Vedas." we may be appraised, consequently, that the Buddhists of this period had become quite well versed in the scriptures of the orthodox brahmins.

Let us now consider some of the reasons why the passages of the Upaniṣads were frequently quoted in this way. It is quite possible to interpret one of the reasons as being that the then extant Upaniṣads had reached the prominence of being worshipped and followed among the common men of the day. Rather than this, however, it might perhaps have been that because quite a few of the orthodox brahmins of the time were converted to Buddhists and became Buddhist priests, the scholars of Hīnayāna Buddhism had the first-hand opportunity to learn the Upaniṣadic sayings as they were originally taught from the lips of the new converts themselves.[6] After all, since the Early Upaniṣads came

5. *MBh*. XII. 281.33. Hopkins (Great Epic of India.) 179-180. Further, see Dr. Kanekura, *Indo Kodai Seishinshi*, pp. 203-204. And on the phrase, "like a string through pure gems" in the *Satya-siddhi-śāstra*, see the note to v. 18 of the *Saṃkhya-karikas*. (The present work, Chap. II, Sect. 6, p. 89f.)

6. Prior to the Buddha, the religious texts were handed down primarily by recitation, but after the period of early Buddhism, the general practice in India was to record the words on bark, leaves, bamboo, plates of metal and other objects. (G. Buhler : *Die Indische Palāographics*, S. 3-6). Being now able to look at the scriptures as they had beea written down, the Hīnayāna scholars of this period might have been thus enabled to record with some accuracy the Upaniṣadic sayings. Further study on this subject is requisite.

into being before the advent of the Buddha and from that time on have been handed down from master to disciple by word of mouth generation after generation, it would certainly seem that in some region of the land, they had been quite properly studied and memorised. Still, one must not overlook the fact that the very earliest Buddhism developed upon a foundation of the new citizen classes in the recently arisen cities of the time, and was thus limited by such historical and social conditions, the early Buddhists, for example, not evincing a favourable attitude towards Sanskrit, the language employed by the Brahmins, and in many cases the vocabulary of the religious order being the colloquial language. This coincides with the circumstances of early Jainism. But as the Buddhist community progressively developed and several sectarian divisions came into being, a few of the sects made Sanskrit, the traditional cultural language of India, their common language in the religious community, and some of them rewrote their scriptures into Sanskrit. The most influential of the Hīnayāna sects was the Sarvāstivāda, and this sect wrote nearly all of its works in Sanskrit. As a consequence, the scholarly priests in the Buddhist community who had adopted Sanskrit as their daily language were in a far better position to understand the works of the Brahmins, much more so than the other early Buddhist scholars who used only the colloquial languages. Of course, there must have been quite a few others among the Buddhists of the early period who were able to read and interpret Sanskrit, but in so far as they used the common language of the day, they must have somehow had the feeling that Sanskrit was rather *formal and distant* from their everyday language. Scholars of the Sarvāstivāda, on the other hand, were accustomed to employing Sanskrit in their writing and reading, in their conversation and records of everyday living, so that they were able to easily understand, comparatively speaking, the Vedas, and, one feels, must have experienced some pleasure in being able to know their contents. The fact that they could comprehend the Vedas should perhaps be interrupted as being one of the attendant phenomena accompaning the great historical transition which saw early Buddhism, a religion in the very small region of Maghada, come into its own as a religion covering all of Indian, losing its character as a newly arisen belief of a remote colony, and rowing out in the

mainstream of Indian culture by means mainly of its employment of Sanakrit.

But it becomes evident from our examination of the materials above that the Budhists then were merely acquainted with the men who believed in the Upaniṣads and the expressions contained therein, but have yet to refer to the great endeavour of later Vedānta scholars who were confronted with the difficulties of the contradictions apparent in the Upaniṣads and who tried to work out some rational and unified means of interpreting them. Lack of reference to this academic tradition which was to set up systematic and orderly doctrines by seeking out a unified plan of Upaniṣadic thought, would seem to show that such a tendency was very diminished, if it existed at all, not enough so as to draw the attention of the buddhists.

In the *Lalitavistara*,[7] a biography of the Buddha which was originally a work of the Sarvāstivādins and which later was adopted by the Mahāyānists, there are mentioned the schools of Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Hetuvidyā, and Bārhaspatya as contemporary philosophy schools, but there is no mention made of the Vedānta school. Therefore, those brahmins who were adherents of the Upaniṣads probably believed in the sayings literally. As for example, in the expressions above like "the size of the thumb," they firmly believed that the *puruṣa* was indeed just exactly the size of the human thumb, and those who, like the later Vedāntists, understood this phrase to contain an obstruse and symbolic meaning, then adding their own philosophical interpretions, must indeed have been few.

Now what should be noticed as Vedāntic thought of the time, seems to rather be the amalgamated thought of both the Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya. The *Buddhacarita* by Aśvaghoṣa has an account of the story taught by the the sage Ārāḍa to Prince Siddhārtha which mentions such thoughts of ' the ones who meditate on the ātman" (*ātmacintaka*),[8] and "the philosophers of the supreme Brahman"

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7. *Lalitavistara*. hrag. von S. Lefmann, Teil. I, S.I 56.
8. *Buddhacarita*, XII. 20.

(paramabrahmavādin) [9]. According to these doctrines, the sphere of liberation is "the imperishable sphere" (padam akṣaram)[10] and the "attributeless, permanent, imperishable, Supreme Brahma" (paramaṃ brahma nirliṅgaṃ dhruvaṃ akṣaraṃ).[11] In this respect, some influence can be found of ancient Upaniṣadic ideas, but the thought here expressed as that of Ārāḍ, is more of an admixture of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta philosophy, and coincides with the thoughts expounded in Book XII of the *Mahābhārata*.[12] Consequently, the thought of this period which had general influence through-out the society is perhaps not the Vedāntic school in the narrow sense, but rather the philosophical ideas following the tendencies mentioned above.

At any rate, Buddhists during this period had contact with Vedānta ideas possessed of varying tendencies, and had assumed a positive posture of decisive combat with those concepts. When the Vedāntic thought is referred to in the early Buddhist Canon, it is by no means always refuted by recourse to logical arguments; rather, the accounts related the recourse to the supernatural powers of the Buddha to break down and overcome the followers of such heretic doctrins. They have yet to take up the question of logical disputation itself. The scholars, on the other hand, of the Sarvāstivāda who complied the Abhidharma, decisively attacked and refuted the other doctrines by means of logical discourse. And as one example of logical refutation used against Vedānta thought, we should draw attention especially to the attack launched against the concept of "presiding deity."

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9. Ibid., XII. 20.

10. Ibid., XII. 41.

11. Ibid., XII. 65. Cf. *MBh.* XII.8136.

12. Cf. O. Strauss : *zur Geshichte dea Saṁkhya*, WXKM., 1913, S. 257-275. E.H. Johnston: *The Budhacraita*, Part II, p. 167 ff (and the tootnotes on this section).

Although the concept of "presiding deity" had already been refuted and rejected in the early Buddhist Canon, the great treatise of the Sarvāstivāda, the *Mahā-vibhāsā-śāstra*, records the following account :

(*Jnānaprasthāna-śāstra* :) "Some have this view : 'All that which is received by every *puruṣa* and pudgala is caused by the transformation of the Self-existent (*Iśvara*). (Commentary :) This non-cause is reckoned as the cause by the religious rules of permission and prohibitions (*Śīlavrataparāmarśa*), and should be overcome by a right view of suffering." (Subcommentary :) The "this non-cause is reckoned as the cause by the rules of permission and prohibition" manifests the self-(true-) nature, and "which it regards as the ending of all suffering" reveals its method of treatment (*pratipakṣa*). The general theory is as before.

Question :—How have these arisen ?

Answer :—They are said by some outsiders who either are influenced by false ways of thinking, or get them by meditation, or are caused by evil friends, and that is how this views arise, just as we have learned before. However, everything (all dharmas) is not caused by *Īśvara*, for they appear gradually and successively (*krameṇa*). If it be said that all the world comes into existence caused by the transformation of *Īśvara*, then everything should indeed be born at the same instant (*yugapad*). For their causes all exist, and nothing could prevent their not being born. (Cf *Tattvasaṃgraha*, V.165.) Or if it is said that Īśvara has additional and out side causes so that it can give birth to things, it then is not Īśvara because there are extra causes. (*Tattva*. V.159). Or if it is said that because all dharmas arise in accordance with the desires and pleasures of Īśvara, they do not suddenly arise. Why do the desires and pleasure of Īśvara not suddenly arise ? For Īśvara gives birth to desires and pleasure and there is never anything which can obstruct it. (*Tattva* V.162). Or if it be said that Īśvara needs additional and extra causes in order to give birth to desires and pleasure, then it is not Īśvara. And this again would be a *regressus ad infinitum* (anavasthā), for these causes would again require other causes in order to be born. (Tattva. V. 161).

And if it be said that Īsvara gives birth to all dharmas, because the cause is undifferntiated, the dharmas must also be undifferentiated. (*Tattva. v. 136)* Or if it be said that Īsvara produces the very first dharma, and afterward, many dharmas are evolved and produced from this dharma, how is it that this dharma can be said to be able to produce many dharmas ? For like Īsvara, its body is one. *(Tattva. v. 170)*

"And again, all the dharmas which are produced must be eternal, because the effect resembles the cause. (*Tattva. v. 138)*

"Again, Īsvara itself should not be able to produce these things, for it is eternal like space *(ākāśa)*. *(Tattva. vv. 140, 147)*"

As we may note here, the monistic, theistic doctrine that "all and every living thing comes into being by the transformation of 'Īsvara', i. e. "the presiding deity," is logically refuted. And the Sarvāstivādins, for their part, have arrived at the conclusion that such a doctrine is a pernicious theory which should be included within the views on the religious rules for permission and prohibition, having mistaken what is not the true cause for the real cause, and that the way to overcome it is by correctly cognizing the truth of suffering.

Let us now try to express in more detail the import of the above translation. (As we have noted, the same refutation appears without much change in the chapter on *Puruṣaparīkṣā* of the later *Tattvasaṃgraha*, and for the sake of reference, we shall again append the verse number.)

(1) If one holds that everything in the world arises from the presiding deity, the cause of these things should exist latently within that deity. Therefore, when the presiding deity carried out the work of creating the world, all things should have been born at the same time. For no cause exists which would serve as a hindrance to their simultaneous production. Yet in the real world it does not

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13. *TT*. XXVII. 993b.

happen that everything is produced and determined at the same time, for the vast range of phenomena are continually and successively being produced. If it were true that all things arise from the presiding deity, such would not be the case as it is *(Tattva Samgraha. v. 65)*.

(2) If one says that 'because the presiding deity during the course of its creation of the world needs to rely on another cause in order to complete that process, all things are not brought into being at the same time," the presiding deity is then limited by anothere cause, and cannot be called the presiding deity (*Īśvara,* i. e., the self-existent, the free one) (*Tattvas.* v. 159)

(3) To say that ' all things come into being based upon the desires of the presiding deity, and so do not arise at the same time", invites the question : "Why is it that these desires of the presiding deity do not arise simultaneously?" Since it is the ruler of all things, it is also the ruler (controller) of its own desires, and there is not supposed to be anything in existence which could prevent this (*Tattvas.* v. 162)

(4) If one tries to vindicate this position by the assertion that "all things cannot arise at the same time, because the presiding deity gives rise to its desire to create the world by relying upon some other cause," it cannot be said that this deity is in control of its own desires and consequently, it cannot be the presiding deity. Furthermore, the cause which it relies upon would have to be based upon another cause and that again would require still another cause, thus the entire argument falls into an infinite regress (*anavasthā*). (*Tattvas.* v. 161)

(5) Now. if one holds that the presiding deity causes all things to arise, if he is a Vedāntist, he must admit that such a presiding deity as the root cause is unique and undifferentiated, and that all things, as the effect, must also be unique and undiffere-

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14. Jacobi :*Gottesides* (Translation. in to Japanese) by Yamada and It3 as "*Indo Kodai Shinkanhi*" (History of the Concept of God in Ancient India), pp. 66, 184 ff.)

nttated. But the assertion that the differentiated and multifarious elements of the world developed from a unique and undifferentiated principle is clearly illogical. (Tattvas. v. 136)

(6) The explanation that "the presiding deity, as the world-cause, first produced forth a principle in the remote past, and from this principle a great number of things were brought successively into existence later," raises the question : How could this principle, produced in the very beginning, give rise to a great many other things ? Since that principle, the same the presiding deity, would in itself be unique and undifferentiated, it would be illogical to assume that it could evolve the differentiated aspects of the phenomenal world. (It is possible that here is attacked the idea which assumes that the world-cause first gave birth to something like the Brahma or the Brahma-egg in the beginning, and at some time, the latter gave rise to the objects in the world.) *Tattvas*. v. 170)

(7) The effect mus always have a homogeneity and resemblance with its cause. Therefore, since the presiding deity is eternal, the phenomenal world, as its effect, must also be eternal. In effect, it cannot be impermanent. But this assertion is contradicted by our experience of reality. (*Tattvas*. v. 138)

(8) Because the presiding deity,the world-cause, is eternal, it will not be able to give rise to anything. This must be the same as in the case of space (*ākāsa* , which also cannot produce anything, since it is eternal. Only something which is impermanent and perishable has the potential to give birth to another thing. *Tattvas*. VV.140,147)

We have reproduced above with some elaboration the general import of the verse examined earlier in the *Mahāvibhāṣā sastra*. Up to the present time in the academic world, the earliest arguments and refutation on the doctrine of spiritualim in Indian history have usually been taken to be those found chiefly in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX.119-126, by Śantideva (7th century) and those discussed by the Jain scholar, Hemacandra (12th century). We, however, have discovered that long before that time, around the second century A.D., Buddhist scholars in the mountains of Kaśmīr had set down

their minute speculations in order to refute theistic doctrines. And the arguments asserted here have been handed down later among the Buddhists.[15] Prior to Śāntideva, both Maitreyanātha and Asanga had already recounted arguments similar to these, and the doctrines of Santiraksita and Kamalasila, as pointed out above, also bear a remarkably close resemblance.

Well now, the refutations have taken up in this section coincide with those found in Santiraksita and Kamalasīla. which we shall list later, and as we see in the explanation of the latter, he is attacking the Vedavādins so that it might be well to interpret that the *Mahā-vibhāsa-sāstra* is also striking against the Vedavādins and in a limited sense, the Vedāntists as well (together with the other schools of Hinduism which have adopted that philosophy.

15. In the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha*, IV. 4 22-37, a work attributed to Śankara, a refutation of the concept of presiding deity is presented as one of the Buddhists' views.

Section 4. The Mahāyāna Sūtras and Vedānta Thought.

An interesting question is that of the attitude assumed by writers in the Mahāyāna Sūtras towards the Vedānta thought. We would have to search a long time, however, in that vast and voluminous compendium of work on the Mahāyāna to find any account which mentions the Vedānta Philosophy. Even passages which discuss the Upaniṣads or refer to their ideas are difficult to come by. In the earliest Mahāyāna Canon, e.g., the *Prajnāpāramitāsūtras*, the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra* and other works, no discussion is made of those heretical theories. This fact is certainly worthy of our attention.

In some what later centuries, however, when intercourse had become more frequent with Brahmanic ideas, the Mahāyāna Sūtras clearly refer to the thought of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta as heretical doctrines. As an example of this, we have at hand an account given in the Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra the Southern version of Nan pen ta pan neih p'an ching (of Mahāyāna) Nj. 114) of the Mahāyāna. In this Sūtra, the Tathāgata is said to have originally taught the doctrine of no-self, and while he sometimes spoke of the self, his concept of self "was nothing like the personal self imagined by the ordinary man." Then, this heretical theory is given :

"The self which is presumed by the ordinary man (*pṛthagjana*) and the foolish man (*bāla*) is, in some theories, said to be as large as the thumb, or like the mustard-seed, or like the atom. The self taught by the Tathāgata is completely different from any of these."[1] A similar theory is presented in another passage of the same work :

"Men who are not saints broadly assum the self has more or less such and such an aspect, as if it were like a weed, or perhaps like a grain of rice, a bean, the thumb, etc. In this way they give birth to various false conception, but the symbols of this false thinking are not true."[2] Again, it is recounted that when the srāvaka

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1. Nanking Recension, *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. Vol. VIII. Chap. III (TT. XII. 618b-c).

2. *Ibid*., *Loc. cit*., Chapter 12, 'The Nature of the Tathāgata," (*TT*. XII. 649c).

and the pratyekabuddha of the two vehicles asked the general folk about the appearance and state of the self, they were told :

"It is as large as the thumb, or perhaps it is like a grain of rice, or like a weed. There are those who said that the form of the self dwells within the heart and is as bright as the sun."[3]

These views correspond in general to the tenets of the Hermit Śaṇḍilya in the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* (X.6.3).[4] And while the Upaniṣads frequently refer to the size of the atman being "as large as the thumb,"[5] the assertion that it is similar to an "atom" appears not only in the ancient Upaniṣads,[6] but can also be found in the *Brahma-sutra* (II.3.19-32). It would seem, therefore, that the author of the Mahāyānistic *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* must have had some knowledge of Upaniṣadic thought.

What offers us a somewhat later, but interesting, account of intercourse with Vedānta thought is the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* (*Ju lang chia ching*). This sūtra was formulated compartively late in the history of Mahāyāna Sūtras. Three versions have been preserved in Chinese translation, and the oldast, the *Lang Chia* A Pa To Lo Pao Ching four volumes, was translated in 443 during the Sung Dynasty, so that this work must have come into existence, I think, by the end of the fourth century, at the latest. This sūtra contains the doctrines of the fivefold dharma, threefold self-nature, eightfold consciousness and twofold non-self, which are the basic thought of the sūtra itself, but the manner of presentation is confused, and a consistent interpretation eludes us for the moment. Nonetheless, it is quite certain that the concept of *Tathāgata-garbha* is one of the peculiar doctrines that is expounded throughout the entire work. In the sūtra itself, this *Tathāgata-garbha* frequently appears to be

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3. *Ibid., loc. cit*, (*TT*. XXI 653c). Mr. Tsukinowa has an article on the ideas of selflessness and the Great-self in the *Mahāyāna-nirvāṇa-sūtra* on these verses. (Journal, "Bukkyō kenkyū, "Vol. III, No. 3 (1959, pp. 120-141.)
4. Cf. the present work, Sect. 3.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
6. Cf. the *Muṇḍ-Up*. III. 1.9., and the *Śvet. Up*. V. 8,9.

regarded as identical with the *ālayavijnāna* of the Vijnānavāda[7], and is held to be the primal source giving rise to all phenomenal things.

"Oh Mahāmati, the Storehouse of the Thus-come is the cause of both good and evil and is that which creates all living things and pursuits."

tathāgatagrabho Mahāmate kuśalkuśalahetukaḥ sarvajanmagati-kartā[8].

The definition of this Storehouse of the Thus-come is quite similar to that of the Brahman as taught in Vedānta philosophy,[9] The problem now is, what sort of differences exist beween the two concepts ? The *Laṇkāvatāra-sūrta* is well- known for its vivid reflection of the state of affairs in the intellectual world of India during that period. It holds in particular, that Brahman, Viṣṇu, and Īśvara are other names for the Tathāgat, and explains, moreover, its concept of the ultimate state by using the words of Vedānta philosophy. It even says :

"The Supreme Brahma is the highest state of existence." (*miṣṭhābhāvaḥ paraṃ brahma*)[11]

In which case, the criticism that ultimately both the tathāgata-garbha and the Brahman would be none other than the same principle, seems to have come forth among the Buddhists of the time. In the dialogue between the Bodhisattva Mahāmati and the Buddha we have ample evidence of this occurence :

"Then the Bodhisattva Mahāmati said to the Buddha : 'Again, the Buddha has expounded in the Sūtras on the Tathāgata-garbha

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7. PP. 221, line 12; 222, lines 6, 9; 223, lines 2, 6, 11; 235, lines 7, 16.

8. P. 221 lines 9-10. Cf. *TT*. XVI. 619c.

9. E. g., *Brahma-sūtra* I. 1.2, *Vākyaapadīya* I. 1.

10. *brahmāṇam Viṣṇum Īśvaram* (acc.) p. 192, line 14. (Perhaps a scribal error for *brahmāṇam*.)

11. P. 153, line 9. Cf. p. 325.

even teaching that it is essentially brilliant, and being pure, is the fundamental purity. It is possessed inherently of the 32 marks, exists within all sentient beings, and is like a priceless jewel which has been covered over by some filthy thing. Although it is hidden by the elements, the spheres and place, and is tainted by the filth of false discriminations like greed, anger and foolishness, it is permanent, stead-fast, blissful and eternal-so the Buddha has taught. If this be so, Oh Lord, would not the theory of the *tathāgata-garbha* is equivalent to *the doctrine of the self held by the outsiders* (*tīrthakara-ātmavāḍa*) ? The outsiders, too Oh Blessed One ,hold as their doctrine and teaching of the self that 'it is permanent and the agent; separated from all guṇas, it is omnipresent and imperishable (*tīrthakrā api Bhagavan, nityaḥ kartā nirguṇo vibhur avyaya ity ātmavādopadeśaṃ kurvanti*)."

To this question, the Buddha replied that he had taught such an idea only for the purpose of leading into Buddhism those who adhered to doc'ines of the outsider.

"The Blessed One said : 'Mahāmati, the doctrine of the *tathāgata-garbha* which I teach is truly not the same as the theory of self held by outsider (*tīrthakara-ātmavāda*). But the Tathāgatas, Mahāmati, formed the doctrine of the *tathāgata*-garbha according to the meaning of voidness, reality, Nirvāṇa, unborn, attributeless desire less etc., and the Tathāgatas, the Arhats and the Samyak-Sambuddhas, Mahāmati, pointed out the undifferentiated and imageless realm by relying upon the instructions as an introduction to the *tathāgata-garbha*, in order to lead the foolish man away from his fear of the teaching of selflessness. And Mahāmati, all the Bodhisattvas and Mahāsattvas of the present and future have formed no attachment in this respect to the self. For example, Mahāmati, just as the potter, by combining his hands, skill, stick, water, cord and efforts, can produce many pottery objects from a lumb of fine clay, in the same way, Mahāmati , the Tathāgatas, by combining their wisdom, methods and excellent skill, or the teaching of the (*tathāgata-*)*garbha* or the doctrine of selfilessness, can reveal that the dharmas are selfless so that all aspects of differentiation are ceased, by utilising this verse or words. Because of this reason, Mahāmati, the teaching of the tathāgata-garbha is not the same as the outsiders' doctrine

of the self.' Thus, in order to attract these outsiders who adhere to a teaching of self, the Tathāgatas indicate the *tathāgata-garbha* by means of the teaching on the *Tathāgatagrabha*—How then (one will think) does the mind of the people who have fallen in the opinion of the differentiation of the illusory self, and that of the man whose mind have fallen into the realm of the three liberations, speedily achieve enlightenment of the supreme truth? For this purpose, Mahāmati, the Tathāgatas, Arhats and Samyak-sambuddhas had expounded on the *tathāgata-garbha*. Therefore, it is not the equivalent of the outsiders' doctrine of self. And thus, Mahāmati, one should now follow (the teaching) of the selflessness of the Tathāgata and the ('tathāgata-)garbha, so that he may put a stop to the opinion of outsiders."[12]

Even within the ranks of Buddhism, as we have seen in the verse above, it is evident that there were some who had some doubt about the difference between the thought of the *tathāgata-garbha* and the Vedānta philosophy (i.e. the Sāṃkhya-Vedanta philosophy). It can not be denied, in any case, that between the two concepts there does exist some resemblance in conception.

This can also be said concerning the Vijñaptimātratā philosophy in general, This philosophical system teaches the "evolution of the body of consciousness" (*vijñāna-parināma*), and this word was also used by the early Vedānta scholars of that period[13]. Consequently, although Sāntiraksita attacked the Vedānta school, he admitted that their doctrines, when compared with the teachings of the Buddhists, had "only a very small error (*alpāparādha*)."

Elesewhere, we learn that the *Great Sun Sūtra* (*Ta jih ching* Maha vairocana-sūtra) has recorded some theories of the men who regarded "pure consciousness" (*vijñāna*) as the adsolute principle. In the first chapter, *Chu hsin pin*, of this sūtra, thirty types of outsiders are listed, the 16th of which refers to the consciousness theory, held by outsiders. I-hsing iu his *Commentary on the Great Sun*

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12. Pp 77, line 13-79, line 9.
13. Cf. the present chapter, Sect. 6.

Sūtra, Vol. II, understands this to be : "The saying in the sūtra, 'or the consciousness," means that there is one type who takes this consciousness to be pervasive in all places, from the earth to the water, fire, air and other. This consciousness pervades and fills all therein."[14] Opposing this, I-hsing refutes it in the following manner :

> ' If consciousiess or spirit were omnipresent and eternal, it should be able, by itself, to see, hear, perceive and cogitate. Yet now, what essentially occurs is that by the union of sense-organ and object, we have the birth of consciousness. But the consciousness or spirit you hold has need of nothing else. Again, if consciousness or spirit pervaded the five types or being, how could birth and death recur again and again. Therefore, we know that it is impossible".

In other words, if the principle of consciousness" he asserts is omnipresent in all things and is also eternal, that conscinsess must always be functioning at all times no matter where it is, so that the conscious process should always be arising. Consequently, it cannot be the case that consciousness arises by the contact of our sense-organs with the object of cognition, such as we experiene daily. And if consiousness is omnipresent, it cannot happen that our birth and death, our transmigration, can occur. Thus, what he teaches about consiousness cannot explain the reason why our consiousness and transmigration actually do arise. The idea that *vijñāna* is the absolute principle appears in the Ancient Upaniṣads, and has been already rejected in the earlist Buddhist Canon,[15] and it seems again to have here been made the topic of consideration. A thorough investigation of that voluminous Canon of the Mahāyāna should reveal other passages which refer to ideas similar to those of the Vedānta, but it seems more likely that any account which might be able to clarify the history of early Vedānta philosophy are more than is to be expected. It should be adequately noted, however, that the later Mahāyāna Sūtras, were composed while both struggling against and rejecting, yet at times coming under the influence and persuasion of, Vedānta thought.

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14. *TT*. XXXIX. 593c.
15. Cf. the present article, Sect. 2.

Section 5. The Early Mādhyamika and the Udaniṣads

Despite the fact that a great number of Mahāyāna Sūtra are extant, in so far as there are comparatively few references to the Vedānta throught, and as the chronological order and dates of their coming in to being are still today almost entirely unknown, the accounts presented therein, as has already been pointed out, offer relatively little in the way of contributing towards an indirect explanation of the history of Vedānta philosophy. while that may be, there neverthelss are innumerable references to Brahmanical thought in the writings of the teachers of Mahāyāna, whose dates have been verified to a considerate extent, and we may therefore consider their accounts as highly valuable source materials in our elucidation of the history of Vedānta thought.

1. Nāgārjuna and the Upanisads:

The most famous work of Nāgārjuna is his *Madhyamaka-śāstra* the major concern of which is to criticise the Sarvāstivāda, the Vātsiputrīya, and the Sāmmitiya schools within Buddhism, and the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśesika schools outside Buddhism No logical discussion is made, however, of the Upaniṣadic thought or Vedānta philosophy, and very little mentions made on the words in the various commentaries *Akutobhaya*, *Prasannapadā* the commentry by Pingalanetra, etc.). One feels that, consequently, for Nāgārjuna himself, there was no particular urgency in taking up the Vedānta school as an object of logical criticism, so that whetever influence it had, it must have been very slight.

However, in another work by Nāgārjuna, the *Daśabhūmivibhāṣa-śāstra*, there is some treatment of thought which seems to resemble that of the Upaniṣads. In vol. X, Chapter 22 ("Criticism of the Omniscient Person") of that work, he engages in a logical debate on the subject of whether or not the Buddha is a man who knows all (omniscient). There. the questioner (refuter) lists several reasons, and asserts that "the Buddha is not omniscient. As one of the reasons, he points out the circumstancc that the Buddha is not completely versed in all the Vedas. Nāgārjuna responds to this

by answering, "Since the method leading to the liberation of men is not taught in the Vedas, the Buddha did not teach the Vedas, although he knew them well."

"If you say that the Buddha did not teach the Vedas and other heretic sūtras, and therefore was not omniscient, I must now answer that in the Vedas there does not exist a good method for attaining the desired calm; there are only various fallacious doctrines. By all that the Buddha taught, every one can attain to that wonderful calm. Therefore, although the Buddha did know the Vedas and other sūtras, as these words cannot aid men to attain the desired calm, and thus, he did not teach them."

Hereupon, the refuter asserted that "a method for liberation is also taught in the Vadas."

"It is said : In the Vadas also there are teachings for the desired calm and liberation. In the beginning of the world everything was in darkness and there existed nothing. At first, a Great Person appeared, who was like the sun. If someone sees him, he can cross over death and obstacles, and there are other guidance. Again it is taught, if the body of a person is small, his spirit is small, and if the body of a person is large, his spirit is large. The body forms the abode of the spirit which dwells always therein. If one developes by wisdom and releases the bonds of the spirit, he can obtain release. Thus, we must know that in the Vedas there is calm and release."

The Vedic verse quoted here coincides with the one we quoted from the *Satya-siddhi-śāstra* and examined in an earlier section : it also corresponds to *Śvet.-Up*. III. 8, III. 7, II. 15. (See also the *Śvet.-Up*. IV. 15, 16 on the latter part of the verse.) In reply to this objection, Nāgārjuna answers : Because the four metaphysical incongruities (viparyāsa), i. e., eternality, bliss, self and purity, are taught in the Vedās, liberation by means of the Vedas is also impossible."

"It is answered : This is not the case. For in the Vedas are the four metaphysical incongruities : (1) In the World there is no eter-

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1. *TT*. XXVI. 74 b-76.

nality, yet separate from it, there is an eternal world. This is as to teach that if one once performs the rituals of heaven, he will fall back, twice performed, he again falls back, but performed the third, he will not fall back. This is the metaphysical incongruities of there being eternality in the non-eternal. (2) The world is suffering, but they teach that there is an eternal and blissful place. This is the metaphysical incongruity of there being bliss in suffering. (3) Again it is taught, the spirit of the self evolves and becomes a child, and prays to have long life. The child is another body, so how could it be the self? This is the metaphysical incongruity of there being a self in selflessness. (4) It is taught that the body is pure, supreme and incomparable, unsurpassed by gold, silver or precious jewels. This is the metaphysical incongruity of there being purity in impurity. The metaphysical incongruities are not true, and not being true, how can there be the desired calm. Therefore, in the Vedas, there is no method for the desired-calm."

The first incongruity on eternality, e. g, the assertion that "there is an eternal world," is frequently used in the Upaniṣads to explain the eternal life of the person who has attained the "world of Brahma (brahmaloka)", and perhaps refers to the teaching that once a person reaches there, he no longer dies and returns to this world. (*Cf. Bṛhaḍ -UP*. VI. 2. 15; *Chānd.-UP*. VIII. 15; *Mund.-UP*. III. 2. 6, etc.) The second incongruity concerning bliss, i.e., the idea that "there is a place of eternal bliss," means that the world of Brahma is by far much more beautiful, splendid and blissful than this earth, and seems to correspond to the expostulations in the Upaniṣads (Cf. *Kaus.-UP*. I. 3-5; *Chand.-UP*. VIII. 5, 3). Now the third incongruity on the self has some relation to the thought in the society of ancient Indian which felt that it was important, after giving birth to a child and raising it, to instruct it in performing the ritual for life after death. "By his son alone, the father stands firm" (*Bṛhad.-UP*. I. 5. 17). While such a thought can be found throughout the general works of the Brahmins,[2] it may refer in the verse by Nāgārjun to the idea of "successful bestowing" (*sampatti, sampradāna*) at the instant of one's death. In the Upaniṣads, there is a

2. *Atharva-Veda* XI.4.20 ; *Taittirīya-Brāhmana* III. 12.9.7 ; *Aitareya-Brāhmana* VII.13.9 ; *Manu* IX. 8.

prescribed ritual which states that the father, at the instant of his impending death, should call his son to approach the head of his bed, and perform a kind of ritual which symbolises that the father transfers to his son all his physiological functions, the father requesting the son's prosperity and happiness, and the son praying for the father's rebirth in heaven (*Bṛhad*.-UP. I. 5. 17-20; *Kauṣ*.-UP. II. 15). As a result of so much respect for the son, the son is even said to be his ātman (or self). (*ātma vai putra nāmāsi*. *Śat*. *Br*. XIV. 9. 4 26. Cf. *Vedāntasāra* 147.) As for the fourth incongruity, the concept that our body itself is pure, it is not to be found in the Upaniṣads, but a passage does exist which teaches that one can obtain a pure body :

"He who obtains a body formed from the fire of Yoga, shall have no disease, no old age and no death." (*Śvet*. UP. II. 12)

The opponent, however, asserts that "by means of knowing the Vedas, one can attain liberation."

"It is asked :—'It is taught in the Vedas that the one who can know the Vedas becomes pure and peaceful. How can you say that there is no method for obtaining the absolute calm ?"

It is not clear to which passage in the extant Vedas the verse given above refers, but it seems to be closest in import to the text found in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VII. 15. There it is explained that a person who studies the Vedas under a Master, and continues to study and recite them even after returning home as a householder, "will reach the world of Brahman, and will never return (to this world)."

Nāgārjuna refutes this argument by saying that "while there is something taught in the Vedas which resembles liberation, it refers to rebirth as a long-lived god (dīrghāyuṣodevāḥ) and is not the true liberation."

"It is answered :—Although the Vedas teach that he who knows them is peaceful, this is not the ultimate liberation. They think that liberation arises in another body, and teach that liberation is caused by the long-lived gods. Therefore, there is really no liberation in the Vedas.

"And again, it is taught in the Vedas that there are three parts : first, the *mantras* or encantations ; second, the *arthavāda* or explanatory passages ; and third, the *vidhi* or rules. The mantras say e.g., May I obtain a wife, children, cattle and horses, gold and silver and precious jewels !' The *arthavāda* say, e g., 'You, oh God of Fire (Agni), with black head, red neck and yellow body, are always in the five elements of all creatures.' The *vidhis* say, e.g., 'This deed must be performed, and this must not be performed,' just as in the ceremony of the first receiving of fire from the Kṛttikā stars (the Pleiades), But in reality, these *mantrās*, *arthavāda* and *vidhis* do not lead to calm and liberation. Why ? Because the lusting after worldly pleasure, the burning of Kuśa grass and the recitation of formulas have nothing to do with true wisdom. Unless one eliminates afflictions, how can he have liberation ?"

The central problem of the logical debate given above is this : when the interlocutor (of the opposing school) stoutly maintains that "instructions leading to liberation are also taught in the Vedas, "Nāgārjuna replies that "the true liberation is not taught in the Vedas : what is taught amounts to no more than a mistaken conception that liberation consists of being born and attained long life in a better world in the future." Since the discussion of liberation is found in the Vedas and in particular the Upaniṣads, the Vedas referred to here may justifiably be interpreted as being limited to the *Upaniṣads alone*. And therefore, the Upaniṣadic doctrine known to Nāgārjuna consists merely of being reborn in a better world in the future. This fact can also be ascertained from the passages of the Upaniṣads compared one by one with the words of Nāgārjuna in the foregoing. These theories are the inferior teachings in the Upaniṣads and, as can be seen in the standpoint of Śaṇkara later, belong to the "lower knowledge" (*aparā vidyā*). Whereupon we may think as follows : During that period, the passages of the Upaniṣads were faithfully handed down and were interpreted and followed in a strictly literal sense ; their influence, ended here, and there were no thorough-going attempts to formulize a logical and consistent doctrine of the entire work, such as we have in the Vedānta philosophy to appear later. And therefore, I think we can say that the Vedānta school had yet to assume a definitive form as a true philosophical school.

Further evidence to verify this is also found in the Vedic divisions as mentioned by Nāgārjuna. As we saw above, the brahmin who engaged in debate with Nāgārjuna, divided the entire Vedas in three general classifications ; the *mantrās*, or encantations ; the arthavāda, or explanatory passages ; and the *vidhi* or rules.

Not enough attention can be paid to this fact. For the construction of each of the four Vedas is divided into two : the Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas. The Samhitā consists of *mantrās*, the generic term for laudatory chants, ritual expressions and magical verses. At present, when only the Vedas are mentioned, it is generally taken to mean only the Samhitās, as for example, in the case of the Ṛg Veda, which is the abbreviated title of the *Ṛg Veda Saṃhitā* On the other hand, the Brāhmanas are the explanatory literature appended to each of the Veda Samhitās, and their contents, according to the Non-dualistic Monistic School of the Vedānta School, are classified into the following three divisions[3] :

1. *Vidhi*. Or the imperative rules related to the rituals, which control each of the minute regulations for the performance of rituals and ceremonies, the procedureal order of the actual performance, the correct usages of the laudatory chants and ritualistic expressions, etc.

2. *Arthavāda*. Or the supplementary passages on the *vidhi* (*vidhiśeśa*), which explain the meaning of the laudatory chants and ritualistic expressions, discuss the etymology, explain the origin and secret meaning of the rituals and interpose here and there myths legends and ancient stories.

Vedānta. Or the Upanisads, which have a different nature which either the *vidhis* or the *arthavādas*, being mainly the passages which expound on the Brāhman, The Vedānta school looks to this portion as its true canonical authority. The Vedānta portion is the Barhmakānda, while the others are the Karmakānda.

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3. Classified according to the "Prasthānabheda" of the *Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī*. Cf. Dr. Ui, "Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyā," Vol. IV, p, 531 ff.

In regard to the foregoing division, scholars of the later mimāmsā and Vedānta school have under-taken extremely subtle and complicated distinctions, and have further divided them more minutely' but as this *is* not necessary here, I shall omit it. Now then we may diagram the classlfications given above as follows :

Veda— { Saṃhitā———*mantra* ; Brāhmaṇ — { *vidhi*, *arthavāda*, *vedānta* } }

{ Saṃhitā———*mantra*, *vidhi*, *arthavāda* } karmakāṇḍa

vedānta—————brahmakāṇḍa

Referring again to Nāgārjuna's discussion of the Vedas, we see that he has completely ignored the "Vedānta," i.e., the Brahmakānda. Consequently, the orthodox brahmins with whom Nāgārjuna had direct contact, *did not admit that the Upaniṣads had a particularly important significance*. In which case, it would be a problem to determine to which of the classifications listed above these brahmins had appended the Upaniṣad portion ; but perhaps they included them either in the *vidhis* or in the *arthavādas*.[4]

From our considerations above, we can now draw among the orthodox brahmins during Nāgārjuna's life-time, the tendency to place a particularly high esteem on the Upaniṣada alone of the Vedic canon had yet to appear to any marked degree. And even supposing that there were some brahmins who were especially devoted to the Upaniṣads, their influence was very slight had not drawn the notice of Nāgārjuna. Thus, the vast majority of brahmins still interpreted the Upaniṣads literally.

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4. *Madhuśūdana-Sarasvatī*, after asserting that at the passages of the Vedānta have a nature differing from either the vidhis or the arthavāda, has preserved the following theory : "In some cases, however, in so far as the Vedānta, for the reason that it merely explains what is unknown, is said to be a vidhi, and instead of being verses which reveal the vidhi, is the grounds of cognition, and in other cases, (the vedānta) is called the doctrine of the true meaning (bhūtārthavāda), but in either case there is no problem " (Dr. Ui, Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū," Vol. IV,p. 435.)

2. Since there are a great number of points, in common, not only in technical terms and manners of expression, but · ideological as well, between Mahāyāna Buddhism and the Vedānta school, the inter-course between the two has become an important point of consideration for the academic world. Not a few of the scholars in the West and in India have thought that Mahāyāna Buddhism had adopted Upaniṣadic views and Vedānta philosophy : from our considerations above, however, as the brāhmins with whom Nāgārjuna was conversant do not seem to have had any for the Upaniṣad in particular, it cannot be concluded that Nāgārjuna was influenced by any Vedāntic thought coming from such brahmins. When, consequently, some identity or resemblance in literary expresion does occur between Nāgārjuna's works and those of the Vedānta schools, we must conclude that the Vedānta school had adopted them from Nāgārjuna. The reverse is impossible. Later in our discussion of the *Māṇḍukya Kārikās* and the thought of Bhartṛhari, this fact shall assume an important perspective.

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2. Orthodox Brahmanical Thought Mentioned in Āryadeva's Sāstra on Heretic and Hīnayānist Nirvāṇa.

A disciple of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva endeavours to attack in particular those schools outside Buddhism ; nonetheless, he has seldom referred to the thought of the vedānta line. In his work, *The Sāstra by the Bodhisattva (Ārya) Deva on the* Expanation *of Nirvāṅa by (Twenty) Heretical and Hīnayāna (Teachers) Mentioned in the Lanka (-avatāra)-sūtra (T'i-p'o-p'u-sa shih-lang-chia-ching chung-wai-tao-hsiao-sheng-nieh-p'an-lun* Nj. 1260), however, both the Upaniṣadic thought and the orthodox Brahmanical ideas are presented in some detail, This work classifies into twenty types, and minutely examines them one by one, the arguments enumerated in the Lankāvatara-sūtra[1] related to the concept of Nirvāna held by schools cutside Buddhism. It is dubious whether this work is truly by Āryadeva, the disciple of Nāgārjuna, but as its translation was by Bodhiruci (508-535), it must have been composed by the fifth century, at the latest. In the preceding, we shall examine the orthodox brahmanical thought presented in this work.

First of all, the theories of the orthodox brahmins who followed the Vedas is introduced as a theory of the Vedavādins.[2]

1. "It is asked:—Which outsiders teach that the Brahmā Deva is the cause of Nirvaṇa ?"

"It is answered . The fourth class of the oursiders, the Vedavādins, teach that from the navel of the god Nārāyaṇa is born the great lotus flower, and from the lotus is born Brahmā Deva, the forefather of creatures (*pitāmaha)*. All living and non-living things are made by the Brahmā ; from the mouth of Brahmā are

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1. *"Ju-lang-chia-ching,"* tr. by Bodhiruci, Vol. VI, Chapter on *Nirvāna*. Sanskrit version, pp. 182, line 15, 184, line 14.

2. The word "Vedavādin" appears also in the *Tatvvasamgraha-paṇjikā* ad v. 153. Cf. Vedavāda. (Rāmānuja : *Srībhāśya*, ad II.2.26, p. 494).

born the kṣatriyas, from both arms are born the Vaiśyas, and from both feet are born the śūdras. All the earth is a sacrifical place in which are performed the acts to bring happiness and merit. All lotus flowers are produced so that they may be used as offerings. Undergoing transformation, it makes the mountains and fields, birds and beasts. Among men, the domestic pigs, sheep, asses, horses, etc. in this world-arena are killed to be offered up to the Brahmā Deva, so that man may obtain rebirth in Nirvāṇa, the name of Brahmā's world. And therefore, the Vedavādins teach that Brahmā Deva is always said to be the cause of Nirvāṇa."[3]

Although this account mentions the "Vedavādins," it would appear that the theory given about is closer to the *Puruṣa sūkta*[4] in the Vedas. This hymn came into being around the latter period of the *Rg Veda*, which teaches that the gods made puruṣa, i, e. the original man, the object of sacrifice, and as a result of carrying out the ceremony, all the things in world evolved from each of its parts.

"All things of the past and of the future, everything in this whole universe, is none other than puruṣa." (2)

"From the completely burned sacrifice flowed forth the liquid mixture tasting of ghee. All living species which dwell in the sky, in the forests, and in the villages are born from it."[5] (8) "Horses, too, are born from it, and every beast which has two rows of teeth are born from it. Cattle, too, are born from it, and both goats and sheep are also born from it." (10) "When puruṣa was cut into small pieces, into how many different portions was it transformed? What did its mouth become? What its two arms, what about its thighs, and what were its two feet called?" (11)

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3. TT. XXXII. 157 a.

4. *RV*.X.90. It also appears in *AV*.XIX.6; *Vāj. Samh. Tait. Ar*. III.12.

5. The following is according to Drs. Takakusu and Kimura, *Indo Tetsugaku Shūkyō-shi*, pp. 189-190.

"Its mouth became the brahmins, its two arms the Kṣatriyas, its thighs are now the Vaiśyas, and from its two feet the Sūdras were born." (12) "Chandra (the moon) was born from its heart, and Sūrya (the sun) came out from its eye ; Indra and Agni (fire) were born from its mouth, and Vāyu (the wind) was born from its breath." (13) "From its navel arose the world of the sky, and the world of the gods originated from its head. The world of the earth was born from its feet, and the regions from its ear. In the way was this world created." (14)

A cosmogonical myth similar to the above is recounted also in the *Mahābhārata*,[6] where the creation of the world by Prajāpati is told. It, however, does not coincide with the account in Aryadeva's *Sāstra* where the Brahmā Deva is born from the navel of Nārāyaṇa (i. e., Viṣṇu), and the world is constructed from this Brahmā, so that among one section of the religious students of India during that time, some men must have actually lived who taught such a myth of creation based upon the Vedas.[7] Other Buddhist works[8] have also presented the myth that the lotus flower arose from the navel of Viṣṇu, that Brahmā sits within that lotus, giving birth to "the heavens and earth, and all mankind." Even in the Ancient Upaniṣads, furthermore, there is taught the creation of the world from Puruṣa[9] or Brahmā[10], but these accounts are by no means in agreement with that in Āryadeva's *Sāstra*.

It is also a brahmanical assertion that the grass, trees, birds and beasts which are killed as sacrifices in the rituals, are born again

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6. *MBh*. XII.298 (B. 296), 6-6 (-10865-10866).

7. The myth that Brahmā is born from the navel of Visnu appears in *Rāmāyana* VII.56.7. (Hopkins : *Epic Mythology*, p. 191.)

8. *Ta-chih-tu-lun* (*Mahaprajna-pāramita-upadesa-sastra*), Vol. VIII (*TT*. XXV.116a), *Fen-pieh-kung-te-lun* (Nj. 1290), Vol. I (*TT*.XXV. 31a.)

9. *Brhap. Up*. I.4.1, I.5.2 ; *Mund. Up*. II.1 5 ; *Prasna*-Up. VI.4.

10. *Mund. Up*. I.1.1,

into a good condition in the future world, and that the men, also, who perform these ceremonies will receive happiness in a future life. (See, for example, *Manu* V. 39, 40, 42; *Viṣṇu Code* 51. 61 ff.; and the *Yoga Śāstra* II. 33 ff.)

Āryadeva has also refered to the creation myth in the Brāhmaṇas.

2. "It is asked—What class of outsiders teach that the seeing of being and non-being is the cause of Nirvāṇa ?

"It is answered—The twentieth class of outsiders, the philosophers who hold that in the beginning arose an egg, teach that originally there were no sun, moon, stars, sky or earth, that there was only the great waters. Then a great egg was born, like that of a hen, but of a golden colour all around. When it hatched, it broke into two parts, the upper part making the heavens, and the lower part forming the earth. Between these two parts arose the Brahmā Deva, which is called the forefather of all sentient beings. and which made all living and non-living things. Thus, these living and liveless things fall and dissappear into the Brahmā place, which is called Nirvāṇa, And that is why the outsiders, the philosophers of the egg, teach that the great egg gave birth to the Brahmā Deva, who is eternal and is called the cause of Nirvāṇa."

Only water existed in the original state of the universe, after which "a golden egg" arose. and when that hatched, the entire world evolved-this creation myth exists in the ancient Brāhmaṇa literature.

"In the remote past there was truly only water in the universe, only the waves of water,..... etc.

The creation myth that from the primordial waters a gold egg arose, and from this golden egg the world developed, is also taught in other passages in the Brāhmaṇas and it also has been held in the

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11. According to Dr. Tsuji Noashiro, "Veda oyobi Brahmana no shiso" (Veda and Brahmana Thought), in Iwanami Koza, *Toyo Shicho*, (Oriental Thought), pp. 90-91.

12. Sat. Br. VI.1.1.8-10.

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Upaniṣads, that the universe evolved from "egg,"[13] but these do not refer to to Brahmā. Now this thought that the Brahmā arose from a golden egg, and then caused the entire world to evolve, first appears in the Mahābhārata;[14] and in the *Manu Laws*, it assumes the most characteristic expression.

"This myriad existence (in the very beginning) was in darkness, was not perceived. had no special marks, was not reasoned about, was not discerned, and was completely fallen into a deep sleep, as it were." (1.5)

"He (i. e., the supreme self) desiring to produce the various kinds of living species (*prajā*) from his own body, thought (thus), and created first of all water. (Next) he placed his seed within the waters." (1.8)

"That (seed) became a golden egg, in brilliance equal to the sun. In that (egg) Brahmā, the forefather of all the world, was himself born." (1.1)

"After staying for one entire year in that egg, such a Bless One (i. e. Brahmā), by means of thinking about himself (ātman), divided the egg itself into two." (I. 12)

"And from those two fragments, he fashioned heaven and earth, and in the space between (heaven and earth), he made the sky, the eight regions and the eternal dwelling place of the water." (I. 13)

"He made all the living species in the minute portions of himself." (I. 16) (*ātmamātrāsu sarvabhutāni nirmame)*.

These verses exist only in the *Laws of Mauu*[15]. Consequently

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13. *Chand. Up*. III.19.103 ; *Maitri-Up*. VI. 36.

14. *MBh*. XII.312.3, XIII.154.16 ff. Cf. Hopkins ; *GEI*, pp, 187-188, *Epic Mythology*, p. 191.

15. No similar verses in other works on these have been given in the ' Synopsis of Parallel Passages," G. Buhler's apaendix to the English Trans. of the *Manu Code*.

it would seem that the author of Āryadeva's śāstra has perhaps used doctrine theory of the Manu Code-here as his source.

In the same works, agai , are presented also theories which are found only in the Upaniṣads ;

3. "It is asked :—What class of outsiders teach that seeing non-being is the cause of Nirvāna ?

"It is answered :—the nineteenth class of outsiders, the philosophere who assert the power of the mouth, teach that space (ākāśa) is the cause of every-thing. In the beginning arose space, and space arose the wind ; from the wind arose fire, and from fire arose warmth ; from warmth arose water, and water then froze and made the hard earth. From earth arose all kInd of grass and herbs, and from all these kinds of herbs arose the five grains. From the five grains arose life ; therefore, in our theory, it is taught that life is food. In the final period, all returns to disappear in space, which is called nirvāṇa. Thus, the outsider who advocate the power of the mouth, teach that space is eternal, and call it the cause of Nirvāṇa."

The idea that space is the cause of world evolution, is also found in the *Chānd. Up.* VIII. 14 ; but the theory of "the philosophers who advocate the power of the mouth" given above is agreed, for the most part, with doctrine of world devlopment taught in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*

"Truly, from this ātman arose space. From space arose the wind. From wind arose fire, and from fire arose water ; from water arose earth, and from earth arose vegetation ; arose from Vegtation food, and from food arose man. Truly, this man (*puruṣa*) consists of the essence of food." (Tait. Up. II. 1)

"Living things which depend upon the earth, truly all and every one of them arose from food. And they truly exist by means of food. Moreover, they again return to this food (after death). Food, truly, is the highest of (all) the living things."

"(All) the living species arose from food. And all that has arisen grows by means of food." (*Tait Up.* II. 2)

Then, in the very beginning of the world creation, space arose from the Brahmā, from space wind, from wind fire, from fire water, from water earth[16] arose—the order of this development is adopted in the *BS*. II. 3.1-12. Moreover, food came out from the last-mentioned "earth," so Ṡaṇakara has understood. And the idea that all living spacies exist by means of food, is indeed taught in a great many works of India[17].

4. "It is asked :—What class of outsiders teach that by not seeing a difference between the eternal and transitory is Nirvāṇa ?

"It is answered :—The fifth class of outsiders, the Īsānavādins, the form of the Blessed One is invisible, omnipresent, and by this formlessness, it can give birth to all living and lifeless things, which is called Nirvāṇa. Therefore those who belong to the Īsānavādins teach this theory, and say that Īsāna" is eternal and the cause of Nirvāṇa"

"Īsāna" had already in the Brāhmaṇas been taken as another one[18] of the names for the god Siva, and is a term which was latter inherited also by Hinduism. In the Ṡvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, which exalts the god Ṡiva, a verse which corresponds to the one given above is frequently taught.

"He rules all the worlds by his powerful authority. He exists within all men after creating all living creatures as their protecting deity, he withdraws them during the final period." (*Śvet. Up.* III. 2)

"By that puruṣa, this entire world is filled." (*Ibid*. III. 9) "That which exists higher than this world is formless, and does not suffer. The man who knows it will become immortal." (*Ibid*. III. 10)

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16. In the *Chānd. Up.* VI.2.4. there is : "Fire is born from food," but the *Brahma Sūtra* (II.3.12) understands in this case that the word for food (*anna*) means earth as a substance.

17. Cf. *Bhag. G.* III. 14 ; *DN.* III, p. 211....*sabbe satta āhāraṭṭhikā.* "All things are born and exist by food ; without food, they die." *Tsenn-i-a-han-ching*, Vol. 42, *TT*. II. 778c).

"He pervades all things, and is bliss (*bhagavat*) (*Ibid.* III. 11)

"Your are beginningless and exist with omnipresence inherent. All that which is arose from it." (*Ibid.* IV. 4)

"His form is not to be seen. No one can see him with the eye. Those men who, by menas of heart and mind, know that he exists thus in the heart, will become immortal." (*Śvet. Up.* IV. 20-(var.) *Kaṭha-Up.* VI. 9 ; *Mahānār.* I. 11) The "Saint" mentioned in Āryadeva's *Sāstra* perhaps is a translation for *bhagavat.*

5. It is asked :—What class of outsiders teach that the wind is the cause of Nirvāṇa.

"It is anwered :—The third class of outsiders, those who teach that the wind is sacred, teach that the wind can give birth to long-lived thnigs ; the wind makes all things, and can destory all things. They say that the wind is *Nirvāṇa.* Thus those who think the wind is sacred teach that wind is eternal and is the cause of *Nirvāṇa.*"

Originally, the god of wind (*Vāyu*) was thought to have been the apotheosis of the natural phenomenal wind since the time of the Ṛg *Veda*, and was an important deity alongside other gods such as the sun-god (Surya), and the fire-god (Agni). While there have been handed down even the Upaniṣad gods with such a character, thinkers, however, newly appeared who went a step further and regarded the wind as the fundamental principle of all things. It was taught that "The other divinities, truly, go on their way to destruction, but this does not happen with the wind. this divinity, the wind, is one which never goes to ruin." (*Bṛhad Up.* I. 5.22). And the famous scholarly priest, Yājnavalkya, when asked what the thread (*sūtra*) is which is the principle maintainning the world, answered that it is the wind. "The wind truly is that thread......... By the wind, which is the thread, this world, the other

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18. Bhandarkar : *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems* (Strassburg, 1913), p. 105.

world, and all existence are held together" (*Bṛhad. Up*. III. 7.1-2). And the philosopher Raikva, who spent his life wandering about with no possessions, replied to King Jānaśruite, when asked politely and with all decorum about his teaching, that :

"The wind, truly, is the snatcher of all. Verily, when the fire is extinguished, it returns to the wind. when the sun sinks, it returns to the wind. When the moon sets, it returns to the wind. When the water dries up, it returns to the wind. For the wind, truly, is that which absorbs all these (deities) " *Chānd Up*. IV. 3.1-2

And among the gods, that is, when mentioned in reference to the universe, the wind is the fundamental principle ; and when mentioned in regard to the individual substances, breath (prāṇa) is the primal function, he asserted. In both of them, there is *moving air* (An idea resembling this further appears in the *Jaiminīya-Upaniṣad-Brāhmaṇa* III. i. 1,2[19] and in the *Kaau. Up*, II. 11-25.)

6. "It is asked :—what class of outsiders teach that seeing of being is called Nirvāṇa ?

"It is answered :—The eighteenth class of outsiders, the philosophers who submit water,[20] hold the following theory: Water is the fundament of all thnigs. Water can give birth to the heavens and the earth, proudce all living and lifeless things. From the Avīci hell below to the *Aknaiṣṭha* heaven above, everything is ruled by water. Water can produce things, and water can destroy things, and is called *Nirvāṇa*,"

The idea which says that water is the source of all things, is taught in the famous *Nāsadāsītya-sūkta* (X. 129), which indicates the highest peak of ancient Ṛg-Vedic philosophical thought, and the theory of "those philosophers who hold that the egg originally gave

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19. Oertel, *JAOS*, Vol. XV (1893), dp. 249-251.

20. The "submit to" in the phrase "submit to water" may mean to "use" or to "respect." The same ideograph appears in the Northern Edition of the *Ta-pan-nieh-p'an-ching* (Nj. 113), Vol. 16 (*TT*. XXII. 462c), where it says : "The four months submit to fire, the seven dahs submit to the wind."

birth to all," as related above, could be admitted as one of the branch-streams of this ideological tendency. In ddition, it appears in several places in the Vedic literature (*Kāṭhaka-Samhitā* VIII. 2 ; *Vāj. Samh.* XXXII. 1 Tadreva-*Up.* ; *Tait. Samh.* V.6.4 2. ; *Śat Br.* VI. 8. 2. 3. ; XI. 1. 6. 1-16 ; and, *Tait. Br.* I. 1. 3. 5). Such an idea gradually disappeard as the Brahmātma theory developed, but in the Upaniṣads, the Legal Codes And the Epic Poems, the last traces remain of the thought which regards water as the fundamental principle (*Bṛhad. Up.* I.7*Kaṭha-Up.* IV. 6; *Manu* I. 8-11 ; *MBh.* XII. 183 , 2-13)[21]

7. "It is asked :—What class of outsiders teach that all things are created by time, which is called *Nirvāṇa* ?

"It is answered :—The seventeenth class of heretics, the Kālavādins, teach as follows. Time ripens all the elements ; time makes all things ; and time disperses all things. Therefore, in our doctrine it is taught : Even supposing that one is shot by hundreds of arrows, it his time has not come, he will not die ; but if his time has come, he could instantly die by touching a small blade of grass. All things time produce, all things time ripens, and all things time destroys. Time is not to be transcended. Therefore the Kālavāidins teach that time is eternal, gives birth to all things, and is called the cause of *Nirvāṇan*."

"The idea that time (*kāla*) is the principle which generates the world, had already been taught in ancient times in the *Kālasūkta* (AV.XIX. 53), and has always been a concept of the orthodox brahmins. This idea was inherited in the Upaniṣads also,[22] and the latter Epic Poems[23] taught that time was one type of divinity which commanded the birth and destruction of all things. Such a concept

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21. On the idea that the concept of primordial water belongs to the orthodox brahmins, see further R. Garbe : *Sāmkhya Philosophie*[2], S. 23-24.

22. *Maitri-Up.* VI. 14-15. This is listed in the *Śvet-Up.* I.2, VI.1, however, as one of the heretical views

23. *MBh.* XII. 223.5 ff, 227.29 ff ; *Anugītā*. 45.9 ff.

was than latter adopted by the Vedānta philosophy also. As we shall discuss latter, Bharatrbari regards time as the principale which causes tsansformations to arise in the world, while Kamalaśila, whenevar he attacked the *puruṣa* in orthodox brahmanical thought, included within his polemics the theory of "intellectual time (*buddh-imān kālaḥ*).[25] Consequensly, the concept of "Time" suppositioned by the Kālavādina was not a substance which made possible the conceptions of before and after, simultaneity, and earlier or later, as was taught in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School, but was the unique principle which causes generation and transformation to arise in the world.[26] Funthermore, the words quoted in Āryadeva's *Sāstra* above coincide with this verse.

"Time causes living things to mature, and time causes living things to return to destruction. Time is make in the persons who sleep, Time truly, is difficult to overcome."

kālaḥ pacti bhūtāni kālaḥ saṁharate prajāḥ

kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi duratikramaḥ.[27]

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24. The present work (Vol. IV), Part VII, Chap, 4, Sect. 4.3. See further; this writer's "Kotoba no Keijijogaku" (The metaphysics of language), in *Tetsugaku Zasshi*, Feb. 1945.

25. *Tattvasamgrahapañjikā* ad v. 170.

26. On Kalavadin, see F.O. Schrader, *Diss.*, S. 17 ff, S. 58 ff, Concerning the accounts extant in Buddhist literature, see Dr. Mochizuki Shinko, *Bukkyo Daijiten* (Buddhist Dictionary), reference under "Jironshi" (Kalavadin). Also, see *Lankavatara*, p. 184, line 11 ; *Mvr* p. 159, line 7, 567, line 2.

27. Quoted in the *Madhyamaka-vṛitti*, p. 386, lines 6-7. Cf. Poussin's commentary on this passage. Elsewhere, it appears in Gaudapada ad *Samkhya-karika* 61, the commentary of the Suvarnasaptati on the same verse, and in Ānandajnana ad *Bṛhad. Up. Vārttika*, p. 1825. The verses quoted in the Commentary by by Bhattotpada (Vix. SS. p 9) on *Bṛhatsaṁhitā*, says : *ke 'pi Kālakāraṇikāḥ Paurāṇikāḥ kālam karaṇam āhuḥ.*

The foregoing has consisted in our examination of the coincid ence in thought between some theories present in Āryadeva's Sāstra and the Vedas, particluarly the Upanisads. And since some theories are also presented of Hinduism, which have a close conncetion with these, I shall ·ake this opportunity to examine them here. Firstly, we should know that the thought of the *Bhagavadgītā* is enumerated.

8. "It is asked :—What class of outsider teach that the seeing of Īśvara, who makes all creatures, is called *Nirvāna* ?

"It is answered :—The twelfth class of outsiders, the followers of Māṭhara[28], say that the adherents of Nārāyaṇa teach that "I make all things. I, among all living things, am supreme. I give birth to the entire world of living and lifeless things. I am the King of Mt. Sumeru, the largest of all mountains. I am the largest ocean of all the waters. I am the grain of all medicines. I am Muni Kapila of all the sages. If a man with pious heart offers water, leaves, flowers and fruit to me, I shall not lose him, and he shall not lose me.' The Māṭhara masters teachd that the adherents of Nārāyana say that "All things are created and produced by me, and when they return to perish in this place, it is called Nirvāṇa."

Because "Nārāyaṇa" is another name for the god Viṣṇu, "the adherents of Nārāyaṇa" should refer to the religionists of the Viṣṇu school, or the Vaiṣṇava. In the Viṣṇu school—not to mention the general orthodox thought In India—, the most important scripture is the Bhagavadgītā, in which we can discover many verses correspon- ding to the above quoted passage.

"O Son of Kunti, all living things enter in to my original essence (*prakṛti*) when this eon (*kalpa*) returns to destruction. In the beginning of the eon, I again create them." (Bhag. G. IX, 7) "Standing in dependence upon my own original nature, I repeatedly create the entirety of these

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28. Cf. the item in *PW* on Mathara. Further, the correspond- ing relationship with the Gita was already pointed out by Dr. Ui. (*Tetsugaku Zasshi*, (Journal of Philosophy), 1919, p. 271 ff.)

aggre-gates of being. As they do not have that power, they rely uopn the power of my original nature." (*Ibid.*, IX. 8)

"By me, the overseer, the original nature (*prakṛti*) gives birth to the entire world accompanied by both the *things which move (animals) and those which do not move (plants)*.

O Son of Kunti, by this causal relation, the world evol ves." (IX. 10)

"And of Rudra grup of deities, I am the god Rudra. I am the god of wealth among the Yakṣa and the Rākṣasa clans. And I am the god of fire among the Vasu group of deities. *I am Mt. Sumera among tho highest peaks.*" (X. 23)

"And, O son of Pārtha, know that I am chief lord of prayers among the household priests. I am Skanda (the war-god of the gods of war. *the great ocean of the lakes and rivers.*" (X.24) "I am the Bodhi traee of all the trees. And the Sage Nārada of all the divine sages. I am Citraratha among the Gandharvas. *I am sage Kapila among the divine sageis who have perfected religious practice.*" (X. 26)

"If a man with a faithful minp (bhaktyā) offeve to me one leaf, one flower, one fruət, or both hanps full of woter, I shall aceept the offering given with a faithfui mind by a person whose beart is pious." (IX. 26)

"I am, towasrds all being, equal. To me, there is nothing hateful,nor is there anything dear.

If there are any, however, who worship me with a faithful heart, they shall exist in me, and I shall exist in them." (IX. 29)

In the last two verses, especially, devotion (*bhakti*), the central conception of the *Bhagavadgītā* is emphasized. Now, in Āryadeva's *Śastra*, it is recorded that the "adherents of Māṭhara" have handed down this theory of the Vaiṣṇava. Māṭhara, according to several dictionaries of India *Trikāṇḍaśeṣa Abhidhānacintāmaṇi Anekārtha-samgraha*), is another nam efor Vyāsa. Consequently, this must point

to the Vyās said to be the author of the *Mahābhārata*, And we note in the *Bhāgavatī*, one of the Jaina scriptures, that the historical poems (itihāsa) are called Māḍhara in the vulgar language (Prakrit); Albrecht weber understands this to mean *"die werke des Māthara (Vyāsa ?)."*[29] Therefore, not only was the author of Āryadeva's *Śāstra* familiar with the legend that the *Mahābhārata* was a work of Vyāsa, he also knew that the *Bhagavadgītā was* later inserted in the *Mahābhārata*. From this account, we see that the inclusion of the *Bhagavadgītā in the Mahābhārata* must have been considerably earlier.

9. "It is asked :—What class of outsiders teach that when the creator and created are united together, this is called Nirvāṇa ?

"It is answered :—The fifteenth class of outsiders, the proponents of Māhesvara, teach as follows: The effect is created by Nārāyaṇa. Brahmā is the cause. Mahesvara has one body and three parts, i.e., Brahmā. Nārāyaṇa, and Mahesvara. The earth is the foundation. The lord of the earth is Mahesvara. In the three worlds, all the living and lifeless things which exist are produced by Mahesvara. As for Mahesvara itself, space is its head, earth is its excrement, all creatures are worms in its bowels, wind is its life, fire is its warmth, and merit and demerit are its actions(*karman*). These eight types are the Mahesvara itself. Īsvara is the cause of birth and destruction. All is produced by Īsvara and by Īsvara is destroyed, and this called Nirvāna. Therefore, the propoudners of M hesvara teach that Īsvara eternally produces all things, and is the cause of Nirvāṇa."

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29. A. Weber, *Uber die Fragments der Bhāgavati*, Teil II, S. 248 .—*baisesiyam|Buddhasāsaṅam, Kāvilam, Logāyatam Saṭṭhitamtam Madhara-Purāna-vagarana-nāḍagāī* Further, in the *Ju-ta-ch'eng-iun* the outsiders are classified as : identical different, both identical different, neither identical nor different, and it says: "All outsiders and Maṭhara have different, thoughts. They all are not apart thus from the four classes." (*TT*. XXXII. 40b). In such cases, needless to say, "Mathara" does not means the Mathara who wrote the commentary on the *Sāmkhya-Kārikās*.

"Mahesvara" is another name for the god Śiva, and is translated in the chinees as "Great Self-existent Deity." Here the theory is presented of a certain school which worshlps Śiva. The theory of one body and three spirits (*trimurti*), which holds that the Brahmā, Nārāyaṇa, i.e., the god Viṣṇu, and Maheśvara, i.e., the god Śiva, are three manifestations of the single and supreme reality appears in the latter period of the Epic Poems, and later became the fundamental thought of Hinduism.[30] Further, as in the words Āryadev's *Śāstra* above, this typs of thinking which holds that the supreme deity manifests ltself as a personification, and that the parts of this deity are the same as the consittuent elements of the universe, had already appeared in the Upaniṣads. (*Bṛhad. Up.* VI. 4.3; *Chānd UP.* V. 18. 2 ; *Muṇḍ. UP.* II. 1.4) The concept of Siva having "eight manifestations" (*āṣṭamurti*) appeared already in the Epic Poems *MBH.* III. 49.4,8), and the poet-saint Kālidāsa also praised Śiva as being of eight manifestations.[31]

On the part of the Buddhists, also, the theory is handed down in the esoteric suftras that the constituent elements of Īśvara are regarded to be identical with the various phenomena of the world.[32]

10. "It is asked :—What class of outsiders teach that the evolution and transformation of the lives of men of independent substancesis called Nirvāṇa ?

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30. The word "*trimurti*," however, in so far as the extant Sanskrit literature is concerned, appears in the *Kumārasambhava* of Kalidasa, and this is the oldest source It should be adequately noted that the "one body, three parts" is clearly mentioned in Aryadeva's *Śāstra*, presumed to be of the same period or prior to the *Kumārasambhava*.

31. Hopkins, *Epic Mythology*, p. 221 ; M T. Narasimhiengar *Kalidasa's Religion and philosophy*, IA. 1910, pp. 236-241. Further, the legend has been handed down in the *Ta-chih-tu-lun*, Vol. VIII (*TT.* XXV. 116c), the "eight children" are born from the mind of the Brahma king, and "the heaven, earth and mankind" are born from these eight children.

32. *Mo-teng-chia-ching* (Nj. 645), Vol. I (*TT.* XXI. 402c).

"It is answered :—The ninth class of outsiders, those who hold that all things derived from certain female persons, teach that Mahesvara made eight females. The first is called Aditi, the second Diti, the third Surabhi, the fourth Vinatā, the fifth Kapilā, the sixth Manu, the seventh Ilā, and the eighth Kadru. Aditi begot the gods; Diti created the demons. Surabhi produced the serpents; Vinatā gave birth to the birdhs. Kapilā begot quadrupeds; Manu to men. Ilā produced all kinds of grain; Kadru gave birth to all kinds of snakes, scorpions, mosquitoes, gnats, flies, fleas, millipedes, centipedes, etc. To know this, is called Nirvāṇ. Therefore, those who teach that all derives from females, say that females are eternal and are called the cause of Nirvāṇa." Since this theory also has concluded that Mahesvara is the primaly cause of word evolution, it might perhaps have been taught by some sect of the Śiva school. A creation-myth similar to it has also been taught in the Epic Poems. In the Mahābhārata (1 65), Marīci, the son of Brahmā, is said to have given birth to Kaśyapa, who married the thirteen daughters of Dakṣa, the result being the birth of all the devas, mankind and the animals. These thirteen daughters were Aditi, Diti. Danu, Kālā Danāyu, Simhika, Krodhā, Prādhā, Visavā, Muni and Kadru. The minute details of the birth of these women are recorded, and we note that there are many coincidences with the account givenabove. Again, according to the *Rƨmāyaṇa* (III.14) and the *Harivamśa* (170), Kaśyapa wed the eight daughters of Dakṣa, given birth to all living things. The names of these eight are Aditi, Diti, Danu, Kālikā, Tārmrā Krodhavaśā, Manu and Analā[33]

Consqueutly, while it is true that the creationmyth similar to this are merely mentioned in the epics, it is still very interesting that a theory which is in almost complete agreement with the account in Āryadeva's Sāstra was handed down by a Jain scholr, Abhayadeva, in the 11th century as a "doctrine of creation" (*nirmitavāda*). (The names of the women mentioned in the passages above translated fron the Chinese were derived from Abhayadeva)[34] He has record-

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33. Hopkins, *Epic Mythology*, p. 200.

34. F. O. Schrader, *Diss*. S. 56. However, Abhayadeva has taken Sulasa, instead of Kapila.

ed in completely the same from the names of "the eight daughters" and the various things to which they gave birth.

Ten more kinds of heretical doctrines have been presented in addition in Āryrdeva's Śāstra, but as they do not have any direct connection with the thought of the orthodox brahmine who were devoted to tha Vedas, I shall omit then here. By our considerations in the foregion, we have gathered, rather surprisingly, that the author of this *Śāstra* was minutely versed in the ohtaodox brahmanical thought. Howver, we have seen in the theories quoted above that while they coincide with those in the Vedas. and, in particular, the Upaniṣads and the Mahābhārata, there is nonetheless no explicit reference to the Brahman or to the ātman, the central concepts of Vedānta Philosophy. Nor is there any mention of the efforts of the schoolars who tried to unify and unite the heretical doctrines taught in the Vedas (especially the Upaniṣad) and the Mahābhārata (particularly the Bhagavadgita included therein), in order to set up a unique system. Not only is no mention made of the Vedānta scholars, the thought of the early Vedānta a philosophers after the period of the *Brahma-śutra* in not toutched upon either.

As a consequency, we can, I think, draw forth the following conclusion from these facts. The brahmine who were in contact with the author of *Aryadeva's Śāstra*, had yet to set up a philosophical systems such as we find developed in the later Vedānta. They had merely followed some such of the special philosophical theories taught in the voluminous Vedic literature, and were only concerned with the commentaries and explanation of these sacred verses. Even supposing, for example, that somewhere in the Indian society of that time there were scholars or schools which undertook comprehensive and systematic investigations on the entire thought of the Upanisads, their influence must have been quite slight, and did not draw the attention of the Buddhists. (Although Āryadeva's *Sastra* does lists the names and presents the doctrines of the Vaiśesika and Sāmkhya as schools. and also mentions the Lankavatara itself, in in addition to the names of the founders of some of the schools, as Kaṇāla, Akaśpāda, Brāhaspati, and Pāṇini, no name which might refer to the Vadānta school in particular or to its

philosophere has been give.) Our conclusion, then, is the same as that which we reached when we examined the words of Nāgārjuna.

We should say a word further in this connection : Aryadeva's Śastra, it is true, does quote a number of Upaniṣadic theories as those of *Separate teachers.* Thus, the author of this work never thought that the passages of the Upanisads contain unified thought. He probably accepted, as a self-evident fact, that the Upaniṣads contain a great nnmber af heterogeneous concepts. It may have happened that a goodly number of the men among the brahmins then had emphasized one or the other of the thoughts found in the Upaniṣads.

(Further, in *The Questions of King Milinda*, p. 3, among the 19 kinds of learning which King Milinda studied, are given the Samkhya Yoga Niti Visesika...Cātubbeda...Hetu, etc. but there is no reference to either the Mimamsa or the Vedānta.)

Section 6. Vedānta Thought Reported by Maitreya-nātha and Vasubandhu.

The Vijnaptimātratā philosophy is said to have been first set forth by Maitreya-nātha (c, 970-350). developed by Asanga (c. 310-390), and diffused throughout all of India by Vasubandhu (c. 320-400), Now what kind of attitude had this scholars adopted towards Vedānta thought ?

Maitreya-nātha is reported to be the author of a voluminous work, the *Yogācārabhumi-śāstra*, 100 Vole., and in Volumes 6 and 7, there is presented and criticized "the sixteen types of heretic doctrine" prevalent in India up to that time. Despite the fact that his discussion of the doctrines is extremly detailed, he does not refer to the Vedānta school. The school which held theories closest to thsoe of the Vedānta, was perhaps the Īśvarādikāraṇavādin theories presented in tne work.

What is here taken as the object for criticism, is the theory which asserts that everything in the world is formed by "Īśvara" (presiding deity), or by Puruṣa, Among them, there is, I think, a worldview somewhat like that of the Vedānta which says that from a single and undifferentiated cause, this pluralistic and multifarious world appeared as an evolute. Since such proponents have accepted that the cause and the effects are heterogenious, they were also called "the non-equal cause proponents," Now, the logical grounds that such disputants must have had far assuming a single world-cause would be as follows : No matter how much man may endeavour to fulfil his world ot the next, he is by no means assured that he shall obtains the desired results. Therefore, whether or not man obtains the fruits of his actions, must be thought to depend upon the presiding deity[2]. (A similar argument is set forth in *Nyāya-sūtra* IV.1.1.9 ff.)

1. Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yü-chia-shih-ti-lun) (Nj 1170), vol. VII (*TT. XXX*. 309, a-c.)

2. The Īśvara mentioned here need probably not be limited to Śiva *alone*,

Against such an argument, Maitreya-nātha systematically set forth his objections by means of the dilemma based upon the four points of view. Since most of his arguments are the same as those in the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* noted above and the *Tattvasaṃgraha* to be discussed leter, we shall omit examination of them here.

Moreover, in the *Prakaraṇāryavāca-śāstra* (*Hsien-yang-sheng-chiao-lun* (Nj. 1177) by Asaṇga, also, the 16 types of heretical doctrines are similarl, given, and the theory of the "Īsvarādikāraṇ-vādins" is also mentioned. but as it coincides closely with the words and passages in the *Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra*, there is no need to re-examine it here.

Again, in the *Mahāyāna-samparigraha-śāstra* by Asaṇga there are given five kinds of heretical doctrines which confuse the first relational arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) of the ālayavijñāna (storehouse of intellectual impressions), and one of them says : "Some adhere to Īsvara as the creator (*nirmāṇa*)". Upon this the famous translator Paramārtha (499-569) wrote the commentary :

> "There is but one world-cause, named Īsvara. It causes us to do good and evil, to evolve and to transmigrate. Later, it causes aversion to arise in us and the wish to attain liberation. The doctrine that Īsvara is the world-cause, is born in wisdom releases all bondage, and unites one with the Īsvara itself."[4]

We see in this passage that Paramārtha here seems to have thought that Īsvara was rather the deity who directs the destiny of the individual. Such an idea has olready been taught in several places in the Ancient Upaniṣads (E. g., *Kāṭhaka-Up*. II. 20, 23; *Svet Up*. I. 6, III.20 etc.)

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3. vol. X (*TT*. XXXI, 527 a-c).

4. *TT*. XXXI, 164 c. This is a passage in Vasubandhu's Commentary, but as no corresponding verse exist in either the translation by Gupta or that by Hsüan-tsang, we must think that the interpre tation of Paramārtha himself.

Thus, the early Yogācāra ṣcholars, Maitreya-nātha, Asaṇga and Vasubandhu presented and criticized the concept of the presiding deity (Īśvara) or the puruṣa being the world-cau e, but had yet to mention, the "Vedānta school".

Section The Vedānta as Presented by Bhavya

In the eighth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā*, which is a comm n-tary by the author himself on the *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya* by Bhavya (c. 490-570) the Vedānta philosophy of his days is described and refuted.[1] Bhavya was a Buddhist philosopher of the Mādhyamika school, and is said to have been the founder of the Svātantrika sub-school of the Mādhyamika School. The chapter, representing some aspects of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta philosophy, is very important for the study of the history of the Vedānta school. The argument used by Bhavya to attack the Vedānta philosophy are highly interesting. Here I should like to point out some of the characteristics of the Vedānta philosophy described in his works, using Bhavya's description as a basis.

In the Vedānta theory described by Bhavya, the Absolute is called Brahman, Ātman, Puruṣa, Īśvara and Maheśvara, all of which are held to be different names for the same fundamental principle. That is, he regards that all the world principles expounnded in the Upaniṣads are the same principle. We can learn, accordingly, that those Vedānta scholars who had intercourse with Bhavya at that time maintained a composite and unified interpretation of the contents of the Upaniṣads.

Now, the Vedānta doctrines which Bhavya knew are by no means similar, but are really variegated and multifarious.

Take the theories on Puruṣa for example. "Puruṣa," a noun meaning the original "human being," developed in meaning to become the fundamental principle of the world ; even in the philosophy of later centuries, it was not disassociated from the form of man. The same holds for Bhavya's account. Puruṣa was, of course, identical with "Īśvara" (V. 3), and "Ātman" (v, 43) and anything that could be

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1. The first portion of the eighth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā* (vv. 1-16 with notes to them) was translated by Prof. V. V. Gokhale into English and Puhlished with the Tibetan text prepared by Hajime Nakamura in *Indo-Iranian Journal*, vol. II, 1958, Nr. 3, pp. 165-160.

said of the Absolute could also be predicated of Puruṣa. He said for example, that because it surpasses all things, it is "the Great" (v. 2); as it controls all things, it is called "the governing god of everything (v.15) and "the governing god of all bodies"(v. 26); it is called "the immortal" (v. 6), and liberation is its fundamental nature (v. 43). Yet here as before, he portrays Puruṣa by way of personification and thinks that it has a body similar to that of a human being ; he asserts that the individual parts of its body in themselves correspond to the various phenomenal elements of the natural world (v.4). Again, he says that Puruṣa is of a gold colour (v. 3), and has inherently the various brillances of the sun (vv. 3, 55). Further more, he thought that the place where Puruṣa exists is particular and limited—Puruṣa abides in a dark orbit remote from the orbit of the earth (note to v. 2) He also says that Puruṣa transcending the three worlds exists far away (v. 3). Thus, he portrays Puruṣa very concretely, and there are, in Bhavya's concept of Puruṣa, the left-over dregs of a primitive *simple and puerile* idea.

While Puruṣa was thus a transcending deity, being one, it also includes the three worlds (v. 9 v. 8) and pervades all things (vv. 2, 3, 4). All things in the past, present, and future none other than Puruṣa ; the internal and external, the near and far, are also none other than Pnruṣa (v. 4). He says that all things do not differ from Puruṣa (v. 43), and that Maheśvra consist of the entire world (v. 2) This idea can also be found in the hymns on Puruṣa in the *Ṛg-Veda* and was not a new thesis.

Despite the fact that Bhavya frequently employed the word "Puruṣa" in the same sense as Ātman as a philosophical concept, his concept of Puruṣa, whenever he took up this question alone, was still not completely free of the mythological tints of the remote past. In it were further included child-like speculations. The fact, then, that an explanation on Puruṣa was thus detailedly presented as a Vedānta philosophical theory should be regarded as extremely important in the history of ideas. Vedānta scholars like Gauḍapāda Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkara, discuss the concept of Puruṣa. It would, seem that they thought that Puruṣa was only an ancient mythological concept. and that they did regard it so highly as a philosophical

concept. Since, however, theories on Puruṣa were quite influential during the time of Bhavya, it seems that they would have discussed this one before all else. Both Śāntirakṣita and Kamaraśila, who are later than Bhavya, thoroughly discuss the concept of Puruṣa as a theory of the Vedavādins. In the light of this, it would seem that this idea had been vigorously pursued in the intellectual world which the eyes of the Buddhists at that time reflected.

It is particularly noteworthy that the concept of Puruṣa presented above has a remarkable resemblance to the concept of the supreme deity in the Śivasect. Here, Puruṣa is protrayed as having human form, and was thought to have a body similar to that of human beings ; and it was asserted that the individual parts of its body in themselves have their respective counterparts in the phenomena and elements of the natural world (note to v. 4). Although this idea had already appeared in the Upaniṣads, the Buddhists presented it as a theory of the Śiva sect in particular.[2] Again, the fact that Puruṣa is of a golden color, is also expounded in the Upaniṣads which explain the worship of Śiva.[3] While this Puruṣa is also called Maheśvara here, there were many instances throughout Indian religious literature in whieh this name was used as a title for Śiva. Another interesting fact is that all the Upaniṣads cited here to present the Vadānta theory either teach faith in Śiva, or emphasis the grace

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2 Cf. Bodhisattva Ārya Deva's Commentary on the Docrine of the Heretics, the Hīnayāna and Nirvāṇa, in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (Hajime Nakamura, Upaniṣadic Tradition and the Early School of Vedānta as noticed in Buddhist Scripture, in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 18, June 1955, Numbers 1 and 2, pp. 99-101.)

3 Eg., *Kaivalya. Up.* II. 1.

(Prasāda) of the supreme god.[4] With these facts in consideration, it seems that by the time of Bhavya, a section of the Vedānta school had already worshipped Śiva, and that there existed a particular sect with theistic inclinations which worshipped and followed the Upaniṣads readily related to the theology of the Śiva sect (*e. g. Īśa*, Kāṭhaka, and Śvetāśvatara). Bhavya's conceat of Puruṣa, then, may have derived from his knowledge of this sect And one could think that this school framed a traditon diffarent form than of those Vedānta scholars of the *Brahma-sūtra* tradition wich emphasized the *Chāndogya Upaniśad*.

In connection with this fact it is also noteworthy that one can here find the idea of sun-worship. Bhavya makes out that Puruṣa is "that which has the brilliances of the sun", that the various colours are "the substance of all the gods", and that the fundamental nature of the sun is "the great Īśvara (the great self-existent god)" (note to v. 4) [5] Sun-worship is a form the faith which has been maintained in India also without interruption from the time of the *Rg-veda.* These Upaniṣads also teach that which exists in the sun and that which exists in the individual bodies (Puruṣa) are really identical (*Tait. Up.* II. 8, III. 10). They thought, therefore, that the Absolute Brahman exists in the sun. But that as it may, sun-worship has been of particular influence in Hinduism and the popu-

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4 In Chapter VIII of the *Tark-jvālā*, passages of the Upaniṣads are quoted in eight stanzas. Except for the one whose canonical grounds are not clear, the Kāṭhaka-Up-is quoted once, the Īśā-Up. and the Śvetāśvatara Up. five times. Since Īśvara is called Śiva in the Śvetāśvatara, and in the Īśa there cau be found theistic ideas, it is not in the least strange that the word Īś (vara) should have been interpreted by men of later centuries as another name for Śiva. And the words of the Kāṭhak Up. II-21 quoted by Bhavya are found in exactly the passage which emphasizes the grace (prasāda) of the Supreme Deity.

5. Cf, īśvarah sarveṣām bhūtānāṃ gopāyitādityaḥ (Nirukta. III. 12).

lar faiths of India. Some of the Purāṇas (e. g., *Saura-Purāṇa*, *Bhaviṣya-Purāṇa* 73) refer to it together with Śiva-worship, and regard Śiva as identical with the sun. And Bhavya may have faintly heard of the tradition of this faith.

On the other hand, again, as it has been recounted that the Puruṣa is indistinguishable from and completely identical in meaning with the ātman as a Pure Philosophical concept, I shall next summarise the ātman theory presented here. In this theory of ātman, there are traces of an extremely advanaced philosophical speculation. As the ātman is the original self of every individual soul which cannot be replaced by anything else, no person can be apart from the ātman (v 1). The ātman is bound and is also liberated (note to v. 1). One ought only to say that it exists (v. 19). And the ātman also has cognition (jnāna or knowledge) as its original attribute (note to v. 31; v. 39; note to v. 46).[6] 'One can also say that it is the subject of cognition (note to v. 30 ; note to v. 31) As it is the subject of ourselves, it cannot be grasped as an object. It is impossible to affirmatively describe its basic essence by words (v. 17 ; note to v. 76). The ātman has no form (v. 53) Actually, the ātman has frequently been referred to as "the only one" or "the unique" (vv. 39, 57, 61-63, 72, etc). As the One, it exists eternally in time (note to v. 42, v. 74). "The ātman belongs to the class of immutable things, and it cannot be split up by any relation whatsoever" (note to v. 6) Again, it exists everywhere spacially (v. 58) Completely filling all bodies, it is the unique ātman of all things (note to v. 49). Its characteristics of "omnipresence" and "uniqueness" are frequently mentioned together (v. 61 ; note to v. 72 ; note to v. 79).

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6. Bhavya mentions, and rejects, the theory that "the essence of ātman (Puruṣa) is non-cognition (ajnāna)" and the theory that "the essence of ātman is not cognition, nor is it non-cognition" (vv. 41, 69), but he may merely have incidentally referred to this in connection with the common doctrine of the Vedānta school that the essence of ātman is cognition," for the reason that the ātman also cannot be established as something whose essence is different from cognition : and it may not have been the case that there actually was some person who advocated such a doctrine at that time.

It can also be said to be undifferentiated (v. 17 ; note to v. 75). In some cases, the ātman was thought to be a substance (dravya) (vv. 51, 59). Because it surpasses everything else, it is also called "the Supreme" (mchog) (note to v. 34), "the principal" (gtso bo), "the highest" (dam pa) (note to v. 37).

Now, how can ātman as this transcendental Absolute become the subject of the action of individual bodies ?

The Vedānta sect described by Bhavya recognised two kinds of ātman. (1) There is the ātman bound by the body, that is, the ātman appearing within the body ; and, (2) there is the highest, liberated ātman, that is the supreme self (paramātman) (v. 23). The letter corresponds to the Puruṣa described already ; the former is generally said to be the individual self (jīva) in the Vedānta philosophy, and *all the gods are understood to be individual selves* (v. 12) This individual self is the actor who performs good and evil Karma and is also the one who enjoys the fruit of its action (vv. 14, 34). The individual self centered within the individual body is sometimes called Puruṣa, and it is said that Puruṣa- is the actor and the function within the eyes, etc note to v. 30, note to v. 32) The existence of this Puruṣa or ātman cannot be perceived by the sense organs (note to v. 33),but the existence of the ātman must be admitted as the subject which unifyingly perceives the mental processes of the individul body (vv. 25, 28). All mental processes, *e. g.*, sensation, perception, association, memory etc , are really formed by the functioning of the Puruṣa. Human speech and concepts are also produced from the working of the ātman (v. 27 ; note to v. 30). Concerning the proofs for the existence of ātman they follow similar lines as those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Opposed to this, however, the Supreme Self is the ruler which controls all individual selves While one must accordingly say that it participates in all actions of individual selves, the Puruṣa or Supreme Self itself, nevertheless; does not receive the fruits, good or evil, of its action (note to v. 15) While dwelling within all bodies, it functions with a desire towards all objects, but it is not stained or defiled by them (vv 15, 71). And it is completely apart from any defects or faults (v. 87).

Now, individual self, differing with each body, exists in numerous forms, but the Supreme Self in only one pervasive existence, and does not exist in differentiated forms

In order that one understands this meaning, two illustrations are given. One analogy alludes the individual self to a clay pot and the Supreme Self to the clay. It is said to be similar to the fact that while pots differ from one another as individual objects, the clay from which they are made does not have any differences in its material essence (vv. 12, 67). One cannot, however, immediately compare the relation of the Supreme Self to the individual self as one between the material cause and its mutable forms. A further attempt is made to clarify this meaning by the analogy with space. The ātman is frequenty compared to space[7], in which the Supreme self is analogised as the Great Space and the individual self as the space within the pot. The Supreme Self is a unique universal existence, wnich exists throughout all the individual selves, but in no circumstances does it receive the fruits of birth and death, pleasure and pain, as does the individual self nor dose it have a transitory, determinate and differentiated nature as does the individual self. It is similar to the fact that while pots are made and destroyed the space itself which exists within is not produced, or destroyed but is eternal, one and omnipresen (v. 10). In the same way, just as one can establish differences between the Supreme Self and the individual selves, so can one set up differences between each individual self also. It is not the case that the pleasure and pains of one individual self exert an influence upon another individual self. It is said that this condition is exactly similar to the fact that while the space within one jar may be obscured by dust and smoke, the space in another jar is not obscured because of that (v. 13). We can find the same idea in Chapter III of the *Māṇḍukya-Kārikā*. Rejecting other theories, the Vedānta theory presented by Bhavya holds that as "the one Great Space divides and because the space within numerous jars, so the unique ātman becomes numerous" (note to v. 11). That is, they are opposed to the interpretation that the analogy of space means that the the ātman evolves. These theories consequently, adopt the position (or one very close to it) that the individual self and Great Self coincide, that is, the theory of non-

7. Cf. v. 3 note to v. 47, v. 70, among others.

dualistic monism. Since, however, no mention is made of ignorance (avidyā) or māyā as the principle of the temporary appearance of the world, it would seem that although the Māyāvada of the later Śankara school had note been completely formulated, it was not to be long before its beginning strands were to be woven together.

It is not, however, that the non-dualistic view alone is presented here. It is obvious, also, that since it is said that "all living species are comprised within the ātman" (v. 9), one should admit the germination of the limited non-dualism (viśitādvaita) of the later Rāmānuja school. Moreover, Bhavya also presents the view that the Supreme Self and the individual self are "neither one nor different" (gsahan daṅ gashan ma yin pa=bhedābheda) (note to v. 51), and it is worthy of note that such a predication should clearly appear. Bhvya, however, divides the view in to two, that the individualself is different from the Supreme Self and that it is not different, and attacks both of them (vv. 51, 52). As the Mādhyamika School, which admits tentatively the basic principles of formal logic, critically discusses the doctrines of other schools based upon those principles, it seems he could not admit a concept containing the contradiction "neither one nor different" as an affirmative conceptual premise.

Thus, we have learned that several different theories on the relation of the Supreme Self and the individual self were in existence during that era ; and, in addition, another view on the ātman has also been handed down. According to it ; "It has been argued in various ways among scholars whether the ātman is universal existence or whether it only has a size conforming to the body, or whether it is extremly small ; but all these opinions merely take up one side of the ātman. It is exactly similar to the parable of the blind men[8] who, feeling the various parts of an elephant, offer

8 Udāna, VI, 4. pp. 66-67 (The Pali Text Society edition). The Chinese version of the *Arthavargiya sūtra*, vol. 1. (Taisho Tripiṭaka, vol. 4, p. 178 a-c,) The andhagajanyāya was commonly resorted to by Brahmin philosophers as well as by Jains. (M. Winternitz : *A History of Indin Literature* Vol. II, p. 88, n.)

many conjectures about its actual body. Both one and many together are but one side of the ātman." (v. 54, note to v. 53). It is clear that there the facts of the heterogeneous views on the universe are taken up and reflectively discussed. And since the variations in the opinions on the ātman are really interpretations based upon the ātman itself, this philosophical position should rather be regarded as close to that of the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā.*

Alongside the ātman, Brahman is also mentioned (note to v. 17) Although Brahman is taught as being unique, omnipresent, eternal, and is the dwelling place of immortality (v. 16), no singular explanation is offered in addition, The appelation "Supreme Brahman (tshaṇs mchog—paraṃ brahma) (v. 16), is cited, but this concept is not opposed to a concept of "lower Brahman" (aparaṃ brahma). The "Supreme" mentioned here is merely an ornamental modifier to the "Brahman". Brahman is also taken to be Īśvara (note to v. 2 : note to v. 16). An idea similar to Śaṇkara's which distinguishes two kinds of Brahaman, consequently, was not known to Bhavya. Furthermore in the description of Brahman in this passage, he interprets Brahman to be different from the cognitive function (ṛ am par ṡes paṁ=vijñāna). Later, Śāntirakṣita reported the idea which prescribed that the fundamental essence of Brahman (ātman be the cognitive function,[9] and it should be noted that he differed in this respect.

Let us next take up the views on the evolution of the world. Puruṣa, or ātman is the "unique" (vv. 19), and is the creator (kartṛ) of the world (v. 3). The entire world arose from it, just as the silken thread is produced from the body of the silkworm (v. 5) puruṣa itself, however after, it has given birth to the entire world, neither changes from its former state nor is completely used up in the process (note to v. 5.), This idea was already expounded in the Ancient Upaniṣads, and the analogy similar in purport to it, that of the thread of the spider, frequently appears in the Upaniṣads. No new idea in particular is thus taught on the evolution of the world, and the position adopted is chiefly that of evolutionism (pariṇāmavāda. No explanation on the Māyā doctrine can be found. In

9 Tattva-saṃgraha, v, 329. Cf. Gaudapādiya-Kārika III, 33, IV, 96, 99.

this respect, he is quite different from the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* in general, and Śankara and others.

While the essentials of his description of the Supreme Self or the Absolute are about as was presented in the foregoing, the Vedānta ideas in Bhavya's work are by no means consistent throughout. Consequently, we can learn that prior to the sixth century during which time Bhavya lived, there existed already difference in the various branches within the Vedānta School, and that the scholars asserted among themselves varying theories on the funda mental essence of the Absolute, the relation between the Supreme Self and the individual self, and other problems.

Even in regards to his theory on liberation, he differs little from the general theory of the Upaniṣads. One obtains liberation by seeing and realising the Puruṣa in its true state (vv. 3, 19). To see the Puruṣa is Truth (tattva) itself, and no one can cause it any injury (note to v. 17). One finds the absolute significance in the direct introspection of the Puruṣa. Liberation is "the highest tranquility (Śānti)" "the highest state" (v. 3 and note), and is the acquisition of "non-aging and immortality" (vv. 2. 5). In liberation, Puruṣa (=ātman) has no activity (note to v. 40), being seperated from the sense organs (note to v. 42) As it is seperated from all functioning in its state of liberation (note to v. 3), it surpasses all evil obstructions and beneficial virtues (v. 4), in which state all evil and good become undifferentiated and equal (v. 9). There, all differences disappear between the fool and the sage, the lowly and the Brahmin, and become of one aspect (vv. 9. 61). All become indistinguishably fused with Puruṣa the fundamental Principle, and never return to be born into this world filled with its pains and sufferings (vv. 5, 16).

The Vedānta theorists maintain that one is not able to explain the reasons why bondage and liberation can occur, if one follows the ideas of non-self and momentary destruction of Buddhism (note to v. 35).

Now, in order to reach this state of liberation, one must correctly think upon, must concentrate his thoughts upon, the Puruṣa

or ātman (vv, 3, 50, note to v. 16). For that purpose, one must practise meditation or Yoga. The practice of Yoga to see the ātman is praised to the highest (vv. 3, 5. 16 ; note to v. 17 ; note to v. 22). The one who completes the yogic practices come to be furnished with eight kinds of mysterious powers (note to v. 7 v. 8).

Judging from this account, the Vedānt scholars of that time admitted a liberation by cognition or knowledge, and the grace (Prasāda) of the Supreme God and the devotion (bhakti) toward the Supreme God are not emphasised so highly. As already indicated, Bhavya quoted, sacred passages from the Upaniṣads which teach faith in Śiva or his grace, but he does not offer a theological explanation on grace or devotion. Perhaps the early Vedānta scholar who had intercourse with Bhavya chiefly thought Yoga as the direct introspection of the Absolute and as a practical method, and as explanations on grace and devotion are included within these methods, they were not noticed by Bhavya. And it seems that among the Vedānta scholars known to Bhavya, such important differences of opinion on the problem of practice did not exist.

It should be noted, however, that in regard to the question of practice. the Vedānta school upon which Bhavya reports had endeavoured to destroy the concept of class distinctions firmly maintained by the orthodox Brahmins. It was held that if one were to know the ātman, no matter who it may be, he could obtain the state of liberation ; and in that state, all distinction between classes would be reduced to nil (v. 9) Although this intellectual trend had already appeared in the Ancient Upaniṣads'[10], it was still denied by the orthodox Brahmins, who maintained the position of their own supremacy in all respects. This conservative and aloof attitude distinctly appears in the *Brahma-Sūtra*. The Vedānta school mentioned by Bhavya, however, opposed this idea, and was universalistic and for the masses. and endeavoured to include all of the castes within its fold. And I hasten to add that this attitude can easily be combined with that of Hinduism, the popular religion of India.

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10 Cf, the Muṇḍaka Up. I. i, 5. and the narratives by the poet Raikva and Satyakāma in the Chāndogya Up.

Perhaps closely related to this attitude is the fact that in this account by Bhavya, one can faintly discern the tendency to worship Śiva and the sun ; and there are ideas in this social position which are also common to those of Buddhism. Some notions of ethical practices in Buddhism might have contributed this factor in the formation of the distinctive features of Vedānta practice.

The topic of the relationship between Buddhism and Vedānta is an important problem. Bhavya offered the view that in so far as the schools outside of Buddhism adopt the theory of ta'hāgata among their own theories and advocate a doctrine resembling that of Buddhism, the ātman theory of the Vedānta school and the non-self theory of Buddhism are actually identical in content (note to v. 87 ; note to v. 91). He strongly asserted, however, that distinctive differences exist between the two schools (esp, vv. 60, 78, 91 ; note to v. 79). Buddhists of the late period in general had thought that Buddhism is the only doctrine which ought to be the basis of all philosophical theories, and that the schools outside the Buddhism had secretly stolen Buddhist theories and freely used them as their own doctrines,[11] so that Bhavya also may have gone among with this idea. It should be regarded as important, however, that he emphasised in particular *the differences between Buddhism and the Vedānta theories*. Because the Vedānta school, during Bhavya's time had already taken up to a great extent Buddhist philosophical theories, and had become very close to Buddhist doctrines in respect to its ideas, terminology, methods of expression etc., and as the similarities and differences between the two schools were discussed in the intellectual world of that day, Bhvya was quite aware of the fact that the Vedānta school held items has resembling Buddhist doctrines. The problem, therefore, of such expression as "a Buddhist in disguise" etc., can be traced back to the sixth century when Bhavya was alive.

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11 'There are some teachings of the Buddha which still remain now Brahmins have stolen them in various passages of the scriptures of their own." (The *Mahāparinirvāṇ sūtra* of Mahāyāna, the Southern Version, Vol. 16, Taisho Tripitaka, Vol 12, p. 716 c. Cf. *ibid*. p. 382 a. Bhi-tsang: *San-lun-hsuan-i*, ed; by Yensho Kanakura, Iwanami Bunko edition, pp. 26, 161,

The Vedānt philosophy presented by Bhavya has, in the main, the features presented above, and taken as a whole there are no other outstanding traces of an advance in thought to be seen in the Upaniṣadic doctrines. There is no doubt, however, that the Vedānta school, as a philosophical school had already been firmly established in the intellectual world of that time. It seems that the scholars of this school then mainly endeavoured to synthesize and organize the doctrines taught in the Upaniṣads. For them, accordingly, the sacred Upaniṣads had absolute authority. Bhavya also reports on this attitude (note to v. 48). They were progressing in the direction toward forming a new philosophical system based upon the Upaniṣadic canon. And it is clear that in the various philosophical problems, *the seeds which were to cause sectarian disruptions* in the later Vedānta school itself, had already been planted among the Brahmin scholars during that time, It also seems that the synthesis of the study of grammar and Vedānta philosophy had already begun to be formed during this period.[12]

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12. In the note on v. 30, it can be seen that there were several persons who asserted the reasons why the existence of the ātman should be posited from the standpoint of grammar.

Section 8 : Conclusion

In conclusion, I wish to point out a matter of considerable importance. The picture that we gain from Buddhist sources of the Vedānta, with its philosophy which was to become so important is in remarkable agreement with that which we might draw by relying on Jain sources. The results of an examination of these Jain sources have been partly published on other occasions [1]

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[1]. H. Nakamura : Vedānta philosophy as Seen from the Scriptures of Early Jainism. Journal of the oriental Institute, vol. VIII, No. 2, Dec. 1958, pp. 148-155. Also, The Vedānta as Noticed in Mediaeval Jain Literature. In *Indological* Studies in Honor of W. Norman Brown, American Oriental Society, 1962. New Haven, Conn. pp. 186-194.

THE RĀSTRAKŪṬAS OF KUNTALA AND THE DATE OF KĀLIDĀSA

—Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. V. V. Mirasi

THE RĀSṬRAKŪṬAS OF KUNTALA AND THE DATE OF KĀLIDĀSA

THE date of Kālidāsa has been a subject of keen controversy during the last nearly two hundred years ever since the publication of the English translatian of the *Śākuntala* by Sir William Jones in 1789. No less then six theories have been put forward by scholars. They range in date from the second century B C to the sixth century A. D. Notwithstanding interminable discussion there has been no unanimity among scholars on this point. I therefore, propose to place before the learned scholars assembled here some new evidence bearing on the date of the great poet which eventually lead to the solution of the problem.

I shall first state briefly the different theories—(I) Second Century B.C.—This theory has been put forward by Prof. Kunhan Raja on the evidence of the Bharatavākya of the *Mālavikāgnimitra* ; (II) First Century B.C.—This theory has been advocated by several on the basis of the tradition that Kālidāsa was a court-poet of Vikramāditya whom they identify with the founder of the Vikrama-saṁvat which is even now current in North India as well as in some part of South India ; (III) Third Century was put forward by the late Mr. D. V. Ketkar, a noted astronomer of Bijapur, on the evidence of a verse in the sixteenth Canto of the *Raghuvaṁśa*, which shows that the Dakshiṇāyana (Summer solstice) occurred near the ecliptic mark of the star Agastya (Canopus); (IV) A.D 400—The fourth theory is that Kālidāsa was a court-poet of the famous Gupta king Chandragupta II, who assumed the title of *Vikramāditya* and ruled from Ujjayinī after subjugating the Western Kshatrapas of Malwa and Kathiawad. This theory is now generally accepted and, as shown below, it is also corroborated by the evidence set forth in this paper; (V) Middle of the fifth century A. D.—This theory was propounded by Prof. K. B. Pathak

on the evidence of the mention of the Hūṇas, who are described in the fourth canto of the Raghuvaṁśa as vanquished by Raghu on the bank of the river Vaṅkshu (modern Oxus). (VI) Sixth century A. D —This theory was previously advocated by Prof Max Mūller who supposed that there was a renaissance of Sanskrit learning during the reign of King Vikramāditya, who obtained a victory over the Śakas in the battle of Korur in the sixth century A. D. This evidence is now proved to be baseless. Still the theory is sought to be proved by Prof. P. C. Sengupta on astronomical grounds.

It is not intended to examine these theories here; for that will take us a long time. I mention them here only to show how controversial the present subject is. Besides, I have examined them critically elsewhere[1] and shown that none of them except that which makes Kālidāsa a contemporary of Chandragupta II—Vikramāditya stands scrutiny. I shall now proceed to state some new evidence in support of this theory based on my own researches.

The subject of my present lecture is 'the Rāshṭrakūṭas of Kuntala and the Date of Kālidā a'. You will wonder who these Rāshṭrakūṭas were. The Rāshṭrakūṭas of Mānyakheṭa, who succeded the Chālukyas of Bādāmī in Mahrashtra and Karnataka, are well-known, but not so the Rāshṭrakūṭas of Kuntala, about whom considerable information has become available only by recent researches. More than 75 years ago Dr. Bhagwanlal Indraji published a grant of this family, known to scholars as the Unḍ kavāṭ kā grant, in the *Journal* of the *Bombay Branch af the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol, XVII pp. 68 f. It gave the following genealogy :—

Mānāṅka
|
Devarāja
|
(Not named) — (Not named) — Bhavishya
Bhavishya
|
Abhimanyu

1. *Studies in Indology*, Vol. IV, pp, 1 f.

The plates were issued by Abhimanyu while residing at Mānapura and record the grant of the village Uṇḍikavā kā to a recluse named Jaṭābhāra in honour of the god Dakshiṇa-Śiva of Peṭhapaṅgaraka. The original findspot of the grant was not known. It was from the collection of Bhau Daji and was evidently discovered somewhere in Western Maharashtra or Gujarat. In the absence of definite information about the provenance of the grant, scholars about the identification of the places mentioned therein and about the country over which this family was ruling. Dr. Fleet thought that the god Dakshiṇa-Siva mentioned in it was the same as is worshipped even now in the Mahādeva Hills of the Hoshangadad District of Madhya Pradesh. He identified Peṭhapaṅgaraka with Pagāṛā, the headquarters of the former Zamindari of the same name, about 4 miles north of Pach marhi, and Uṇḍ kavāṭikā with Oonṭia, 30 miles north-north-west of the Mahādeva Hills. He was not able to suggest any satisfactory identification of Mānapura, the capital of the royal family, which had evidently been founded by Mānāṅka, its progenitor. He suggested two identifications viz (1) that it might be identical with Mānapura in Malwa, about 12 miles souht-west of Mhow and (2) it might be the same as Mānapura near Bandhogarh in Rewa.[2] Both these places are away from the village Oonṭiā in the Hoshangabad District, which Fleet supposed to represent the donated village Uṇḍikavāṭikā But the identifications proposed by Fleet suggested that this family was ruling in Madhya Pradesh. Dr. Dubreuil, acting on this suggestion, further identified Devarāja, the son of Mānāṇka with the Sarabhapurīya king Sudevarāja, whose records have been found in Chhattisagarh[3]

Another grant of this family, recording the donation of the village Pāṇḍaraṅgapallī was found in a village near Kolhapur, which mentioned Avidheya as a son of Devarāja. It was pubiished by Dr. M. H. Krishna, Director of the Mysore Archaeological Survey in his report of the Survey for 1929, p. 197 f. This grant showed for

2. *Ind. Ant.*, Vol. XXX. pp. 509 f.

3- *Ancient History of the Deccan*, p. 77.

the fiirst time that the family was ruling in Southern Maharashtra, not in Madhya Pradesh or Central India. As the characters and the Seal of this grant differed from those of the King of Sırabhapura, who ruled in Chhattisgarh, it was clear that the two families were not identical. This grant was not forthcoming for a long time, but two years ago, through the efforts of my friend Dr. A N. Upadhye, Ex-Professor, Rajaram College, Kolhapur, it was rediscovered at Korochi, a village in the Hatakanagale taluka of the Kolhapur District. I am editing it in the *Epigraphia Indica.*[4] It begins with the following verse—

वसुधाविधिसंत्रस्तविदर्भाश्मकमण्डलः ।
मानाङ्कनृपतिः श्रीमान् कुन्तलानां प्रशासिता ।।

This describes King Mānāṅka, the progenitor of the royal family as the ruler of the Kuntala country, who had harrassed the *maṇḍalas* of Vidarbha and Aśmaka. Dr. Krishna, who had edited this grant before, could not read this ver e correctly He read सात्कुन्तधरानः in place of श्रीमान् कुन्तलानां प्रशासिता and thus missed the important information about the location of the kingdom of this family. The correct reading given above shows that Mā āṅka was the ruler of the Kuntala country (*Kuntalānām praśāsitā*). O. e scholar has recently put a fantastic interpretation on this expression. He translates it as 'the chastiser of the Kuntala country'. This interpretation is absurd, The root *śās*, no doubt, has both the meanings of ruling' and 'chastising', but it conveys the former meaning when its object is a country or a place as in the following hemistich from the Junagadh rock Inscriprion of Skandagupta :—[5]

सर्वेषु भृत्येष्वपि संहृतेषु
यो मे प्रशिष्यान्निखिलान् सुराष्ट्रान् ।

On the oter hand, when the object is a living being, the root conveys

4. I have published the grant in my *Studies in Indology*, Vol. IV, pp. 124 f.

5. Fleet, *C.I.I.*, Vol. III, p. 59.

the meaning of 'chastising' as in the following legend on the seal of the grants of Vākāṭaka king Pravarasena II—[6]

वाकाटकललामस्य क्रमप्राप्तनृपश्रियः ।
राज्ञः प्रवरसेनस्य शासनं रिपुशासनम् ॥

So the expression *Kuntalānām praśāsitā* must be taken to mean 'the ruler of the Kuntala country'. Mānānka, the founder of this Early Rāshṭrakūṭa family was therefore ruling over Kuntala.

In later literature and inscriptions Kuntala denoted the predominatly Kanarese country, now included in the Mysore State over which the Rāshṭrakūṭas of Mānyakheṭas and the Later Chālukyas of Kalyāṇī were ruling. For instance, Bilhaṇa. in his *Vikramāṅkadevacharita* (X, 6) refers to the well-known Later Chālukya king Vikramāditya VI as '*Kuntala-kshoṇipati*' or ruler of Kuntala. But in ancient times Kuntala comprised also the upper valley of the Kṛishṇā. See e. g. the following verse descriptive of king. Jayasiṁha *alias Mallikāmoda* of the Later Chālukya dynasty :—

विख्यातकृष्णवर्णे तैलस्नेहोपलब्धसरलत्वे ।
कुन्तलविषये नितरां विराजते मल्लिकामोदः ॥

This verse has puns on several words and therefore conveys two meanings - (1) The fragrance of the *mallikā* flowers in the locks of a lady, well-known for their black colour and straight (i.e. uncurling) on account of the unctuousness of oil (*applied to them*) is extremely attractive and (2) in the country of Kuntala, which has famous river Kṛishṇavarṇa (i.e. the Kṛishnā) and the residents of which have become straightforward on account of their loyalty to (*king* Taila (i.e. Tailapa, the founder of the Later Chālukya dynasty , there shines exceedingly (*the king*) Mallikāmoda (i.e. Jayasiṁha).

This verse shows that Kuntala comprised what we now call

6. Mirashi, *C.I.I.*, Vol. V.p. 26.

7. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XII, p. 153.

the Southern Maratha Country. The *Udayasundarīkathā* of Soḍḍhala (11th cen. A.D.) says that Pratishṭhāna (modern Paiṭhaṇ in the Aurangabad district of the Maharashtra State) was the capital of Kuntala. See the following passages[8] :—

(१) कुन्तलेषु तटे गोदावरीति महासरितः प्रतिष्ठानं नाम नगरम् ।

(२) प्रतिष्ठाननगरपरमेश्वरः कुन्तलानामधीश्वरो राजा मलयवाहनो भवान् ।

These passages show that the northern limit of Kuntala extended the Godāvarī.

Mānapura, the capital of Kuntala, was situated in this region. I identify it with Māṇ, the chief town of the Māṇ taluka of the Satara district in Maharashtra.

A third grant of this family was recently found at Hingani Berdi in the Dhond taluke of the Poona District. It mentions Māṇa *alias* Vibhurāja as another son of Devarāja.[9] We thus get the following genealogy of these Early Rāshṭrakūṭas of Kuntala :—

Mānāṅka
|
Deverāja
|
Māṇa *alias* Vibhurāja — Avidheya — Bhavishya
Bhavishya
|
Abhimanyu

When did this Early Rāshṭrakūṭa family flourish ? Its records are dated only in regnal years and therefore afford no clue to the age of the family. On palaeographic evidence, however, the grants can be referred to the fifth century A.D.. Again, the Pāṇḍaraṅgapallī grant mentions in its date the year Bhādrapada of the twelve year-cycle of Jupiter. Such years of the twelve-year cycle are cited in very early records such as those of the Parivrājaka Mahārājas Hastin

8. *Udayasundarīkathā* (G.O.S.), pp. 21 and 83,

9. *E.p. Ind.*, Vol XXIX, pp. 174 f.

and Sankshobha found in North India.[10] In the south they are found cited in very early records of the Kadambas. They are not noticed in any southern records after the fifth century A.D. So this evidence also points to the conclusion that these Early Rāshtrakūṭas flourished in the fifth century A.D at the latest.

These Early Rāshṭrakūtas, who were thus ruling over Kuntala or the southern Maratha Country in the fifth century A.D., were contemporaries of the Traikūṭakas, who were ruling over Vidarbha in the same period. In that age they were known as *Kuntaleśas* or *Kuntaleśvaras*, lords of Kuntala.

As the country of these Early Rāshṭrakūṭas of Mānapura was conterminous with that of the Vākāṭakas of Vidarbha, there were frequent clashes between these two royal families. As stated before the Pāṇḍarangapallī grant describes Mānāṅka as one who by his policy had harrassed the countries of Vidārbha and Aśmaka. Vidarbha is the well-known coutry between the Narmadā and the Godāvarī east of Khandesh and west of Chhattisgarh. Aśmaka was the name of the country immediately south of the Godāvarī, corresponding to the modern districts of Ahmadnagar and Bhir in the Marathwada Division of the Maharashtra State. On the other hand, in the inscription in Cave XVI at Ajanta, the Vākāṭaka king Vindhyasena or Vindhyaśakti II is said to have won a victory over the *Kuntaleśa* or the ruler of Kuntala.[11] Later on, however, amicable relations were established between the Vākāṭaka and the Early Rāshṭrakūṭas and the Balaghat plates of the Vākāṭaka Pṛithivisena II state that his father Narendrasena married the Kuntala princess Ajjhitabhaṭṭārikā.[12] She must have belonged to this royal family of the Early Rāshṭrakūṭas.

The date of these Early Rāshṭrakūṭas has bearing on that of the great Sanskrit poet Kālidāsa. It is well known that Kālidāsa is the author of the following seven works viz. the four *kāvyas* the *Ritusaṁhāra*, *Kumārasambhava*, *Meghadūta* and *Raghuvaṁśa*, and

10. Fleet, *C.I.I.*, Vol. III, pp. 93 f.
11. Mirashi *C.I.I.*, Vol. V, p. 108.
12. *Ibid.*, Vol. V, p. 81.

the three *nāṭakas* viz. the *Mālavikāgnimitra*, *Vikramorvaśīya* and *Śākuntala*. He is also reputed to be the real author of the Prākrit *kāvya Setubandha* or *Rāvaṇavaho*, which is ascribed to Pravarasena. See the following colophon of all the cantos (*āśvāsas*) of that *kāvya* :—

इति श्रीप्रवरसेनविरचिते कालिदासकृते दशमुखवधे महाकाव्ये···आश्वासः ।

According to a tradition recorded by the commentator Rāmadāsa of the *Setubandha*, the work was composed by Kālidāsa for the *Mahārāja* Pravarasena by the order of *Mahārājādhirāja vikramāditya*.[13] इह तावन्महाराजप्रवरसेननिमित्तं महाराजाधिराज—विक्रमादित्येनाज्ञप्तो निखिलकविचक्रचूडामणि कलिदासमहाशय···आह । This tradition can be satisfactorily accounted of if we identify Pravarasena with the Vākāṭaka king Pravarasena II and Vikramāditya with the famous Gupta king Chandragupta II, who is known to have assumed that title; for this Pravarasena II was the daughter's son (*dauhitra*) of that Gupta king. Prabhāvatīgupta, the daughter of this Chandragupta was given in marriage to the Vākāṭaka prince Rudrasena II, the father of Pravarasena II. It is again noteworthy that Vākāṭaka copper-plate grants mention these very titles, viz, *Mahārāja*, and *Mahārājādhirāja* while referring to Pravarasena II and Devagupta (another name of Chandragupta II) respectively. See, e.g., the following extract from the Jamb plates of Pravarasena II :—[14]

महाराजाधिराजश्रीदेवगुप्तसुतायां प्रभावतीगुप्तायामुत्पन्नस्य वाकाटकानाम्परममाहेश्वरमहाराजश्रीप्रवरसेनस्य वचनात् ।

The tradition recorded by Rāmadāsa that Kālidāsa composed the work *Setubandha* for *Mahārāja* Pravarasena by the order of the *Mahārājādhirāja* Vikramāditya seems therefore to be trustworthy and points to A.D. 400 as the date of Kālidāsa.

The identification of Pravarasena, the author of the *Setubandha*, with Pravarasena II, the Vākāṭaka king of Vidarbha, is doubted by

13. *Setubandha* (Nirṇayasāgar Press ed), p. 3.

14. Mirashi, *C.I.I.*, Vol. V, p. 12,

some on the ground that 'while the theme of the *kāvya* is Vaiṣṇava, the king was a devotee af Śiva'.[15] The suspicion is baseless. We may as well doubt Kālidāsa's authorship of the *Raghuvaṁśa;* for while the *Raghuvaṁśa* glorifies Rāma, an incarnation of Vishṇu, Kālidāsa was himself a devout worshipper of Siva. Pravarasena II, though himself a Śaiva, may have composed that *kāvya* at the bidding of his mother Prabhāvatīguptā, who was a fervent devotee of Rāmachandra, just as he built a grand temple of Rāmachandra at Pravarapura (modern Pavnār near Wardhā) when he shifted his capital there. Several sculptures of this temple have recently been discovered at Pavnār.[16]

It is not unlikely that Kālidāsa stayed for some time in Vidarbha in that age. From the history of the Vākāṭakas we know that Rudrasena II died soon after his marriage, leaving behind two little sons Divākarasena and Dāmodarasena, who afterwards became known as Pravarasena II. Prabhāvatī guptā was acting as regent for the elder son Divākarasena for at least thirteen years as shown by her Poona plates. It is easy to conjecture that Chandragupta II must have sent some experienced officers of his court to Vidarbha to help his daughter in governing the kingdom. That Gupta influence was great at the Vākāṭaka court in this period is indicated by the palaeographical evidence and the Gupta genealogy in the Poona plates of Prabhāvatīguptā.[17] Kālidāsa was probably one of these trusted men sent by Chandragupta II to Vidarbha. During his stay at the Vākāṭaka capital Nandivardhana. Kālidāsa must have often visited Rāmagiri (modern Rāmṭek) which lies only three miles away. In his *Meghadūta* Kālidāsa has described Rāmagiri as the place of the exiled Yaksha's sojourn. The way of the Cloud Messenger described in the *Meghadūta*[18] suits Rāmṭek and no other place as I have shown elsewhere.[18] During his stay in Vidarbha Kālidāsa composed the *Meghadūta* and wrote or helped the Vākāṭaka prince Pravarasena II to write the *Setubandha*.

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15. *H.C.I.P.* Vol. III pp. 183-84.
16, *Studies in Indology*, Vol. II, pp. 272. f.
17. Mirashi, *C.I.I*, Vol, V. Introd. p. xxiv.
18. Mirashi, *Studies in Indology*, Vol. I, pp. 12. 12. f.

As stated before, there are several theories about the date of Kālidāsa, but the only theory which reconciles the evidence detailed above is that which places him about A. D. 400 and makes him a court-poet of the Gupta king Chandragupta II—Vikramāditya. The other rival theory which places the poet in the first century B. C. and make him a contemporary of the founder of the Vikrama era of 58 B. C. cannot explain this evidence. In the first place there is no evidence that any king named Vikramāditya flourished in that century. The era that now goes by his name had another name viz. *Kṛita* in the first few centuries of the Christian era. Secondly, that theory cannot explain why Kālidāsa selected Rāmagiri (Rāmṭek near Nandivardhana) as the place of the exiled Yaksha's residence. It cannot also account for the tradition that Kālidāsa was the real author of the *Setubandha*, which is generally ascribed to Pravarasena. there was, besides, no king named Pravarasena in the first century A. D. in North or South India. The only theory that appears plausible is that Kālidāsa flourished about A. D. 400 at the court of the Gupta King Chandragupta II *alias* Vikramāditya.

Besides the seven works mentioned above, one more viz. the *Kuntaleśvaradautya* is ascribed by tradition to *Kālidāsa*. Kshemendra, the well-known Kashmirian polymath, states explicitely in his *Auchityavichāracharchā* that Kālidāsa was the author of the *Kuntaleśvaradautya*[19]. See अधिकरणौचित्यं यथा कुन्तेश्वरदौत्ये कालिदासस्य। Here *Kunteśvarādautya* is evidently a mistake for *Kuntalesvaradautya*. Kshemendra has cited the following verse from the *Kuntaleśvara-dautya* of Kalidāsa as an instance of *adhikaraṇ-auchitya* (propriety of place)—

इह निवसति मेरुः शेखरः क्ष्माधराणा-
मिह विनिहितभाराः सागराः सप्त चान्ये ।
इदमहिपतिभोगस्तम्भविभ्राजमानं
धरणितलमिहैव स्थानमस्मद्विधानाम् ॥

19. *Auchityavichāracharchā*. (Kavyamala, I) p. 133.

While pointing out the propriety of place (*adhikaraṇauchitya*) in this verse, Kshemendra says as follows :[22]

अत्र महाराजदूतोऽपि सामन्तास्थाने स्वप्रभुसमुचितगौरवपूजार्हमासनमनासाद्य कार्यवशेन भूमावेवोपविष्टः प्रागल्भ्यगाम्भीर्येणैवं ब्रूते—'यदस्मद्विधानां वसुधातल एव भुजगपतिभोगस्तम्भप्राग्भारनिष्कम्पे धरासने स्थानं युक्तं. यस्मादिहैव मेरुरचलचक्रवर्ती समुपविष्टः सप्तमहाब्धयश्च तत्तुल्यतैवास्माकमित्यौचित्यमधिकरणपदसम्बद्धमेव ।

Translation—When the ambassador of a *Mahārāja* went to the court of a *Sāmanta* (feudatory), he was not offered a seat in keeping with the position of his lord. Still, in view of importance of his work, he sat on the ground and (when the courtiers jeered at him), he said boldly—"This surface of the earth is a seat rendered immovable by the pillars in the form of the hoods of (the serpent) Śesha. This is a seat worthy of persons like us ; for Meru the best of mountains, as also the seven great Seas are seated on this very seat and I am in no way inferior to them." The ambassador wanted to tell the assembly that the ground where he was sitting was not an ordinary seat, but was the most appropriate one for an Emperor's representative like himself.

Kshemendra gives us no further information about the identity of the ambassador or of the feudatory prince *(Sāmanta)* to whose court he was sent. But some other Sanskrit works give us very valuable information on this point. The following verse occurs in as many as three Sanskrit works of the 10th and 11th cnturies A. D. viz. the *Kāvyamimāmsā* of Rājaśekhara[21] the *Sriṅgāraprakāśa*[22] and the *Sarasvatīkaṇthābharaṇa*,[23] both of the Paramāra king **Bhoja :—**

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20. *Loc cit.*

21. *Kāvyamīmāmsā* (G.O.S.) 1916). pp. 60-61.

22. *Sṛiṅgāraprakāśa*, Prakāśas XXII-XXIV, Introd. by Sri. Yadugiri Yatiraja.

23. *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* (N.S P. ed. 1925), 168.

असकलहसितत्वात्क्षालितानीव कान्त्या
मुकुलितनयनत्वाद्व्यक्तकर्णोत्पलानि ।
पिबति मधुसुगन्धीन्याननानि प्रियाणां
त्वयि विनिहितभारः कुन्तलानामधीशः ।

This verse says, "Leaving the responsibility of governing his kingdom to you, the lord of Kuntala *(Kuntalesa)* engages himself in kissing the faces of his beloveds, fragrant with wine which have as it were, been cleaned with lustre and the lotuses on whose ears can be clearly seen as their eyes are half-closed."

In the *Sṛingāraprakāśa* Bhoja tells us that this was said by Kālidāsa in reply to Vikramāditya's question "what is the lord of Kuntala doing ?"[24] तद्यथा कलिदासः' किं कुन्तलेश्वरः करोति' इति विक्रमादित्येन पृष्ट उक्तवान् असकलहसितत्वात् ·····। In view of its contents this verse also appears to have been cited from Kālidāsa's *Kuntaleśvaradautya* The ambassador sent by vikramāditya to the court of the lord of Kuntala was thus Kālidāsa himself. On hearing the above report Vikramāditya is said to have replied as follows ;—

असकलहसितत्वात्क्षालितानीव कान्त्या
मुकुलितनयनत्वाद्व्यक्तकर्णोत्पलानि ।
पिबतु मधुसुगन्धीन्याननानि प्रियाणां
मयि विनिहितभारः कुन्तलानामधीशः ॥

This means that the lord of Kuntala may engage himself in kissing the faces of his beloveds, leaving the responsibility of governing his kingdom to Vikramāditya. This reply of Vikramāditya was also evidently taken from the *Kuntaleśvaradautya*. It is cited by both Rājaśekhara and Bhoja in their works.

The four Sanskrit works viz. the *Kāvyamīmāṁsā* of Rāja śekhara, the *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* and the *Śṛingāraprakāśa* of Bhoja the *Auchityavichāracharchā* of Kshemendra thus give us the following information about this embassy of Kālidāsa to the court of

24. *Sṛingāraprakāśa*, Prakāśas XXII-XXIXXXIV, ed. by Yadugiri Yatiraja, Introd.

the king of Kuntala. Vikramāditya sent Kālidāsa as his ambassador to the court of the king of Kuntala. He was not at first well received there but he stayed there for some time and having observed the state of things there, he reported to his patron Vikramāditya that the king of Kuntala was spending his time in enjoyment, leaving the administration of his kingdom to him (i. e. to Vikramāditya). The latter replied that the king of Kuntala may continue to lead that kind of life as he was there to protect his kingdom.

This tradition about Kālidāsa's embassy to Kuntala is older than any other tradition about Kālidāsa and as stated above, it has been referred to by several Sanskrit authors who flourished in the tenth and eleventh centuries A. D. It is thus nearly a thousands years old. This tradition has been known to scholars for a long time. It has, however, been differently interpreted by different scholars. Thus Rev. Heras identified the *Kuntaleśa* of these verses with the Kadamba king Kākusthavarman.[25] The Early Kadambas were ruling over North Karṇāṭaka with their capital at Vaijayantī, modern Banavāsī in North Kanara District. This territory was included in Kuntala. The Talgunda inscription contains the following verse about the Kadamba king Kākusthavarman—

गुप्तादिपार्थिवकुलाम्बुरुहस्यलानि
स्नेहादरप्रणयसम्भ्रमकेसराणि ।
श्रीमन्त्यनेकनृपषट्पदसेवितानि ।
योऽबोधयद् दुहितृदीधितिभिर्नृपार्कः ॥

Translation—This sun of a king (viz. Kākusthavarman), by means of his rays in the form of his daughters, caused to expand the splendid lotus-groups which were the royal families of the Guptas and others, the filaments of which were attachment, respect, love and reverence (for him), and which were cherished by many bees viz. the kings (*who served them*).

From this verse Rev. Heras inferred that Chandragupta II must have accepted a daughter of the Kadamba king Kākusthavarman in marriage for his son and must have sent Kālidāsa to negotiate this matrimonial alliance. This view does not, however, appear to

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25. *F.B.O.R.S.*, Vol. XII, Part IV.

be correct; for this Kākusthavarman flourished about A. D. 450 i.e. nearly fifty years after Chandragupta II. Besides, in that age the term *Kuntaleśa* signified the ruler of the Southern Maratha Country, which adjoined Vidarbha and not the territory round Vanavāsī. We have seen above that Mānāṅka, who ruled over this territory, is described in the Pāṇḍarangapallī grant as the ruler of Kuntala, Again, in the *Daśakumāracharita*, which was composed within about 150 years after the downfall of the Vākāṭakas, the king of Kuntala is described as one of feudatories of the contemporary king of Vidarbha, while the ruler of Vanavāsī, who invaded Vidarbha, is called *Vānavāsya* and is differentiated from the ruler of Kuntala.[26] So the *Kuntaleśa* in the *Kuntaleśvaradautya* cannot be identified with a Kadamba king of North Karṇāṭaka.

The second identification of the *Kuntaleśa* was proposed by Prof. S. Krishnasvami Aiyangar. He identified the lord of Kuntala to whose court Kālidāsa was sent as an ambassador by Chandragupta II—Vikramāditya with Pravarasena II, the Vākāṭaka king who was the daughter's son of Chandragupta II,[27] But there was one difficulty in this view. The Vākāṭakas were known as the rulers of Vidarbha and not those of Kuntala. Prof. Aiyangar proposed to solve this difficulty in the following manner, Pravarasena's grandfather Pṛithivisheṇa I defeated the king of Kuntala as stated in the inscription in cave XVI at Ajanta. Prof. Aiyangar conjectured that since that time the Vākāṭakas must have assūmed the title of *Kuntaleśa*. This conjecture is, however, now proved to be baseless; for in the first place, it was not Pṛihivīsheṇa I of the Nandivardhana branch that defeated the contemporary king of Kuntala. That victory was won by—Vindhyasena or Vindhyaśakti II, who belonged to the Vatsagulma branch as I have shown in a revised edition of that Ajanta inscription.[28] Besides, in view of the relations af the Guptas and the Vākāṭakas in that age, it is very unlikely that Kālidāsa, the envoy of Chandragupta II was insulted in

26. Mirashi, *Studies in Indology*, Vol I, p. 166.
27. S.K. Aiyangar, *Ancient India*, Vol. I, pp. 271-74.
28. Mirashi, *C.I.I.*, Vol. V. p. 81.

the manner described by Kshemendra in his *Auchityaviahāracharchā*. Besides, not only the Vākāṭakas never assumed the title of *Kuntaleśa* but they had matrimonial relations with the kings of Kuntala; for, as stated above, Pravarasena II's son Narendrasena is said to have married the Kuntala princess Ajjhitabhaṭṭārskā as stated in the Balaghat plates of his son Pṛithivīshena II.[29] Again, as stated above the *Daśakumāracharita* states that the king of Vidarbha, who is probably identical with the Vākāṭaka king Harishena's son, had the king of Kuntala (*Kuntala-pati*) as one of his feudatories. For all these reasons the *Kuntaleśa* of the *Kuntaleśvaradautya* cannot be identified with the Vākāṭaka king Pravarasena II.

The only possible identification of the Kuntaleśvar*a* described in the *Kuntaleśvaradautya* of Kālidāsa is that with a Rashṭrakūṭa of Mānapura. who was ruling over the Southern Maratha country. The king of this family who was a contemporary of the Gupta king, Chandragupta II was Devarāja, the son of Mānāṅka. He is described in some records of the family as resembling Devarāja i.e. Indra, the lord of gods.[30] Perhaps like Indra, he was given to the enjoyment of pleasures. It seems that Chandragupta II extended his protection to the Early Rāshṭrakūṭas of Mānapura as he did to the Vākāṭakas of Vidarbha. A*s* both these families had the support of Chandragupta II, they gave up their. previous hostility and became friendly to each other. This ultimately resulted in the marriage of the Vakāṭaka prince Narendrasena, the great-grandson of Chandragupta II with Ajjhitabhaṭṭārikā, the princess cf Kuntala.

This alliance of Chandragupta II with two royal families of the Deccan finds an echo in another almost contemporary inscription. On an iron pillar near the Kutub Minar at the village Meherauli near Delhi, there is an inscription which describes king Chandra of an unspecified lineage. Several identifications of this king Chandra have been proposed but the most probable one is that he is the

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29. *Ibid.*, Vol. V, p. 81.

30. See, e.g. the Pāṇḍarangapallī grant, *Studies in Indology*, Vol. IV, p. 135.

Gupta king Chandragupta II. One of the verses of this inscription describing Chandra is as follows:—[31]

> यस्योद्वर्तयतः प्रतीपमुरसा शत्रून्समेत्यागतान्
> वङ्गेष्वाहववर्तिनोऽभिलिखिता खड्गेन कीर्तिर्भुजे ।
> तीर्त्वा सप्तमुखानि येन समरे सिन्धोर्जिता बाल्हिका
> यस्याद्याप्यधिवास्यते जलनिधिर्वीर्यानिलैर्दक्षिणः ॥

The verse says that even now i,e. after the death of king Chandra the southern ocean is wafted by the breezes of his valour. There in no exaggeration in this description in [view of what is said above.

This is the oldest tradition about Kālidāsa so far known. It can be satisfactorily explained only if he is placed about A.D. 400 and is regarded as the court-poet of king Chandragupta II—Vikramāditya. The first century B.C. theory of his date affords no explanation of this tradition; for there was then no *Kuntaleśa* and no Vikramāditya who were thus allied. Kuntala was then (*i.e.* in the first century B.C.) comprised in the empire of the Sātavāhanas, but there is no evidence that any Sātavāhana king was then dependent on another contemporary king like Vikramāditya for the governing of his kingdom. In fact, as already stated, there is no evidence that any king named Vikramāditya flourished in that age.

The discovery of the inscriptions of the Early Rāshṭrakūṭa dynasty has thus corroborated the view that Kālidāsa flourished in *sirca* A.D. 400.

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31. Fleet, *C.I.I.* Vol. III, p. 141.

SANSKRIT IN MODERN INDIA

—DR. S. M. KATRE

SASNKRIT IN MODERN INDIA

by

Dr. S. M. Katre

1. The history of Sanskrit in India is the history of India since the advent of the Indo-European speakers who came to India more than four thousand years ago and developed its special features on the soil of India. From an Indo-European idiom it took on certain aspects of development in the soil of India which made it a distinct member of this family with characteristics which differentiate it from its sister-language Iranian. In assuming this particular aspect Sanskrit which is more specially known as Old Indo-Aryan among the sophisticated, exhibits characteristics which make it truly Indian, a term which during the nineteenth century applied primarily to Sanskrit as in the famous grammar of Wackernagel : Altindische Grammatik (1896 ff.). Here it shows its wonderful capacity to assume features of other linguistic groups with which it came into contact, while at the same time changing the nature of these linguistic groups. We have thus the particular feature of developing the entire series of retroflex sounds as separate phonemes in Old Indo-Aryan when in origin they were confined to positional variants of dental sibilant and dental nasal phonemes. Linguistics would have us accept this feature as a development of the contacts between speakers of Old Indo-Aryan and those of Dravidian and Austro-Asiatic speakers, the latter two having this system of phonemes as original to their structures. Lexically too the Sanskrit lexicon has incorporated from the oldest strata of Vedic literature down to our own times lexemes from the other families of languages spoken in India, so that when we take a cross-section of a Sanskrit text and analyse its components we get not only successors of forms inherited from the parent Indo-European stock, but also adaptations of forms from Dravidian and Austro-Asiatic or Munda. Indeed this characteristic seems to have contributed a great deal to the development of Sanskrit vocabulary which has been indicated in some detail in Kuiper's

Proto-Munda Words in Sanskrit. Thus apart from the fact that Sanskrit has a continuous tradition in India witnessed by the compilation of Vedic hymns from Rg Veda down to our own times, and a voluminous literature only a part of which has been published and studied so far, it reveals within itself the social, philosophical ahd and cultural history of this long period of Indian proto and ancient history to the making up of our own times. This perhaps explains the special position our Constitution has given to Sanskrit as one of the fourteen languages of Modern India in Schedule VIII to the Constitution and indicated in Article 351 its dominant position as the source from which modern Indian languages derive, in particular those mentioned in the 8th Schedule.

2. To understand, however, the linguistic history which makes Sanskrit one of India's modern languages while it serves as the life-spring for most of them, it is essential to discuss the manner in which Sanskrit may be considered to be a living language and not a "dead" language, in the sense Latin or old Greek are looked upon. Already by the time Pāṇini and his predecessors set to study the structure of the language which formed the medium of communication at their time, they had a large body of ancient material primarily preserved in oral tradition, though writing might have been known and the texts recorded in such writing systems. It was this oral tradition which was faithfully preserved by a number of aids, passed from teacher to pupil in unending succession which gave that particular slant to Indian Linguistics: that language is an oral means of communication which, when subjected to analysis, provided the different levels which constiuted different aspects of descriptive linguistics, and it was an analysis of this utterance sequence which brought into operation the twin branches of phonetics and linguistic analysis: Śikṣā and Vyākaraṇa as two important ancillaries of Vedic tradition. Once recognizing the primary characteristics of language as a sequence of spoken utterances, the nature of language was understood and its exact description became possible, In descrbing Sanskrit Pāṇini and his school, predecessors as well as successors, have occasionally noted divergences from the described usage as peculiar to Vedic tradition or to the speech habits of different regions at that particular time. In following up these divergencies

our ancestors developed another technique which has not been recognized by modern scholars as the precursor of comparative grammar and establishing the notion of linguistic relationship. It is in this sense that the Prakrit grammars of Canda and Vararuci constitute landmarks in the history of linguistic studies in India. For the first time, ·he concept of a family of languages was set up with Sanskrit as its base, and the phonological correspondences between them was set up in relation to Sanskrit as their *Prakṛti* or source,

3. It is true that the evidence we have today of the kind of Middle Indo-Aryan languages is based primarily on inscriptional and religious literature such as the Inscriptions of Asoka, the Pali and Ardhamagadhi literatuɹes, which exhibit the fact that almost all expressions have a phonetic shape which corresponds closely to the descriptions given in the Pali or Prakrit grammars. However, the moment we go from the Purely prakrit inscriptions to others which are contemporaneous, but composed either in Sanskrit or a Mixed Language we see the emergence of Sanskrit as an active partner in the building up of modern and medieal languages, sharing a fairly large slice in percentage. Indeed even the earliest Dravidian inscriptions exhibit a fairly high percentage of Sanskrit vocabulary, which in the case of Kannada and Telugu could assume as much as 75%. By the end of the 10th century A. D. both Kannada and Telugu claim themselves as Prakrit languages derived from Sanskrit and their earliest grammars are actually composed in Sanskrit. With the emergence of the modern languages of northern India which linguists describe as Modern or New Indo-Aryan languages we also recognize the presence of the more than 50%Sanskrit loan-words in these compositions.

The question naturally arises as to the validity of a number of possible assumptions. Is the situation of Asokan inscriptions where all the forms attested are proper to the Middle Indo-Aryan setting the correct one regarding the state of spoken languages at that time ? If so it would be dificult to explain the many interesting situations discussed in Patanjali's Mahābhāsya (C. 150 B. C.) regarding the nature of Sanskrit as a means of communication among the

people in general. On the other hand after Rudrdāman's inscriptions composed entirely in Sanskrit (C. 150 A. D.) we have a whole body of inscriptions in mixed Prakrit and Sanskrit : does this represent a new emergence restoring Sanskrit to its original position of prestige such as the renaissance in Europe gave to Greek and Latin studies in the middle ages ? What was the nature of the actual language of communication in this period, apart from the highly sophisticated literature which it produced ?

For an analysis of this problem we have to take note of Sanskrit, Prakrit and modern Indian literature. We have on the one hand the whole group of texts belonging to the Pali and Ardhamagadhi canons which are composed entirely in a Middle Indo-Aryan form, eschewing the use of loan-words even when questions of philosophical nature are involved, involving technical terms derived no doubt from Old Indo-Aryan but found strictly in their Middle Indo-Aryan phonetic garb. On the other hand we have a fairly representative body of popular literature composed in what has subsequently been called Buddhist and Jain Sanskrit which exhibits divergences in phonological and morphological features which make this Sanskrit look like one of the less known Middle Indo-Aryan dialects. On a similar basis but on a larger scale we have the vast Purāṇa literature composed in a kind of Sanskrit which exhibits the same features as Buddhist and Jain Sanskrit. A consideration of these features has given rise to one theory that the Puranas were original composed in Prakrit but later on translated into Sanskrit.

One clear feature or fact emerges from this examination. Whether we call these languages by any given name or label such as Buddhist, Jain or Hindu Sanskrit, or classify them as mixed languaages, they show the same characteristics as the other members of the Dravidian family which exhibit similar features. And there is one common thread going though all of them and linking them up : the use of Sanskrit loans from the common to the most sophisticated level..

4. To understand the transformation of Sanskrit as Old Indo-Aryan to its Middle Indo-Aryan and New Indo-Aryan stages we

need consider two aspects ; the phonological and morphological on the one hand and the use of vocabulary or lexicon on the other. First regarding phonology we observe the diffrent stages through which inherited forms of New and Middle Indo-Aryan have passed in order to reach their particular shapes Even when such shapes have deviated from the canonical forms proper to Sanskrit we have already in the post-Pāṇinian period justifications for recognising or excluding forms like *āṇapayati* (for *ā-jñā-pa yati*) or *vaḍḍhati* (*vardhate*) as admissible ones in Sanskrit. That this becomes necessary is an indication of the fact that both forms have been in competition for some time and it requires some place and a little time for one of these to oust the other in the final emergence of a new system. Similarly while we note that in the general morphological pattern of Old Indo-Aryan the genitive singular of stems ending in *u* is-*os* (as in *bhikṣuḥ* : *bhikṣoḥ*), we find that Middle Indo-Aryan already exhibits a nuance *bhikkussa* which finds a close parallel in Buddhist Sanskrit *bhikṣu-sya* (and probably its immediate antecedent). The existence of these forms is a clear indication that when these forms developed there was much interplay between the Old and Middle Indo-Aryan tendencies : a fact which should be recognized for what it is worth. Old Indo-Aryan continued side by side with Middle Indo-Aryan and continued to live in a new style which represents what we have presumed to call Buddhist, Jain or 'Hindu' Sanskrit.

That Sanskrit continued to exert its influence also on the lexical side becomes apparent when we consider the etymologies of New Indo-Aryan lexemes. Hundreds of cases can be cited from modern dialectal studies in Indo-Aryan, where we find cognates for some of the New Indo-Aryan lexemes not in the classical Sanskrit lexicon, but in Vedic usages. How did this happen that lexical items to be found in Vedic literature, often restricted either to the Ṛg or Atharva Vedas, are not in evidence in the classical period but have survived in their modern forms in some dialects either in the Rajasthan or Bihar or Maharashtra ? This, to my mind, is an indirect proof of the 'living nature' of Sanskrit, which has the genius to Sanskritise other means of communication, while it can digest and make its own features which originally belong to other language systems.

Take an example, for instance, of words implying the notion of 'to bring' or 'to take away'. Sanskrit has, among a large group of synonymous expressions, the three characteristic verbal bases *nī-*, *hṛ-* and *lag*. The first two are attested in Sanskrit literature from the time of the Ṛgveda while the last has been in use only since the beginning of the Christiar era; nevertheless these are the basis of New Indo-Aryan forms for these concepts, *nī*-being used with prepositions in the peripheral languages (other than Koṅkani where *hṛ* is used with prepositions) while *lag* represents the whole of the central group of languages in Indo-Aryan. This would definitely indicate that the descendants of these forms have lived side by side and have been realised in their present shapes all over the wide country or area covered by them.

We may, therefore, come to the legitimate conclusion that examples of the 'mixed style' where Sanskrit and non-Sanskrit forms exist in the same utterance sequence was the original pattern of verbal eommunication, while the more formal aspect of communication was carried out in the style we come to associate with that of Middle Indo-Aryan literature. Indeed the discovery of a Prakrit language in the Niya documents shows how many languages, including certain features of Old Indo-Aryan, could exist side by side in the same official language. We should, therefore, avoid the use of a term 'hybrid' which, for want of a better one, the late Professor Edgerton used to describe the particular Sanskrit which Buddhists used in their popular Sanskrit texts. I have indicated elsewhere the perspective in which this language has to be considered: not as a representative of Old Indo-Aryan, but as one of Middle Indo-Aryan. This process, then, clearly shows why, even with the first specimens of New Indo-Aryan, in Bengal and in Maharashtra as in other parts of the country, we find the use of Sanskrit vocables as a normal and natural aspect of the New Indo-Aryan speech pattern. While technically they form a subsystem phonologically, for purposes of actual communication the speaker and hearer will not be aware of their separate status unless they are students of Sanskrit and Linguistics. Even in the speech of the most illiterate today we find numerous examples of the survival of genuine Sanskrit forms in a shape which corresponds more truly to the Old Indo-Aryan stage.

5. I would now like to draw your attention to the use of Sanskrit lexemes in two sets of situations: the first one is naturally contextual in the framework of Sanskrit literature: in other words the sets of contextual meanings developed by Sanskrit lexical units in a purely Sanskrit setting, that is within the history of Sanskrit literature. The second one is the use of these items in situations which occur in the modern Indian languages where they, in the course of historical transmission, developed nuances within the framework of its own post-Sanskritic literature. There are today hundreds of Sanskrit vocables in use within modern Indian languages; a large number of them exhibit series of significances which are attested within the history of Sanskrit itself. But there are numerous divergences from this set with reference to gender and meaning in the specialised situation within each language, for which no parallel can be cited. This constitutes what may be called the post-Sanskritic development of Sanskrit vocables in a purely modern setting in a non-Sanskrit context. In each language this development has taken place in a specific direction irrespective of developments in other regions, and consequently no sets of correspondences can be postulated. Much research requires to be done in this direction if the history of Sanskrit has to be written in its completeness. The fact that such development has taken place outside Sanskrit literature indicates that these Sanskrit words are not treated as loanwords but they form an integral part of the vocabulary of modern languages except in their phonetic shape, and consequently grow with the development within the language itself. A work in this direction was completed and presented a few years ago as a Ph. D. dissertation at the University of Poona on the history of such development within Marāthī in the Marāthī context. No doubt such studies have been extended to other modern Indo Aryan languages.

It is interesting to study these new developments of Sanskrit words in these new contexts. In the first place they indicate the manner in which, under specified linguistic situations, the words acquire new significances which may or may not be in consonance with the original history of these words. In the second place we may compare such developments within neighbouring languages to see if there is any pattern that emerges on regional or other lines. Finally we can study the bases of such shift in contextual meanings

which are not attested within the history of Sanskrit but outside it.

6. The proliferation of words in New aud Middle Indo-Aryan often arises from newer combinations of words which as independent forms are attested in the Sanskrit lexicon but not so in these particular combinations. The combinations may be with preverbs or complementary words in composition. When we consider the origin of such forms we have to have recourse to the doctrine which the Vārttikakāra and Patanjali teach us in the Mahābhāṣya. If such combination are not attested in the history of the Sanskrit lexicon we shall have to asume such eombinations at some period in the spoken laguages of some area where such forms have been later realised in their Middle or New Indo-Aryan garb. This is but one more evidence that what is not found in any Sanskrit lexicon or thesaurus, which is or will be based entirely on written records, does not cover the entire range of vocabulary which the spoken languages or dialects possess in their totality, and even this will not exhaust the possible range of lexical items. But one factor is all-important and that is the significance in which the community of speakers accept the usage of the individual item. Whatever the source of its creation, once the expression and its significanee is accepted by the community, it becomes an established item.

In this proliferation we find the means in which our new vocabulary can be advanced, but on this point I would like to reserve some statements later.

7. In a linguistic sense, therefore, Sanskrit may be said to be a living language, because its lexical items form more than 50% of the vocabulary of Modern Indian languages, and some of these items have further developed newer significances in their non-Sanskritic context. This would in consequence justify the inclusion of Sanskrit among the fourteen Indian languages.

8. If Sanskrit, Middle Indo-Aryan and New Indo-Aryan have developed side by side we must find some evidence of this in the vast literature which has been composed during the past two millennia. What is the situation like, for example in the Sanskrit epic ? And what does such study imply or indicate ? It is common knowledge that Sanskrit in its purest sense ceased to be a language of common understanding. Both Buddhist and Jain traditions insist on the fact that the teaching of the founders of these two great religions was transmitted to the popole in their own languages (S*akāya niruttiyaṁ* in

Pali). If this fact were admitted then Pali and Ardhamagadhi would have been the normal media of communication. But in structure they exhibit similar traits to literary Sanskrit and a style which is akin to that, making them creations of a highly trained literary group. They are as far removed from common speech as other items of Sanskrit literature. But when we come to the simpler epics and Purāṇas we are nearer the language of the people, and this Sanskrit, generally described as Epic Sanskrit, shows signs of reginal locutions. Those, who work with critical editing of Sanskrit texts from original manuscript sources, are well aware of the difficulties of constituting the oldest text on the basis of the variants recorded therein. Yet in such variants and their determinable sources we find examples of locutions which indicate the interaction of the Sanskrit idiom on the local idiom. One example of this may suffice to illustrate the problems I have in mind. In kinship statements in the Mahābhārata, which is also paralleled by similar situations in the Rāmāyaṇa, the genitive of kinship has regular southern variants showing the dative of kinship : *pitā mama* in the North against *pitā mahyam* in the South. It is well known that in Dravidian languages the dative of relationship is the normal rule while in Indo-Aryan it is the genitive. It is obvious that the Southern manuscript tradition innovated these locutions in the earlier text when throughout there is the genitive in the remaining groups. This is but one illustration of how the regional idioms influenced the general pattern of expressions in Sanskrit.

A recognition of this is very essential when we consider the role that Sanskrit has to play in modern India. At a certain period in this country when Sanskrit was in the stage of being replaced by other related or unrelated language stocks as a common medium of communication, we must assume the presence of a large group of bilingual speakers whose mother tongue was slightly different from the standard Sanskrit which was used only as a means of communication among the *śiṣṭas* or elite. These latter, as bilingual, thought and dreamt in one language and used the other with facility but only through a process of unconscious translation. This explains the genesis of such locutions where Sanskrit corresponds closest to the local idiom. No one has studied this aspect from a linguistic point of view to estimate how far the mother tongue affects the

style in Sanskrit. We have today a large body of scholars who are quite proficient in the everyday uses of Sanskrit but they are supremely unconscious of the fact that at base is the process of translation, and the idioms which arise from this clearly indicate from which part of the country and from which particular linguistic stock the speaker or writer concerned hails. Beyond a superficial resemblance of style shared by individual speakers and writers is this unconscious assimilation of the local style which is clearly a valuable tool in identifying the 'culprit'. A whole new field of research is available to students of style and stylistics in unravelling the influence which non-Sanskrit has on the development of Sanskrit from Kālidāsa down to our own period. This will be valuable information gained for utilizing the results in the policy of integration and in the development of a national medium.

9. Coming to present day problems of language learning and language teaching, we notice that in spite of the recommendations made by the Sanskrit Commission the position of Sanskrit in High Schools and Universities is one which causes concern to all involved. In the three-language formula there is no place for Sanskrit and year by year the number of students taking up Sanskrit is falling down. Similarly our traditional studies have also failed to keep up, and the question is; how can Sanskrit, one of the fourteen recognized languages in the constitution, survive this negligence ? While scholarships are being provided at the high school and undergraduate classes for the pursuit of Hindi or other languages Sanskrit does not figure among them. It is crucial for the survival of Sanskrit that we should recognize it as a living language in the shape it has given to other modern languages and the vast lexical items which it has contributed to their life blood, either as inherited forms or as forming a subsystem of loanwords following a distinct phonemic pattern. It is essential that lovers of Sanskrit should not depend upon the State recognizing the importance of Sanskrit studies, but they should create an atmosphere where the individual relationship of each language to Sanskrit should be pinpointed by a study of the manner in which Sanskrit has been realised in its present form of a modern Indian language. In other words the interest should be from the known (the mother tongue) to the unknown or (the other tongue=Sanskrit). Once this

interest is created and suitable means provided for identifying the mother-tongue expressions with corresponding Sanskrit expressions, the progress of Sanskrit becomes phenomenal, for the interest of the pupil increases not only in his own mother tongue but in the target language as well. Sanskrit is living in the modern languages and the transition from one stage to the other will provide the necessary stimulus for each of us to acquire a fundamental mastery of the structure of Sanskrit along with its vocabulary.

10. We have a story in the Panchatantra of how that work was composed to teach dull princes policy along with a knowledge of the language in the course of six months. It is a text which has been prescribed and studied in all parts of the country. But no one has made a linguistic study of this text for the purpose of teaching Sanskrit within six months and without pain. We have to provide programmed courses for teaching Sanskrit within two to three months, not six and yet no basic study of vocabulary and linguistic forms which really matter for communication have been made scientifically by utilizing modern techniques. The complications of Sanskrit formal grammar have often driven scholars to take up the study of Prakrits or modern European or Indian languages in lieu, and yet Sanskrit is not such a bogey if it can be presented in the manner in which Viṣṇuśarman composed the Pancatantra.

What we need today is enlightened approaches to Sanskrit study. Some would like to study the Bhagavadgītā in original ; others to read the Upaniṣads, despite the very good translation which our worthy President Dr. Radhakrishnan has provided for modern readers. Others would like to learn it for achieving a particular purpose. There cannot be a single system which can satisfy all these needs. But one thing underlies all this : the desire for a quick grasp of the essentials of the language and the linguistic feeling which gives us an insight for the particular purpose we have in acquiring Sanskrit. All the work that has been done in this direction is psychology-oriented. My plea here is that that should be combined with modern linguistic sophistications and the insights gained thereby in the functioning of language itself. If these intensive programmed courses are worked out with the necessary taped materials the number of people who can claim Sanskrit as one of

their mother-tongues could multiply without limit and the bogey of its being a difficult language laid down for ever.

11. I must refer at this stage to place given to Sanskrit under Section 351 of our Contitution. While considering the development of Hindi as the official language (and ultimately the national language) of India emphasis has been laid on this development through borrowing from Sanskrit and other Indian languages expressions needed to form our scientific and technical terminology. There has been no objection expressed or implied regarding taking loanwords from Sanskrit; the history of Sanskrit as well as the other Indian languages is a clear example of how that proliferation has taken place. But it must be clearly indicated at this point that proliferation was limited to small items over a long axis of time and consequently could enter the blood stream of each language. We are faced today with the creation of tens of thousands of lexical items within a very short period, a reversal of the process of history. We should, therefore, be extra-careful not to harm either the specific regional languages or the great Sanskrit from which they are to seek sustenance. It has been customary in the creation of these scientific and technical terms to take out words from the Sanskrit lexicon out of their contextual environment and without reference to the frequency of usage and give this specific technical or scientific significance. If this were limited to a few items over a long period of time there might be some success of their being accepted. It is well-known that each living cell is capable of absorbing only a limited quantity of food at a given period of time; if sustenance is the aim we must see that the life line is kept free to absorb as much as it normally can. In this process of adding to the technical and scientific vocabulary there is the immediate danger that the Sanskrit loan, whether attested or not in Sanskrit literature, acquires a significance outside the context of Sanskrit literature. When this is done in such large measure even in a simple subject at the high school level there is danger that Sanskrit will be hurt in so far as it is literary Sanskrit and the individual language wiil cease to absorb this large mass of new material without the necessary time to digest and make it a part and parcel of its live cells. Experience in other countries indicates that the actual percentage of live expressions will form but a very insignificant proportion of the new

creations, There is a real danger here to Sanskrit itself, because hundreds of Sanskrit words are to acquire, without the sanction of gradual usage, new significances which they never had in their Sanskrit setting. We as Sanskritists have a sacred dut, here to see that the great harm already done to this sacred language by our neglect and negligence is not further complicated by this additional burden without proper safeguards. Frequency counts have not been used in selecting Sanskrit vocables for this new function. In the history of Sanskrit itself, the number of technical terms for any given science have always been limited ; if it has to fulfil a function in modern times to serve as a handmaid to modern science and technology. Let Sanskrit go back to its unlimited capacity of absorbing expression from other languages and Sanskritise them : this is the smaller of the two evils.

12. One final aspect of the manner in which we can raise the status of Sanskrit needs to be considered here. There has been a long unbroken oral tradition which has been passed through regular transmission from teacher to pupil in an unending series which has to some extent preserved the glory of Sanskrit literature. This traditional study is now in the process of gradual extinction due to economic and other social pressures. Not even the steps which the Government of India have taken in establishing Sanskrit Universities and the Central Institute for Sanskrit at Tirupati can achieve the objective of preserving this traditional system. At best as one member of the Sanskrit Commission mentioned, this will be merely a museum piece. We cannot reproduce the social and other conditions which made possible the existence of this system. With the rapid development modern science and technology have made in the distribution of current knowledge, it is essential that the traditional system should be integrated with modern scientific approaches in the matter of teaching as well as learning, in extent as well as in depth, combining both systems. The need of the moment is to amalgamate these differing approaches and enliven the tradition so that it becomes a vital force which can make its effect felt on the everyday life of the people. Sanskrit provides the key to our social, political, and emotional integration, the thread which knits the diffeient language-entities into a single garland. Our framers of the Constitution have realised this fact by

giving an honoured place to Sanskrit in the 8th Schedule and in according to it the recognition as the source from which our great regional languages have secured their strength. What is needed is to make a scientific effort to teach Sanskrit not in its complicated structure but as a living medium as was done by Viṣṇuśarman in the Pancatantra, and bringing out its close relationship to the modern realisations of Sanskrit, to wit, the great regional languages of this wonderful country, including the representatives of the Dravidian family which have had a longer history than the New Indo-Aryan languages and which have integrated the Sanskrit stream into their own corpus in a manner which enabled them to claim descent from Sanskrit nearly a thousand years back. Herein lies both the strength and weakness of Sanskrit scholarship; catch hold of the strength and with the courage, wisdom and power drawn from this perennial source, develop our modern languages and make Sanskrit a worthy leader among the modern languages of India.

BRECHT'S THEATRE : A NEW APPROACH TO THE SANSKRIT DRAMA

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LADIES and Gentlemen,

Bertolt Brecht, the German playwright who died ten years ago, on 14th August 1956, at the age of 58, no longer needs an introduction to an Indian audience. For quite some time now he has been studied by Indian intellectuals both in English and, occasionally, in the German original, translations into Indian languages have been, or are being, completed, productions of his plays have been attempted, more, and more competent ones, are in the offing. Brecht is turning out to be one of the strongest western influences on the contemporary Indian theatre.

Still, and quite, naturally, his theoretical writings on the theatre have been some what neglected so far. They were produced much under the impression of Asian theatrical traditions ; given the attention they deserve, they might now in their turn help the present-day Asian theatre, and the Indian theatre in particular, to become fully aware of its own potentialities, instead of continuing to simply imitate, often without quite comprehending them, Western examples of various ages, countries, and standards. A revival of the Indian theatre will not be possible without taking into account the enormous vitality of the Sanskrit drama. Let it be told to the modernists : there is nothing more alive on the Indian stage today than the Sanskrit drama, provided that it is produced with a little less respect and a little more love, not so much as a piece of archaeology but as the piece of living theatre it was meant to be. Much injustice has been done to it in the past, especially by Western critics, by subjecting it to Aristotelian principles (Poetics, Chapters VI-XIX); it is the purpose of this lecture to show that Brecht's dramatic theory, which is inseparable from

its practical application on the Brechtian stage, offers a critical alternative, a new approach, which, being an amalgam of Western and Eastern thoughts, is bound to do more justice to the classical drama of India.

In theory and practice, Brecht has introduced, or rather re-introduced, into Western literary discussion the so-called "epic" style of the drama. This term has caused much controversy among our literary critics, many of whom still adhere to the strict, and often misunderstood, Aristotelian distinction between "the dramatic" and "the epic". The fusion of the two, which Brecht postulates, may not sound as controversial to Indian critics, for, according to A. Berriedale Keith, an authority on the Sanskrit drama, "the Indian theory of poetry does not admit any distinction in essence between the aesthetic pleasure produced by the drama and any other form of poetry". Still, it may be useful to us to distinguish between "the dramatic" and "the epic", abstract as these terms are, as the names for two fundamentally different creative attitudes. The "pure" dramatist, if he has ever existed, will delegate his authority to the characters he creates, or will at least make them his mouth-pieces ; he will be absorbed in, or, if you like, disappear *behind*, his work. His story-telling counterpart, on the other hand, will anxiously guard his epic omniscience and omnipotence, the attitude of "You'll be surprised at how many more things I have in store for you, if and when I decide to tell them to you", the epic poet will remain *above*, or *at a distance* from, his production. And it is this epic distance which Brecht introduces into his drama, for the play-wright as well as his audience. "Humen greatness, once a conception of spiritual reality, had", according to Herbert Ihering, "long ago become a name for everything bloated, indistinct, idealistic.. Greatness had to be replaced by a different concept. Instead of greatness. Brecht placed : *distance*...He wanted things to be accounted for. No sentimental trickery was suffered. This resulted in the "objective", the epic style".

The heading under which Breacht summarizes the artistic possibilities of creating distance is (in a not very satisfactory translation) alienation. Again and again, in his theoretical writings, Brecht's mind, never quite satisfied, spins around the "effect of alienation"— in his own language, "Verfremdungseffekt", or, a abbreviated, "V-Effekt"; to the creation of this effect he devotes most of his formal

experiments. "In short," he writes in one of his numerous attempts at defining the V-effect, "it is a technique of putting on dealings between men which are to be presented the stamp of the extra-ordinary, the thing in need of explanation, the not self-evident, not simply natural. It is the purpose of the effect to create for the spectator the possibility of productive criticism from the social point of view". Somewhere else, it is the stage-practitioner who speaks : "The description of the V-effect seems far more unnatural than putting it into practice. This way of playing has, of course, nothing to do with the customary "stylizing". On the contrary, the principal advantage of the epic theatre with its V-effect, which has the one purpose of showing the world as one that can be manipulated, is its very naturalness and earthliness, its sense of humour and its renunciation of all the mysticism that still sticks to the traditional theatre from days gone by". And : "In establishing new artistic principles and working out new methods of presentation, we must start from the imperative tasks of a time of epochal change, there emerges the possibility and necessity of a reorganization of society. All dealings among human beings are examined, everything must be seen from the social point of view."

What, then, is the *tertium comparationis*, the point of comparison, between Brecht' s theatre, with its attempted opening of the world to productive social criticism, and Indian classical drama, which, according to Keith, in the "rarified atmosphere" of an essentially Brahmanical culture, "aimed at the creation in the mind, of the audience of sentiment, and what was necessary for this end was all that was attempted?"

One may doubt the absoluteness of Keith' s statement, especially if one remembers the Vita's words in the "Mricchakatika", quoted by Keith as well as by S. C. Bhatt in a book on 'Drama in Ancient India':

Why talk of birth? Character alone counts.

In rich soil the thorn trees grow fastest.

Quite astonishingly, the same play, in the fourth act, speaks of the "social lie"; and Sharvilaka, setting about the liberation of his friend, the future shepherd-king Aryaka, exclaims, almost Brechtian in tone:

Now I will stir up my relatives, all the rabble
that have been knighted by the strength of their
own arms, the monarch' s own slaves, who are enraged
at the King because of infamous treatment......

The "Mricchakatika" does not seem to be exceptional. Even the serenity of Kalidasa's "Shakuntala" does not exclude the following piece of dialogue between the poor fisherman and the Superintendent of the City Police, taken from the Prelude to Act VI:

FISH. You see in me a poor man, who supports his family by catching fish with nets, hooks, and the like.

SUP. (laughing) A most refined occupation, certainly!

FISH. Blame me not for it, master.
The father's occupation, though despised
By others, casts no shame upon the son,
And he should not forsake it. Is the priest
Who kills the animal for sacrifice
Therefore deemed cruel ? Sure a low-born man
May, though a fisherman, be tender-hearted.

SUP. (probably a little impatient) Well, well ; go on with your story.

The two Constables, when their Superintendent has gone to see the King and keeps them waiting, seem to be somewhat infected :

FIRST CON. I say, Januka, the Superintendent is a long time away.

SECD CON. Aye, aye ; kings are not be got at so easily. Folks must bide the proper opportunity.

With all this evidenne, it can not be denied that, if there is any influence at all, it is not so much the contents and thought as the form and certain techniques of Indian classical drama which may have aroused Brecht curiosity. Brecht himself must have been aware of this ; in his "Little Organon for the Theatre", 42nd paragraph, he mentions musical and pantomimic V-effects used even today by the Asiatic theatre. "Undoubtedly, the V-effects prevented sympathetic implication ("Einfuehlung"), but...the social purposes of these old effects were completely different from ours". In an essay dealing, more specifically, with "Effects of Alienation in

Chinese Dramatic Art" he speaks of the difficulty of recognizing the V-effect of Chinese historionics as a "transportable technique", as an "artistic conception separable from the Chinese theatre". He then goes about describing the Chinese theatre and its social conception as something quite useless "at first sight" to the "realistic and revolutionary theatre" he has in mind. At second sight, however, the artistry prevailing on the Chinese stage, the "chilling" effect produced by the actor's keeping his distance from the figure he is to represent are worth a good deal of study.

Brecht never wrote a similar essay on the Indian theatre ; but there is proof that in his search for artistic impulses, which bridged centuries and continents, he did not fail to notice the attractions of Indian classical drama. I quote from the fragmentary "Song of the Playwright":

> I studied the presentations of the great feudal lords
> By the English, rich figures
> To whom the world is good for unfolding their grandeur.
> I studied the moralizing Spaniards
> The *Indians*, masters of beautiful sentiments
> And the Chinese, who present the families
> And the motley destinies in the cities.

With his praise of "the Indians", Brecht has entered his name into the list of German admirers of the Sanskrit drama, which includes such illustrious names as Goethe's, von Humboldt's and Schlegel's. If we take into account Brecht's artistic sincerity, his disgust at "general, sublime, ambiguous"—in short: untrue—statements, we have reason enough to believe that this is more than a casual, half-obligatory allusion. The question we should try to answer now is this : What are the characteristics the Sanskrit drama may have in common with Brecht's own dramatic theory and practice ? Let us anticipate the answers :

1. Indian classical drama is anti-illusionistic and conducive to alienation, because it is (a) largely epical and descriptive and (b) artistic and audience-conscious in its composition.
2. Its humanity becomes evident, above all, in its combination of realism and serenity.

We shall now try and furnish some proof of our propositions.

1a. The epical and descriptive character of Indian classical drama :

In his chapters on the origin of the Sanskrit drama, Keith has provided "abundant evidence of the strong influence on the development of the drama exercised by the recitation of the epics", especially the Ramayana, in the case of which this influence "appears in its full development". Brecht mentions epic recitals in a different context, calling them "theatralische Veranstaltungen", theatrical performances. That the drama "suffered... from its close dependence on the epic" is regretted by Keith; what is a source of regret to Keith might well have been a source of interest and inspiration to Brecht.

In fact, the drama of India has never quite freed itself from epic influence; looking for evidence, we need not turn to a play like the "Mahanataka", ascribed to Hanumant himself, which is indeed more of an epic than a drama. Epic elements of various kind are part and parcel of the average Sanskrit play. We are indeed tempted to say that what is turned into "action" in customary drama remains "story" in the classical drama of this country ; and most of the "story" parts will be of an introductory and preparatory nature : suddenly, as if impatient of any further delay, they will blossom out into lyrical passages of extreme beauty, for the composition of which the rest of the play seems a mere pretext. This preponderance and accentuation of lyrical "scenes" is reminiscent of the European opera: a form of art on which Brecht experimented a good deal; but he was too much of a dramatist par excellence to go as far as sacrificing "action" altogether (which the Sanskrit drama nearly does); besides, he was quite opposed to lyricism resulting in the creation of atmosphere. In his plays proper, Brecht distributes the dramatic, the epic, and, with certain restrictions, the lyrical components according to a rhythmic principle which in its turn is subservient to the production of alienation.

But let us return to the epic elements of the Sanskrit drama, which is interspersed, in the way described above, with a number of epic small forms, such as the "story" proper and the "report" with its variety, the dialogue-report. There are the stories of Karnapuraka, Vasantasena's mahout in the "Mricchakatika", of how he received Charudatta's coat ; and of Kaushiki in "Malavikagni-

mitra", who, interrupted only by the impatient exclamations of the King, gives such a vivid account of her brother's violent death that Malavika, terrified, has to be reminded by the Vidushaka that she is "talking of past events". Reports will often be found in the form of explanatory scenes, Vishkambhakas or Praveshakas, before or between acts, where they will serve to summarize the situation and, in an astonishingly sober and analytical manner, to set off, by way of contrast, another sentiment-producing climax. Many of you will remember the Young Brahman's report at the beginning of "Shakuntala", Act III :

> How wonderful is the power of King Dushyanta ! No sooner did he enter our hermitage, than we were able to proceed with our sacrificial rites, unmolested by the evil demons....

Further below, in all ill-feigned attempt at concealing the epic character of this scene, the author makes him turn to an imaginary partner off the stage :

> What say you ?—that Shakuntala is suffering from fever produced by exposure to the sun, and that this ointment is to cool her burning frame.

In the same way and for the same purpose, a "report" may be distributed on two or more characters. There is such a "dialogue-report" in the Prelude to Act IV of the same play. Priyamvada and Anasuya, Shakuntala's companions, are shown "in the act of gathering flowers".

PRI. ...I confess, however, that there is one point about which I am rather anxious. What, think you, will Father Kanwa say when he hears what has occured ?

ANA. In my opinion, he will approve the marriage.

PRI. ...What makes you think so ?

In this analysis of the situation, without in the least sacrificing the charm emanating from the two girl characters and the garden scenery, the attitude of mind is that of discussion and argumentation, as can be seen from the vocabulary prevailing: "there is one point...", "What, think you...", "In my opinion...", "What makes you think so ?"

The capture of Aryaka, in Act IV of the "Mricchakatika", is presented in the form of a Chulika, i.e. it is merely announced

backstage, although it is of extreme importance to the action. This may be due to certain taboos imposed on the Sanskrii drama, to, in H. H. Wilson's words, "that regard, indeed, for decorum, which even Voltaire thought might be sometimes dispensed with"; still, one cannot help thinking of Brecht's projections, which he will have thrown on a screen in corresponding situations. What happens in the Sanskrit drama is exactly the same minus the technical facilities of our time. The naming of acts, which is done in the "Mricchakatika", although, in Keith's opinion, "doubtless not by the poet", would be an epic device of the same category.

In close connection with the epical character of Indian classical drama should be seen its predilection for description. Undoubtedly this is another heritage from the epics; but whereas devices like the "story" and the "report" keep up, or even originate, the movement of the play, descriptive passages, mostly in verse, will bring it to a complete standstill. Keith praises Kalidasa's "power of description of all the stock elements of Indian scenery", and as an example of Svabhavokti, vivid description, presents the flight of the antelope pursued by Dushyanta in Act I of "Shakuntala":

> Aye and anon his graceful neck he bends
> To cast a glance at the pursuing car ;
> And dreading now the swift-descending shaft,
> Contracts into itself his slender frame ;
> About his path, in scattered fragments strewn,
> The half-chewed grass falls from his panting mouth;
> See ! in his airy bounds he seems to fly,
> And leaves no trace upon th' elastic turf.

This example must stand for many, among which is the endless description of Vasantsena' s house in Act IV of the "Mricchakatika". Most of the time, this kind of description is a challenge to the spectators' imagination; there are other descriptive passages, used as an accompaniment to, or commentary on, some pantomimic action presented on the stage. The Vita in the "Mricchakatika", Act, I :

> Vasantasena, stay, stay ! What are you doing ? For fear you quite forget your youthful bashfulness, throw up your feet

which are used to dancing, let your eyes roam with unsteady and excited side-glances and hurry along like a gazelle fearfully fleeing the pursuing hunters...

Sometimes the characters will comment on their own actions, such as the Maidservant in Act II of the same play :

My mistress's mother has sent me here on an errand. So I'll go in to see my mistress. (She walks about and looks around).

There my mistress is sitting and drawing something from memory. "I'm going closer".

The dissociation of action and speech and the consequent splitting of the actor's personality which take place here were of extreme interest to Brecht, as is witnessed in some of the grusha—scenes in the 'Caucasian Chalk Cirlce". The artist, in Brecht's own words, "becomes his own spectator". "Not for one moment will he allow a complete transformation into the figure...He merely has to indicate his figure...".

Keith describes a bas-relief from Sanchi representing a group of Kathakas, reciters, "who accompanied with music in some degree their recitations, danced, and indicated by gestures the sentiments of the characters they presented". This "indicating" attitude, having so much affinity with Brecht's "Gestus des Zeigens", has never ceased to be one of the main characteristics of Indian drama. And for Brecht, "to indicate is more than to be".

1b. Artistry and audience-consciousness :

The indicative attitude of Indian drama implies, furthermore, that throughout his performance the actor demonstrates that he remains conscious of the presence of spectators, or, according to Brecht, he "expresses that he knows he is watched '. In a way, he becomes the child that "shows off" in the company of grown-ups—the German "sich aufspielen" can not be rendered into English—, with the fundamental difference, of course, that the child's naivety is replaced by the elaborated naivety of the artist. Indian classical drama is "play" in the intrinsic sense of the word : play with the audience, play with the play itself.

In this connection, Brecht's indebtedness becomes quite evident. In his own words, the "epic theatre, as far as its style is

concerned, is nothing particularly new. With its exhibitional character"—in the original, "Ausstellungscharakater", a term which corresponds to our "indicative attitude"—"and its emphasis on the artistic it is related to the ancient Asiatic theatre". Brecht's fundamental problem as a creative dramatist, and perhaps his dilemma, was how to give his productions, burdened as they were to be with social criticism, the lightness of "play"."And with all this", he comlains,"it is the difficulty in art that it has to do its business, even the most hopeless one, with complete lightness". And, in the 77th paragraph of his "Little Organon" : "...for the lightest way of existence is in art".

In the Sanskrit drama, the discussion of the art of histrionics, initiated by the Natyashastra, is continued on the stage itself.

> Should she really but have changed her voice ? That would be strange. On the other hand, what is strange about it ? She is at home on the stage, has adopted the principles of the art, is skilled in all kinds of make-believe. In this way she has developed her vocal resources to artistic perfection.

In this matter-of-fact remark of the Vita on Vasantasena, the heroine of the "Mricchakatika", and many others similar in content and tone, it seems as if the artists wanted to keep the audience aware of the fact that there would be no creation of sentiment without a good deal of solid stage—workmanship. There is a play in the play in Act III of Harsha's "Priyadarshika" and a music contest in Acts I and II of Kālidāsa's "Malavikagnimitra", both of which draw critical comments from the audience on the stage ; and in the Prelude to Act III of "Vikramorvashi" there is a critical discussion of the heavenly performance in which the heroine took part, carried out by two of Bharata's disciples, who give themselves the air of perfect knowers-how :

PALLAVA ...in the performance...Urvashi was absorbed in the various sentiments, but—

GALAVA The concluding part of your statement implies a certain fault.

PALLAVA. That's right. There was a certain fault due to Urvashi's inattention.

THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

PROF. NAGENDRA,
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in some cases at least, that the Sutradhara, the director, at the end of the Prologue, changes into one of the characters without leaving the stage. This open transformation is one of Brecht's favourite devices, described by him, for instance, in connection with his "Antigone" adaption.

Artistry and audience consciousness required, of the playwright as well as the actor, an attitude which is fundamentally ironic. This irony is shared by Brecht and the Indian drama : but in the case of the latter it is the ironic contrast between the world of reality and the world of artistic play which prevails, whereas Brecht tries to exhibit the ironic contrast between the world as it is and the world as, in Brecht's opinion, it should—or will ?—be.

2. Realism and serenity

Keith claims that the Sanskrit dramatists "make no attempt at realism". Undoubtedly, "realism" is a term much misunderstood. Let us use it as Brecht did : in the sense of an artistically true presentation of human nature. According to Brecht, "the truly cultivated theatre will not have to purchase its realism at the cost of its artistic beauty...The theatre disposes of the delicate colour, the pleasant and significant grouping, original gestures, in short : style; it has sense of humour, imagination and wisdom to master ugliness".

S C. Bhatt has pointed out that much of the realism in Indian classical drama is due to the humanization of the heroes and heroines of the epics. This most probably refers to scenes like the one in which Shakuntala's mantle is caught in a bush; she leaves the stage only "after making pretexts for delay, that she may steal glances at the King". Even the Buddha, it seems, is not spared:

> Feigned is thy trance; of what fair one dost thou think ?
> opening line of Harsha's "Nagananda". is the···

The lion's share of the realism in the Sanskrit drama, however, is taken by the Vidushaka, the Sancho Panza of the Indian theatre, whose relation to the Nayaka, the hero, is the same even in details as that of his European counterpart to the immortal Don Quijote. "Friend, thanks God ! Good news for you !" exclaims Charudatta in the "Mricchakatika", just after having become a victim of theft. And the Vidushaka replies: "What ? Has he really stolen it ?",

CHAR. He has !

VID. And still good news !

CHAR. Because he did not leave without having achieved his purpose.

Keith finds Charudatta's character "attractive in the extreme"; we believe that this is nobility which would be rather unbearable without the Vidushaka's contrasting sobriety and sense of humour. We sympathize with his colleague in "Shakuntala", who, while the king addresses "a few words of reproof" to Shakuntala's rediscovered ring, is afraid his master might be "going stark mad" and complains that he "must stand here to be devoured by hunger, whilst he goes on in this sentimental strain".

Brecht "studying the Indians", must have seen all this, and much more. He must also have been aware, more than anybody else, of the fundamental differences between the two theatres: the opposite valuation of plote and atmosphere, for instance; he must have realized what he failed to achieve although he considered it the ultimate objective of his own experimenting : the serenity, which does not admit of tragedy in Indian drama and which is the reflection of Indian religiosity and humanity in Indian art.

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SOME classics no doubt, exist on other fine arts as well—eg.. on Music and Painting, on Sculpture and Architecture ; yet the fundamentals of Indian Aesthetics have been discussed invariably in the works on Poetics. Consequently, the broader concepts of aesthetic experience have been defined mainly in the context of 'Rasa' which, by and large, constitutes the esssence of poetic experience according to the Indian theory of Poetry and Art. Originally, Rasa constitued the basic quality of a dramatic work—then it infiltrated into Poetry and from Poetry to other forms of art like Music and Painting. Thus, we have primarily to concentrate on the analysis of the constituents of Rasa in order to arrive at a proper definition of the nature of aesthetic experience in Indian Poetics.

For the earlier writers from Bharat to Bhamaha etc., Rasa was an objective concept signifying an aesthetic situation in a drama or an aesthetic expression in a poetic composition. But under the impact of the Advaita philosophy of the Shaivite school headed by Abhinava Gupta, it assumed a purely subjective character. An aesthetic situation, according to Abhinava, was a part of drama, an aesthetic expression was a piece of poetry—and the experience thereof was Rasa. The views of these scholars from Abhinava to Vishwa Nath who have unequivocally defined Rasa as an aesthetic experience can be summed up as follows :

(i) The aesthetic experience is based primarily on *human emotions. It is essentially pleasurable—it is a state of bliss, a state of self-realization or self-fulfilment.

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*I am deliberately using this broad and rather unusual expression because neither of the other two synonyms—the 'material' and the 'physical' can serve our purpose in the present context.

emotional experience of the dramatic character, then the whole thing will result in utter confusion. The love-scenes of Rama and Sita—or even of any other couple will evoke in our minds unpleasant reactions—feelings of embarrassment or disgust at a public demonstraion of a purely private experience. Surely, that cannot be an aesthetic experience.

It is, therefore, clear beyond doubt that an aesthetic experience, though based primarily on human emotions, is not identical with our usual emotional experience; it is neither a personal experience—direct or indirect, nor is it a psycho-physical reaction to the emotional experiences of the dramatic characters. The aesthetic experience is based on human emotions and yet it is distinct from a human emotion—this may sound like a paradox, but it is not. The aesthetic experience is not the experience of a personal emotion, it is the experience of a universalized or liberated emotion; it is an experience of a liberated state of mind and is free from egoistic interests which ultimately leave a bad taste in the mouth: and as such it is a pleasant experience. It is a feeling of self-realization or self-fulfilment through sublimated human emotions embodied in the works of art. This feeling of self-fulfilment is possible through other media as well—e.g. through fruitful action, through dedication or through meditation, but that is not an aesthetic experience. For aesthetic experience, the basis of human emotions and art-stimuli is essential. In short, it is the experience of an impersonal emotion realized in a liberated state of the psyche.

2. Is the aesthetic exprience es entially pleasant ?

This ia a major but highly controversial subject in Poetics. It is not denied that aesthetic experience is often pleasant but the point at issue is whether it is essentially and invariably pleasant i.e. whether the exprience of tragic emotions as well is pleasant. Although the majority of thinkers in India and the West are in favour of the pleasure-principle, yet the opposition too has been quite aggressive and is becoming more so in the present age. I have traversed through the vast regions of criticism from Bharata down to the most significant thinkers of our century in India and from Plato to I.A, Richards and a few other master-minds in the West—and treated this subject in detail elsewhere. But I shall save you

the strain of this long and tiresome journey and present in a nutshell the most representative views on the problem.

(1) The aesthetic experience is verily a state of bliss which is broadly speaking of two kinds—(a) the serene joy of the spirit or the inner consciousness and (b) the psychic pleasure. There is also a third category—the entertainment, which has developed an inferior connotation associated with things of play. Yet that too cannot be ruled out in the context of art which has always aimed at entertainment as well—directly or indirectly. In all these three shades of meaning pleasure is the common factor i.e. the aesthetic experience whether it is a kind serene spiritual bliss or a refined mental gratification or, still lower, an entertainment—is a pleasant experience.

(2) It is both pleasant and unpleasant according to the theme of the work of art : pleasant themes please and unpleasant themes ruffle or depress the reader.

(3) It is a mixture ef pleasant and unpleasant reactions : all our emotions are a mixture of pleasure and pain in varying proportions and as such the aesthetic experience, based on them, also contains elements of pleasure and pain in its texture.

(4) It is neither pleasant nor painful : it is a state of liberation of the psyche in which the joys and sorrows of the individual ego and the resultant pleasure and pain completely disappear leaving in their wake a feeling of perfect mental equillibrium.

(5) The aesthetic pleasure is not a simple experience but a pattern of experiences characterized by a subtle synthesis of several, and quite often, conflicting impulses.

We shall have to examine these closely before we can arrive at a tangible conclusion. For certain obvious reasons, I shall start with the thesis No. 2 : viz., the aesthetic experience can be both pleasant and unpleasant according to the nature of the basic emotion underlying a work of art. Our first reaction is that the experience of a tragic art should be painful as a matter of course. But, there are strong reasons to refute it. The aversion of the human mind to pain is so natural and strong that nobody in his senses will spend his time and money just to gain a painful experience. It is true that quite often we face unhappy situations—may sometimes even court them in our life. The craving of the mystic poets for

(ii) The state of bliss is pervaded by a feeling of spiritual illumination and is mostly free from sensual elements. The physical emotions shake off their sordid attributes when they are converted into artistic emotions—they are freed from the limitations of time and space and are universalized. Consequently, they cease to be a part of the direct physical experince of the spectator, raise him above the petty mundane experiences of the self—refine his sensibility and sublimate his consciousness.

Nevertheless, it is not a state of pure spiritual bliss, because it is neither a permanent state of joy nor is it completely purged of the material concomitants.

Thus, according to Indian poetics, the aesthetic experience is a state of transcendental joy, or a state of self-fulfilment if we choose to use a more secular expression, achieved by means of art though the medium of sublimated emotions.

These concepts are, however, all exposed to criticism in the modern age and three fundamental questions arise in the mind of a modern thinker in this context almost spontaneously :

(i) What is the relationship between an emotional experience and an aesthetic exprience ?

(ii) Is the aesthetic experienee pleasurable essentially and invariably ?

(iii) If it is so, then what is the nature of this (aesthetic) plaeasure ?

A student of art today cannot feel satisfied unless these questions are suitably answered. It is, therefore, inevitable to resolve them in terms of the modern theories of art and criticism.

(i) What is the relationship between an emotional experience and an aesthetic experience ?

The aesthetic experience is primarily based on emotion. It is not possible to conceive of a form of beauty without some finer threads of emotional associations, direct or indirect—patent or latent. The majority of Indian art-critics are agreed upon the interrelationship of the artistic emotion and the human emotion: *na bhavahinosti raso na bhavo rasavarjitah* i.e.—The Rasa is never without an emotional basis—nor can an artistic emotion exist without Rasa. Yet the artistic emotion is distinct from the human emotion and the two can not be identical under any circumstances. The basic

emotions underlying the aesthetic exprience, according to Indian Poetics, can be divided into two categories: emotions like love, wonder, courage and humour are pleasurable whereas the others like pathos, anger, terror and horror are painful in life. But when they form the material-basis of art, they all lose their sting and the element of pain is extracted invariably. The experience of a pathetic situation in art is not at any rate painful as it is in life. The pathetic sentiment has been purged of its venom during the process of artistic creation. Thus, it does not require any great effort to prove that the artistic emotion is not identical with human emotion as such.

The normal human experience is either the experience of our own self or the experience of another person reacting on us through empathy. The experience of our own self can be two-fold—(i) direct and (ii) indirect or reflex. The aesthetic experience is not direct, we have just proved. Can it not be a reflex experience ? The reflex experience is one which recurs in our consciousness without (or in the absence of) the direct stimulus. Broadly speaking,. it is the reminiscence of a direct experience. Now, the aes hetic experience ia not the reminiscence of a direct experience because even the reminiscences have positive personal associations—they are pleasurable or painful according to the nature of the original experience. For example, the reminiscences of a happy union are pleasurable and those of a situation of seperation or bereavement are painful inspite of the distance in time and the indirectness of the experience. The intensity is very much mitigated and the sting is considerably reduced, yet the element of pain in the latter does not disappear. Thus, the aesthetic experience is neither a direct nor a reflex experience of a personal character. For example, while watching the IV Act in Kalidasa's 'The Abhijnana Shakuntalam', the aesthetic experience comes to us not in the form of a direct suffering of the pangs of separation from our own daughter—nor is it a reminiscence of a past suffering. Is that, then, a vicarious experience—i. e. is it the reaction of another person's emotional experience, say of Kanva's emotional suffering presented on the stage—in the above context ? This question has been effectively answered by Bhatta Nayaka. If the experience of the spectator is to be explained in terms of his reaction to the

emotional experience of the dramatic character, then the whole thing will result in utter confusion. The love-scenes of Rama and Sita—or even of any other couple will evoke in our minds unpleasant reactions—feelings of embarrassment or disgust at a public demonstraion of a purely private experience. Surely, that cannot be an aesthetic experience.

It is, therefore, clear beyond doubt that an aesthetic experience, though based primarily on human emotions, is not identical with our usual emotional experience; it is neither a personal experience—direct or indirect, nor is it a psycho-physical reaction to the emotional experiences of the dramatic characters. The aesthetic experience is based on human emotions and yet it is distinct from a human emotion—this may sound like a paradox, but it is not. The aesthetic experience is not the experience of a personal emotion, it is the experience of a universalized or liberated emotion; it is an experience of a liberated state of mind and is free from egoistic interests which ultimately leave a bad taste in the mouth: and as such it is a pleasant experience. It is a feeling of self-realization or self-fulfilment through sublimated human emotions embodied in the works of art. This feeling of self-fulfilment is possible through other media as well—e.g. through fruitful action, through dedication or through meditation, but that is not an aesthetic experience. For aesthetic experience, the basis of human emotions and art-stimuli is essential. In short, it is the experience of an impersonal emotion realized in a liberated state of the psyche.

2. Is the aesthetic exprience es entially pleasant ?

This ia a major but highly controversial subject in Poetics. It is not denied that aesthetic experience is often pleasant but the point at issue is whether it is essentially and invariably pleasant i.e. whether the exprience of tragic emotions as well is pleasant. Although the majority of thinkers in India and the West are in favour of the pleasure-principle, yet the opposition too has been quite aggressive and is becoming more so in the present age. I have traversed through the vast regions of criticism from Bharata down to the most significant thinkers of our century in India and from Plato to I.A, Richards and a few other master-minds in the West—and treated this subject in detail elsewhere. But I shall save you

the strain of this long and tiresome journey and present in a nutshell the most representative views on the problem.

(1) The aesthetic experience is verily a state of bliss which is broadly speaking of two kinds—(a) the serene joy of the spirit or the inner consciousness and (b) the psychic pleasure. There is also a third category—the entertainment, which has developed an inferior connotation associated with things of play. Yet that too cannot be ruled out in the context of art which has always aimed at entertainment as well—directly or indirectly. In all these three shades of meaning pleasure is the common factor i.e. the aesthetic experience whether it is a kind serene spiritual bliss or a refined mental gratification or, still lower, an entertainment—is a pleasant experience.

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We shall have to examine these closely before we can arrive at a tangible conclusion. For certain obvious reasons, I shall start with the thesis No. 2 : viz., the aesthetic experience can be both pleasant and unpleasant according to the nature of the basic emotion underlying a work of art. Our first reaction is that the experience of a tragic art should be painful as a matter of course. But, there are strong reasons to refute it. The aversion of the human mind to pain is so natural and strong that nobody in his senses will spend his time and money just to gain a painful experience. It is true that quite often we face unhappy situations—may sometimes even court them in our life. The craving of the mystic poets for

pain is well known and the Buddhist philosophers have extolled pain as one of the Supreme Truths, yet on a closer analysis it is not difficult to ascertain that here also Pain is a means and not the end by itself. The mystic craves for Pain because it porvides him the opportunity for enjoying a communion with that eternal Object of Love. So also, in the Buddhist philosophy, Pain has been considered a Supreme Truth because ultimately it is through the negation of Pain that we attain Nirvana : thus, there too, it is the negation of Pain and not Pain itself, which is the ultimate target. And then, the reader or the spectator is neither a mystic nor a philosopher : it can never be established that he goes to witness a tragedy for the sake of a tragic experience—mystic or philosophical.

The argument that the experience of a tragic theme is by itself painful and yet the reader or the spectator is attracted towards it for the love of its artistic merits is also untenable in the final analysis. (a) The grief or terror, if there is really a feeling like that, emnating from violent tragic situations should be so powerful that all literary graces—the figures of speech, the rhythm, the musical qualities of the verse, or the embellishments of the stage—will not be adequate to relieve it. (b) Then, a divided concept of the underlying tragic emotions and the artistic qualities as separate entities is unwarranted : Poetics and Psychology both would reject such a concept as out of date. The common man is not really sensible to these subtler graces of art and the art connoisseur can not be satisfied just with the external embellishments of the poetic or the histrionic craft. (c) If we admit of a variety in the nature of the aesthetic experience on the basis of the difference in the underlying emotions, the indivisibility of this experience is negated.

Let us now examine the third and the fifth alternatives which define the artistic emotion as a complex experience. Whereas the exponents of the former talk only of a mixture of pleasure and pain, the modern psychologists think in terms of 'a pattern of experiences'. These concepts were not unknown to the Indian thinker, but in his view this admixture or complex pattern is a part of the process of contemplation only and does not extend to the point of culmination where the diversity of psychic actions is resolved into a unified experience. In the creative process,

the artist does pass through varied experiences, pleasant as well as unpleasant, but ultimately he succeeds in effecting a harmonious fusion of all these experiences--and that is called art. Without this fusion the artistic creation is abortive i.e. art is born invariably out of harmony or harmonious fusion. Similarly, in the process of artistic appreciation, we have a flux of varied experiences of different nature which ultimately formulate into a pattern, and our ultimate experience is the experience of this pattern which, though complex, is a harmonious whole (—otherwise it will be an abortive production and not a work of art). To sum up: the theories which define the aesthetic experience as a mixed experience or a pattern of experiences are tenable only so far as they apply to the process; at the point of culmination, the experience is not mixed or divided but unified and harmonized—which has been described by I.A. Richards as 'a systamatization of impulses'. Quite obviously, this systematization of impulses is a state of happiness or atleast a pre-condition of happiness. Richards and several other significant critics don't wish to call it a 'pleasure' but they admit atleast indirectly that it is a state of gratification : a state of mind when we feel gratified and fulfilled.

Thus, the arguments against the essentially gratifying character of the aesthetic experience do not hold ground in the ultimate analysis.

3. What is the nature of this pleasure ?

I confess that 'pleasure' is a weak term and mostly conveys a sordid meaning, yet there is no other word in the English language and as such this word is being used broadly to denote the whole range of gratifying experiences of the human psyche from the sensual to the spiritual pleasures.)

Quite obviously, the pleasant experience or pleasure also is of different kinds and has different levels of quality and our definition of the aesthetic experience will remain incomplete until we have analysed the nature of the pleasure implied therein. Here again, we have to traverse through the vast realms of Indian and Western Poetics to arrive at some positive conclusions. But I shall again save you the fatigue of a strenuous journey and present in brief the results of these age-long researches of the Indian and Western masters.

(i) The aesthetic pleasure is a kind of psycho-physical pleasure. Plato among the ancients and Marx and Freud among the modern thinkers have propounded this view, of course, in their own and entirely different ways .

(ii) The aesthetic pleasure is a kind of spiritual pleasure. The leaders of Sanskrit Poetics like Abhinava Gupta and Jagannatha on the one hand and the Idealist Philosophers in the West—Plotinus among the ancients and Kant and Hegel among the moderns—subscribe to this view.

(iii) The aesthetic pleasure is really a pleasure of imagination. This concept has its seeds in Aristotle's Poetics, was presented in a clear form by Addison in the 18th century and was ultimately given a philosophical orientation by Croce who enterpreted it as a pleasure of 'intuition' in the 20th century.

(iv) The aesthetic pleasure is a specific and unique pleasure, distinct from all other kinds of pleasures—material as well as spiritual, It is an absolute experience incapable of being explained in terms of the material expereince. Although this concept is very old, it was presented from a new angle by A.C. Bradley, Clive Bell and other aesthetes in the beginning of the 20th century. There is an element of mysticism or at least mystery in this concept and Richards has discovered positive traces of the mystical theories of Kant and Hegel, Yet, it will not be correct to identify this concept of the 'specific' or the 'unique' experience with spiritual joy, because according to the aesthetes this 'specific' expreince of art is different not only from the material pleasure, but from the common conception of spiritual joy as well.

Let us now start from the end, because this last concept, in spite of the support of an age-long tradition, seems to be more vulnerable than others. All the arguments given in favour of the specific character of an aesthetic experience make it clear that it is different from (i) a direct or indirect psycho-physical experience, (ii) from a purely intellectual experience such as the experience of solving a problem or proving a hypothesis, as also (iii) from a spiritual experience : the yogic experience, for example. But this does not prove that it can not be explained in terms of the usual experiences of the human mind—that it is not an experience of this world. It contains sensuos as well as intellectual elements and for

those who believe in the existence of Soul it also contains an element of the spiritual experience. The pattern of this experience is different from the other categories of usual experiences, but its ingredients are not essentially different. Consequently, although different in form, it does differ from them in nature. After all, a detached experience or an impersonal or universalized experience is also a sublimated form of the psyco-physical experience. Dr. I.A. Richards has rightly argued that in the entire process of an aesthetic experience or appreciation, our sense-organs, mind and intellect serve as the inevitable media and, therefore, so long as we do not discover a separate 'specific' sense-organ for the perception of an aesthetic phenomenon, it will be illogical to conceive of the aesthetic emotion as a 'unique' experience. And, that puts an end to the aesthetic theory with all its ingenuities.

The aesthetic pleasure is a pleasure of imagination.—This is only a partial truth. Here, the most significant fact in the context of art, namely, that the humau emotions form the substratum of the aesthetic experience, has been ignored. The basis of all art is our psychie life : imagination is its medium and an essential medium, without doubt. Yet, imagination alone cannot create art unless it has got the required material-basis in the form of human emotions. Therefore, the pleasure, derived from art is not just the pleasure of imagination. Imagination plays a very important part outside the range of art as well, for example, in scientific inventions. But the pleasure of imagination enjoyed by a scientist has little to do with an aesthetic experience. The exclamation of 'Ureka' cannot be poetry by any stretch of imagination. Besides, imagination itself is a faculty of the mind and as such an imaginative pleasure is also a mental-cum-intellectual experience and cannot be regarded as a separate category by itself.

The pleasure derived from art is a kind of spiritual joy—transcendental and super-sensuous. This is, I am afraid, a concept difficult to be proved or disproved by reason because the existence and conception of Soul are matters of permanent controversy. If I do not have necessary scientific data to prove the existence of Soul, I do not, at the same time, have any unimpeachable evidences to disprove it. I would, therefore, accept the traditional view. According to the Shaivite school of Indian

Philosophy, joy is in the nature of the Spirit and accordingly every form of pleasure, from the lowest to the highest, in one way or the other, is a manifestation of the Spirit. The difference between the psyco-physical and the spiritual joy is a difference of quality and not of essence and thereby the aesthetic pleasure is different from the spiritual pleasure only in quality, or only in so far as it is not an absolute state of bliss. The Vedanta also arrives at a similar conclusion from a different angle, of course, and defines sensual pleasure as a semblance of the Spiritual Bliss; as such aesthetic pleasure which is more or less purged of the taints of nature comes very near the Reality—or the Real Bliss. The Western Idealists define it as a transcendental experience—a joy which transcends the sense-organs and is felt by the spirit directly.

In this context, if we accept the definition of the Shaivite philosophers, then there can be no controversy because the difference between one kind of pleasure and another finally disappears in that case. But it is not so in practice, and we do make a distinction. Actually the idealists also do not identify aesthetic pleasure with spiritual joy. According to the Indian thinkers, it is very akin to and not identical with spiritual joy and the Western philosophers also believe that this experience passes through the psycho-physical media in the earlier stages although ultimately it transcends them all and enters into the purer regions of the Spirit. Thus, the difference between the two is evident—even though it may be adifference of quality and not of the essence. Whereas the spiritual joy is an absolute experience of the Supreme Self, the aesthetic pleasure has a material basis invariably. This material basis is extremely refined; it is an impersonal or universalized emotion no doubt, yet it is there because the impersonal or universalized experience also is in the ultimate analysis, a material experience and not a spiritual experience like a yogic experience of or the experience of religious meditation. It is a state of sublimation, a liberated state of the psyche, but it does not transcend the psyche.

Now remains the first thesis—viz. the aesthetic experience is a material pleasure. Although it has been presented rather crudely by its exponents—by Plato on the one hand and by Marx and Freud on the other, yet it becomes difficult to reject it. The pleasure

derived from art is a material pleasure: art is a material phenomenon and its enjoyment is obviously an experience of this world. Except in the case of mysticism, the subject-matter of all art consists of the normal human experiences, its tools and instruments also are the faculties of the mind viz imagination and intellect, the media of appeal are the sense-organs on the physical plane and the imaginative sensibility on the higher psychic plane, and lastly the recepient is the normal human being with all his impulses fully developed—and not a mystic or a devotee. Therefore, it is difficult to disbelieve that it is an experience of this world—a human experience. As such, we shell have to determine its character within the range and in the terms of psychology.

It will be more more fruitful to base our observations on a concrete work of art. Here is a beautiful verse of Bhavabhuti :

> Viniścetuṁ śakyo na sukhamiti vā duhkhamiti vā
> Pramoho nidrā vā kimu visavisarpah kimu madah
> Tava sparśe sparśe mama hi parimudhendriyagaṇo
> Vikāraścaitanyaṁ bhramayati ca sammilayati ca.
>
> (U.R. Ch, 1.35)

I cannot determine whether it is pleasure or pain, whether stupor or sleep; whether the working of poison, or intoxication: at every touch of thine a certain sensation comes upon me, which, stupefying all my senses now bewilders my consciousness, now paralyses it.

My experience on reading this poem is obviously pleasant : the theme is based on love and my mind passes through feelings of eros to attain this pleasant experience. Yet, the fact remains that there is an obvious difference between this experience and the actual experience of love and I am definitely conscious of this difference—every enlightened reader is. What is the nature of this difference ? The experience of love in life is direct; my ego is deeply involved and as such it is more intense. The expeirence of the love-poem is not a direct psycho-physical experience; my ego is not involved therein and, therefore, it is not as intense. It would be necessary to analyse the whole process of this artistic experience in order to explain its character. When I read this poem, the music of its words and rhythm immediately catch my ear; then almost imperceptibly its meaning reveals itself;

thereafter by the magic of the poetic diction i.c. by force of the imaginative use of the language, my imagination is activized, a number of free images are conjured up and under the stimilus of a variety of subsidiary emotions the instinct of love is roused in my consciousness which is liberated from the involvements of the ego because this love is not directed towards any particular object and is as such impersonal and detached; and finally the whole psycho-physical process culminates in a pleasant experience.

Human experience can be divided into three broad categories; sensual, mental and intellectual. This classification is obviously very broad and no category can be exclusive because of the extremely intricate and complex nature of our experiences wherein all the faculties of the human personality are simultaneously involved; yet it is, on the whole, a workable classifiction based on the primary use of one faculty or the other. The experience of a dear person's embrace is, for example, a sensual pleasure, its reminiscence is a mental pleasure and the experience of a successful solution of an emotional problem say of a precise definition of this particular emotional experience in the present context, is an intellectual pleasure. Where does the aesthetic pleasure derived from the love-poem quoted above fit in ? Surely, this is not the pleasure of a physical union with the beloved nor is it by any chance the pleasure of a successful analysis of an amorous experience. Is it then the experience of a pleasant reminiscence conjured up by our memory ? Here we have to pause for a while, because there is obviously some similarity: this experience of a pleasant reminiscence is like the aesthetic pleasure a reflex experience in which imagination plays the major part. Yet, the two are not identical, because a reminiscence is basically personal wherein our ego is invariably involved, it is not detached and is only partially liberated. It is an action of the memory which is a passive form of imagination and as such it is only a revival of a past experience—unlike the aesthetic experience which is an action of the active or the creative imagination and is, therefore, not just a revival but a re-creation of a past experience. The aesthetic experience is different from the experience of a reminiscence because of its impersonal and creative character, which purges it of all the base elements and imparts a pleasurable quality.

Thus the aesthetic experience is the pleasant experience of an imaginative recreation of an emotion. The process of imaginative recreation involves in some measure an action of the intellect as well, because after all it is to a certain degree a conscious and a deliberate activity at least in the later stages of composition or externalization to use Croce's expression. And, this brings in the intellectual element as well within the pattern of the aesthetic experience.

So, in the final analysis, the aesthetic experience can be defined as a complex experience, pleasant in essence, in which the emotional and intellectual elements are blended in a subtle harmony. It has a separate identity because it is more refined than the emotional pleasure and more colourful than the emotional pleasure.